Knowledge that Transforms

How does managers' pursuit of their own intraorganizational interests affect decisions about what work to outsource and how to contract with vendors? I study this question using a qualitative study of outsourcing in the information technology department of a large financial services firm. Traditional transaction cost-based theories argue that decisions about which transactions to outsource should reflect the characteristics of those transactions, yet I find only a weak link between transaction characteristics and outsourcing decisions. Qualitative evidence suggests that managers' pursuit of their own intraorganizational interests helps to explain why outsourcing decisions were often divorced from transaction characteristics. I found that the consequences of outsourcing projects were consistent with the assumptions of transaction cost and capabilities-based theories: managers had less authority over outsourced projects than internal ones, those projects were subject to weaker administrative controls, and outsourced vendors provided different capabilities than internal suppliers. However, the way that those consequences were evaluated often reflected managers' own interests rather than those of the organization. I highlight three aspects of organizational structure that affected how managers evaluated outsourcing: the nature of differentiated goals and responsibilities, the administrative controls that managers faced, and the pressures caused by interdependent workflows within the organization. I also show how the distribution of authority and other resources shaped which projects were outsourced. The analysis highlights the value of understanding make-or-buy decisions as an endogenous consequence of the structure in which those decisions take place, rather than as isolated decisions that are maximized regardless of their context.

Two competing predictions about the effect of status on performance appear in the organizational theory and sociological literatures. On one hand, various researchers have asserted that status improves performance. This line of work emphasizes tangible and intangible resources that accrue to occupants of high-status positions and therefore pictures status as an asset. On the other hand, a second stream of research argues that status instead diminishes performance. This alternative line of work emphasizes complacency and distraction as deleterious processes that plague occupants of high-status positions and thus portrays status as a liability. Which of these two perspectives best characterizes the actual performance of individuals in a competitive setting? And are they in any way reconcilable? In this paper, we summarize these two perspectives and test them in two empirical settings: the Professional Golf Association (PGA) and the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR). Using panel data on the PGA Tour, we model golfers' strokes from par in each competition as a function of their status in the sport. Using similar data on NASCAR's Winston Cup Series, we model drivers' speed in the qualifying round as a function of their status in the sport. We find curvilinear effects of status in both contexts. Performance improves with status until a very high level of status is reached, after which performance wanes. This result not only concurs with the view that status brings tangible and intangible resources but also provides empirical support for the contention that status fosters dispositions and behaviors that ultimately erode performance.

An extensive body of knowledge exists on network outcomes and on how network structures may contribute to the creation of outcomes at different levels of analysis, but less attention has been paid to understanding how and why organizational networks emerge, evolve, and change. Improved understanding of network dynamics is important for several reasons, perhaps the most critical being that the understanding of network outcomes is only partial without an appreciation of the genesis of the network structures that resulted in such outcomes. To provide a context for the papers in this special issue, and with the broader goal of furthering network dynamics research, we present a framework that begins by discussing the meaning and role of network dynamics and goes on to identify the drivers and key dimensions of network change as well as the role of time in this process. We conclude with theoretical and methodological issues that researchers need to address in this domain.

This article comments on the behavioral theory of strategy advanced in Gavetti [Gavetti, G. 2012. Toward a behavioral theory of strategy. Organ. Sci. 23(1) 267–285]. His proposal offers valuable insights into the cognitive aspects of strategy when leaders are trying for big wins. It provides less guidance for understanding the actual achievement of success, partly because it underestimates the role of serendipity and of contextual factors illuminated by prior strategy research.

We develop a dynamic cognitive model of network activation and show that people at different status levels spontaneously activate, or call to mind, different subsections of their networks when faced with job threat. Using a multimethod approach (General Social Survey data and a laboratory experiment), we find that, under conditions of job threat, people with low status exhibit a winnowing response (i.e., activating smaller and tighter subsections of their networks), whereas people with high status exhibit a widening response (i.e., activating larger and less constrained subsections of their networks). We integrate traditional network theories with cognitive psychology, suggesting that cognitively activating social networks is a precondition to mobilizing them. One implication is that narrowing the network in response to threat might reduce low-status group members' access to new information, harming their chances of finding subsequent employment and exacerbating social inequality.

