Knowledge that Transforms

We study a model of film distribution and consumption. The studio can release two goods, a theatrical version and a video version, and has to decide on its versioning and sequencing strategy. In contrast with the previous literature, we allow for the possibility that some consumers may watch both versions. This simple extension leads to novel results. It now becomes optimal to introduce versioning if the goods are not too substitute for one another, even when production costs are zero (pure information goods). We also demonstrate that the simultaneous release of the versions (“day-and-date” strategy) can be optimal when the studio is integrated with the exhibition and distribution channels. In contrast, a sequential release (“video window” strategy) is typically the outcome when the studio negotiates with independent distributors and exhibitors.

By analyzing various alternative mixed channel structures composed of a monopoly manufacturer and online and offline outlets, we investigate how the specific channel structure and varying market co...

This paper describes the use of a marketing science model by Jetstar, a subsidiary of Australia's leading airline, Qantas, to effectively and profitably compete in the low-cost carrier marketplace. We trace the evolution of the Jetstar strategy from a baseline calibration of its initial position, to its efforts to attain price competitiveness and service parity, followed by its highly focused, cost-effective service delivery strategy. We develop a hierarchical model with parameters estimated at the individual level. This allows us to study not only how service design and pricing initiatives shift the perceived performance of Jetstar relative to its competitors but also how the airline can move market preferences toward areas in which it has competitive advantage. The contribution of the research is substantial. The Jetstar market share went from 14.0% to 18.1% during the first five quarterly waves of the research, and profits went from $79 million in 2006–2007, before the study was commissioned, to $124 million in 2008–2009.

We study how multiattribute product choices are affected by peer influence. We propose a two-stage conjoint-based approach to examine three behavioral mechanisms of peer influence. We find that when faced with information on peer choices, consumers update their attribute preferences in a Bayesian manner. This suggests that greater uncertainty in the attribute preferences of a focal consumer and lesser uncertainty in preferences of peers both lead to greater preference revision. Greater number of peers is associated with greater preference revision, although the extent of preference revision diminishes with increasing number of peers. Furthermore, to address the significant time and costs associated with collecting sociometric data, we estimate the accuracy of predicted consumer choices when peer influence data are unavailable. Online social network membership and frequency of peer interactions provide better proxies than more common demographic similarity measures. These findings have key implications, especially for word-of-mouth marketing.

Although prior literature has examined reactions to drastic negative news, we examine the situation in which decision makers receive contradictory information about products and they have to decide whether to persist with or abandon product usage. We investigate physician reactions to conflicting information concerning the cardiovascular risk of Avandia, a diabetes drug. We examine how beliefs about both drug effectiveness and drug safety are updated and speculate that experience, expertise, and self-efficacy impact how such information is integrated with current quality beliefs. Unlike previous Bayesian learning models, we consider that some signals, such as positive and negative news releases and the firm's marketing effort, may be biased in that they provide an opinionated point of view. The results show interesting differences in how physician types (specialists, hospital-based primary care physicians, heavy and light prescribers) update their beliefs and the information sources they use to do so. We find evidence that safety issues about Avandia resulted in spillover concern to close competitor Actos. The results have implication for determining who should be targeted and what vehicles should be used if a firm is faced with a situation where consumers are in a quandary because of receiving conflicting messages.

Service providers and their customers are sometimes victims of failures caused by exogenous factors such as unexpected bad weather, power outages, or labor strikes. When such no-fault failures occur in confined zones, service providers may confine customers against their will if making arrangements for them to leave is very costly. Such confinements, however, can result in severe pain and suffering, and customer complaints put regulators under pressure to pass a customer bill of rights that allows captive customers to abort failed services. This paper shows that service providers are better off preempting such laws by voluntarily allowing customers to escape the service under failure. Moreover, service providers can profit by targeting compensation to customers based on whether they use or leave the service under failure.

