Knowledge that Transforms

This study examined two alternative explanations for disparity in reported work-related experiences and outcomes between black and white managers: treatment discrimination because of race, and differences in human and social capital. Education and training, representing human capital, and racial similarity of network ties and proportion of strong ties, representing social capital, were used to predict whether human and social capital would mediate the relationship between race and the work-related experiences and outcomes under investigation. Results of a survey of black and white managers in a Fortune 500 financial services firm indicate that black managers reported a slower rate of promotion and less psychosocial support than white managers. Race had both a direct and an indirect effect on these outcomes. Participation in company training significantly predicted reported promotion rates, but race remained a significant predictor. Additional analysis revealed that race moderates the relationship between human capital and promotion rate and suggests a type of treatment discrimination against blacks. Contrary to predictions, social capital did not predict promotion rate, although social capital mediated the relationship between race and psychosocial support. Black managers reported having less social capital than whites, and social capital, in turn, was positively related to the receipt of psychosocial support. No differences were found between blacks and whites in their receipt of career-related support.

This article describes an holistic model of intervention geared to achieving transformational change by interweaving culture and structure through the warp and weft of leadership processes. That is, it brings together organization design and organization development by advocating a culturally sensitive approach to organization structuring. Our emphasis is on process throughout and our thesis is based on empirical evidence. We undertook a lengthy action research project (which we prefer to call “action ethnography”) at a large hospital trust in England. In the process of elaborating this field study, we move from an organization which was seen to be “gridlocked” and to have “lost its steering capacity”, through one which was bringing development and design together by way of pilot projects and transitional structures, to one where collective dialogue and debate finally led to some collective and sensible sensemaking. Exploring this relationship between culture and structure enables us to put people back into design and with them, their meanings, aspirations and assumptions. It also means that we are careful to avoid detailing specific design choices or offering organizational archetypes: this article is primarily about the process issues that surround redesign rather than organization design per se, as indeed any redesign is ultimately highly specific and context-driven. Instead, however, we articulate a four-phase change model, focusing on the delicate processes by which to reframe the culture-structure relationship, enabling an organization to move towards fundamental change.

In this research, we address the question: Why do many total quality management implementations fail? We develop a theoretical model in which the total quality management role for line employees results in a dual work design that requires both standardized production and continuous improvement. We propose that workers effectively integrate both types of work by switching, defined as shifting between standardized production and continuous work while on the job in response to situational cues. Alternatively, workers can respond to the challenges of a job involving both types of work by avoiding the continuous improvement work. Switching and avoidance are associated with different performance and attitudinal outcomes. We present evidence drawn from an exploratory field study which suggests that line employees who effectively integrate standardized production and continuous improvement work by switching experienced less job stress and greater job satisfaction. Moreover, plants which were more effective in total quality management performance had a greater proportion of line employees using switching.

Many researchers believe that bounded rationality prevents CEOs in large, complex, multidivisional (“M-form”) corporations from personally formulating division-level strategies. Instead, CEOs are seen as guiding a “bottom-up” process whereby division managers propose strategies for review and approval by the corporate office. Contrary to this view, we argue that CEOs in global media firms frequently drive strategy in a “top-down” manner, especially when their firms seek to expand by integrating the activities of two or more existing divisions. We refer to such firms as “Entrepreneurial M-forms,” and maintain that their reliance on an activist CEO offers benefits: (1) in turbulent environments, when the use of slow, bottom-up planning processes risks forfeiting first-mover advantages; and (2) when expansion entails major capital commitments, and division managers may be reluctant to accept the career risks associated with sponsorship of “bet-the-company” projects.