Whereas capability differences are known to impact governance decisions, what drives heterogeneity in firm capabilities? We propose that capability differences may arise from governance choices related to the focal activity and study how firms accumulate capabilities in the firm-specific, industry-specific, and occupational human capital necessary to perform knowledge work. We theorize that prior outsourcing decisions influence the development of firm- and industry-specific human capital and that buyer–supplier differences in the management of skilled employees can produce systematic differences in capabilities based on occupational human capital. Additionally, we explore some contingencies in the development of these types of human capital and their impacts on outsourcing knowledge work. These propositions are tested with a unique data set on the outsourcing of legal work involved in filing patents (i.e., patent prosecution).

Product innovation often hinges on technological changes in underlying components and architectures, requiring extensive coordination between upstream component development tasks and downstream product development tasks. We explore how differences in the ways in which firms are organized with respect to components affect their ability to manage technological change. We consider how firms are organized in terms of both division of labor and division of knowledge. We categorize product innovations according to whether they are enabled by changes in components or by changes in architectures. We test our predictions in the context of the global dynamic random access memory industry from 1974 to 2005, during which it transitioned through 12 distinct product generations. We find that vertically integrated firms had, on average, a faster time to market for new product generations than nonintegrated firms. The performance benefit that firms derived from vertical integration was greater when the new product generation was enabled by architectural change than when it was enabled by component change. We also find that although many nonintegrated firms extended their knowledge boundaries by developing knowledge of outsourced components, the performance benefits from such knowledge mostly accrued to “fully nonintegrated” firms (i.e., those that did not vertically integrate into any upstream component), rather than “partially integrated” firms (i.e., those that vertically integrated into some components but not others). Our study makes a strong case for the value of integrating the knowledge- and governance-based theoretical perspectives to broaden our examination of how firms organize for innovation and to uncover the technological and organizational sources of performance heterogeneity.

This paper offers an analytical structure to pinpoint the behavioral roots of superior performance, where “behavioral” denotes “being about mental processes.” Such roots are identified in behavioral deviations from market efficiency. The causes of these deviations are behavioral factors that bound firms' ability to pursue and compete for superior opportunities. Because these bounds are systematic and diffused among firms, they ensure that latent opportunities are not competed away. In this setting, the behavioral bases of superior performance stem from a superior ability to overcome focal behavioral bounds. This analytical structure is used to identify the mental processes especially important to firm performance that strategic leaders can reliably manage. Its key insight is that superior opportunities are cognitively distant. They rarely correspond to common ways of thinking. The reason for this is that it is necessary to overcome strong behavioral bounds to pursue these opportunities. This insight contrasts with mainstream behavioral approaches to strategy, which focus on the virtues of local action, and it has two implications: the behavioral essence of superior performance corresponds to strategic leaders' superior ability to manage the mental processes necessary to pursue cognitively distant opportunities; and pursuing the cognitively distant implies a more expansive conception of strategic agency (e.g., the role of strategic leaders) than is acknowledged by mainstream behavioral approaches to strategy. The challenges posed by this conception require a model of human cognition that goes beyond the understanding of bounded rationality that is diffused in current behavioral strategy research. The second part of the paper assesses the traits of a model of human mind that can support the behavioral conception of strategic agency advocated and proposes a unified model of the human mind that centers on associative processes.

A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly—particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt them and a well-developed understanding of how they work—remains incomplete. In this paper we suggest that competitively significant capabilities often rest on managerial practices that in turn rely on relational contracts (i.e., informal agreements sustained by the shadow of the future). We argue that one of the reasons these practices may be difficult to copy is that effective relational contracts must solve the twin problems of credibility and clarity and that although credibility might, in principle, be instantly acquired, clarity may take time to develop and may interact with credibility in complex ways so that relational contracts may often be difficult to build.