Whereas literature in marketing shows that individuals often use noncompensatory decision rules, existing research on dyadic choice is based on compensatory models. In this paper we present a dyadic consider-then-choose model that investigates both compensatory and noncompensatory aspects of the joint decision process. The intersection of individual consideration sets at the dyad level gives rise to dyadic decision processes (DDPs) where dyad members are in concordance or discordance about alternatives to consider. We empirically investigate the implications of different DDPs on outcomes such as decision efficiency and dyadic welfare. The methodological approach merges choice experiments with Bayesian statistical models to uncover nuances of the dyadic choice process. Data were collected using a multiphase nationwide study of 265 husband-and-wife dyads. Results across three categories indicate that both concordant and discordant dyads exist. Among concordant dyads, the noncompensatory dyads make quicker decisions that result in higher dyadic welfare. Among discordant dyads, those that restrict their consideration set make quicker decisions that result in higher welfare than those that expand their consideration set. These findings have important implications for buyers looking to maximize dyadic welfare when making joint choices and for sellers making pricing and new product design decisions.

In this paper, I study profitability of the name-your-own-price channel (NYOP) in the presence of risk-averse buyers. First, I provide conditions that guarantee that for the monopolistic seller the NYOP is more profitable than the posted price. Second, I consider a more competitive framework where buyers with rejected bids have access to an alternative option. I show that if under the posted-price scenario there are unserved customers with low valuations, then NYOP is more profitable than the posted price. Finally, I study whether adding the posted-price option to the NYOP will further increase the seller's profit and show that for the decreasing absolute risk-aversion utility and a monopolistic seller it does not. In the presence of an alternative option, the answer depends on whether buyers consider the posted-price option and the alternative option to be close substitutes or not. Adding the posted-price option will increase the profit in the former case and will not in the latter.

In marketing applications, it is common that some key covariates in a regression model, such as marketing mix variables or consumer profiles, are subject to missingness. The convenient method that excludes the consumers with missingness in any covariate can result in a substantial loss of efficiency and may lead to strong selection bias in the estimation of consumer preferences and sensitivities. To solve these problems, we propose a new Bayesian distribution-free approach, which can ensure that no customer is left behind in the analysis as a result of missing covariates. In this way, all customers are being considered in devising managerial policies. The proposed approach allows for flexible modeling of a joint distribution of multidimensional interrelated covariates that can contain both continuous and discrete variables. At the same time, it minimizes the impact of distributional assumptions involved in covariate modeling because the method does not require researchers to specify parametric distributions for covariates and can automatically generate suitable distributions for missing covariates. We have developed an efficient Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm for inference. Besides robustness and flexibility, the proposed approach reduces modeling and computational efforts associated with missing covariates and therefore makes the missing covariate problems easier to handle. We evaluate the performance of the proposed method using extensive simulation studies. We then illustrate the method in two real data examples in which missing covariates occur: a mixed multinomial logit discrete-choice model in a ketchup data set and a hierarchical probit purchase incidence model in a retail store data set. These analyses demonstrate that the proposed method overcomes several important limitations of existing approaches for solving missing covariate problems and offers opportunities to make better managerial decisions with the current available marketing databases. Although our applications focus on consumer-level data, the proposed method is general and can be applied to other marketing applications where other types of marketing players are the units of analysis.

This paper evaluates the joint impact of exclusive channels and revenue sharing on suppliers and retailers in a hybrid duopoly common retailer and exclusive channel model. The model bridges the gap in the literature on hybrid multichannel supply chains with bilateral complementary products and services with or without revenue sharing. The analysis indicates that, without revenue sharing, the suppliers are reluctant to form exclusive deals with the retailers; thus, no equilibrium results. With revenue sharing from the retailers to the suppliers, it can be an equilibrium strategy for the suppliers and retailers to form exclusive deals. Bargaining solutions are provided to determine the revenue sharing rates. Our additional results suggest forming exclusive deals becomes less desirable for the suppliers if revenue sharing is also in place under nonexclusivity. In our extended discussion, we also study the impact of channel asymmetry, an alternative model with fencing, composite package competition, and enhanced price-dependent revenue sharing.