The collapse of the roof of the Baltimore & Ohio (B&O) Railroad Museum Roundhouse onto its collections during a snowstorm in 2003 provides a starting point for our exploration of the link between l...
The stated purpose of the investigations that invariably follow industrial, transportation, and mining disasters is to learn from those tragedies to prevent future tragedies. But does prior experience with disaster make organizations more capable of preventing future disasters? Do organizations learn from disasters experienced by other organizations? Do organizations learn differently from rare disasters than they do from common minor accidents? In its present state, the organizational safety literature is poorly equipped to answer these questions. The present work begins to address this gap by empirically examining how prior organizational experience with disaster affects the likelihood that organizations will experience future disasters. It approaches the issue in the context of fatal U.S. coal mining accidents from 1983 to 2006. The analysis demonstrates that organizations do learn to prevent future disasters through both direct and vicarious experience with disaster. It also indicates that the mechanisms through which organizations learn from disasters differ from those through which they learn from minor accidents.
We examine how executives' ambivalent evaluation of a strategic issue relates to organizational actions taken in response. Ambivalence occurs when a decision maker evaluates an issue as simultaneously positive and negative, a state that has received scant attention in organizational research. We integrate findings in social psychology with the behavioral theory of the firm to suggest how executives' ambivalence prompts wider and more vigorous search for action responses and enables broader participation. Data from a two-wave survey of 104 German CEOs who evaluated the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 and reported their organizations' responses show that organizations whose CEOs evaluated the event as both positive and negative were more likely to take action when both evaluations were also strongly held. The reported actions were also of greater scope, novelty, and riskiness. The study contributes to research on organizational decision making by theorizing the role of top executives' ambivalence and by providing a first systematic test of how ambivalence affects responses to strategic issues.
Organizations often experience difficulty when pursuing new technology. Large bodies of research have examined the behavioral, social, and cognitive forces that underlie this phenomenon; however, the role of an organization's identity remains relatively unexplored. Identity comprises insider and outsider perceptions of what is core about an organization. An identity has associated with it a set of norms that represent shared beliefs about legitimate behavior for an organization with that identity. In this paper, technologies that deviate from the expectations associated with an organization's identity are labeled identity-challenging technologies. Based on a comprehensive field-based case study of the entire life history of a company, identity-challenging technologies are found to be difficult to capitalize on for two reasons. First, identity serves as a filter, such that organizational members notice and interpret external stimuli in a manner consistent with the identity. As a result, identity-challenging technological opportunities may be missed. Second, because identity becomes intertwined in the routines, procedures, and beliefs of both organizational and external constituents, explicit efforts to shift identity in order to accommodate identity-challenging technology are difficult. Given the disruptive nature of identity shifts, understanding whether technology is identity challenging is a critical consideration for managers pursuing new technology.
This paper discusses some developments in the theory of the organizational capabilities of the business enterprise. Antecedents are recognized, and some promising new developments and areas for future research are identified. The role of managers in the economic system is highlighted and discussed within the context of economic and organizational research. Suggestions for future developments of dynamic capability research involve employment of evolutionary and behavioral theories.
Knowledge work frequently involves both the redefinition of desired outcomes and the specification of task processes. The relative emphasis that teams place on these issues early in work can lead members to become “outcome focused” or “process focused,” with consequences for performance. This paper develops and explores a theory of how outcome focus and process focus develop in teams and the implications of each for team adaptation and performance. Outcome and process focus were both observed and experimentally manipulated in 90 teams working on an open-ended task. Measures of the teams' performance as well as level of action identification and ability to adapt work processes point to an advantage for outcome-focused teams in dynamic environments. Implications for the design and management of knowledge work teams are discussed.
Research provides some observations about learning from events that appear to be rare or quite unusual. All learning has uncertain consequences, but learning from rare events is especially problematic. Learners see many idiosyncrasies and exogenous interference, tendencies that suppress learning on an organizational scale. Rare events also rouse uncertainty and bring on reactions to uncertainty such as wishful thinking, reliance on prior beliefs, biased probabilities, a search for more data, cautious action, and playing to audiences. The most important contingencies affecting these reactions are the content and strength of prior beliefs: people are unlikely to learn if they think they have nothing to learn. Although learning from rare events is statistically unusual, and effective learning from rare events is rare, both individuals and organizations can benefit significantly from active efforts to learn from rare events.
Achieving exploitation and exploration enables success, even survival, but raises challenging tensions. Ambidextrous organizations excel at exploiting existing products to enable incremental innovation and at exploring new opportunities to foster more radical innovation, yet related research is limited. Largely conceptual, anecdotal, or single case studies offer architectural or contextual approaches. Architectural ambidexterity proposes dual structures and strategies to differentiate efforts, focusing actors on one or the other form of innovation. In contrast, contextual approaches use behavioral and social means to integrate exploitation and exploration. To develop a more comprehensive model, we sought to learn from five, ambidextrous firms that lead the product design industry. Results offer an alternative framework for examining exploitation-exploration tensions and their management. More specifically, we present nested paradoxes of innovation: strategic intent (profit-breakthroughs), customer orientation (tight-loose coupling), and personal drivers (discipline-passion). Building from innovation and paradox literature, we theorize how integration and differentiation tactics help manage these interwoven paradoxes and fuel virtuous cycles of ambidexterity. Further, managing paradoxes becomes a shared responsibility, not only of top management, but across organizational levels.
In this paper, the notion of superstitious learning is applied to the context of rare and complex strategic decisions. I argue that superstitious learning is a particularly relevant problem for these types of decisions not only because causal linkages between actions and outcomes might be poorly inferred, but also, more basically, because their performance outcomes are often very difficult to assess in objective ways. I test these arguments with a sample of U.S. bank mergers and find evidence that managers' perceptions of success in previous acquisitions is negatively related to the actual performance of the focal merger, and that this effect increases, rather than decreases, as managers accumulate experience. Consistent with the theoretical arguments developed, the effect is significantly attenuated as the knowledge is systematically articulated and codified and the stock of experience becomes more heterogeneous.