Knowledge that Transforms

Competitive advantage is a key concept in strategic management research for a number of reasons—not the least of which is that an avowed consequence of its attainment is held to be superior economic performance. However, few prior empirical studies have directly and systematically documented the incidence or prevalence of persistent superior economic performance. The research reported here is based on empirical studies of a large number of industry samples for which longitudinal data were stratified by levels of performance using a new methodology and then analyzed in terms of their dynamics. This new stratification technique was used in lieu of autoregressive methods employed in prior studies of performance persistence to allow for a true outlier analysis because persistent superior economic performance both has been argued theoretically, and found empirically, to be rare. Detailed results from a sample of 6,772 firms in 40 industries over 25 years are presented to illustrate the findings that: (1) while some firms do exhibit superior economic performance, (2) only a very small minority do so, and (3) the phenomenon very rarely persists for long time frames. These results, while not providing direct support for a particular extant strategic management or economic theory concerning firm performance, are most consonant with the resource-based view of the firm and have implications for significant aspects of other received strategic management and economic theories.

The purpose of stakeholder management is to facilitate our understanding of increasingly unpredictable external environments, thereby facilitating our ability to manage within these environments. We argue that a powerful implicit assumption within the stakeholder literature—that priorities within role-based stakeholder groups are relatively homogeneous—blurs our understanding of organization-stakeholder relationships. Two important and related areas of concern are presented. The first involves the primacy of role in stakeholder definition. This role primacy approach to stakeholder definition is appropriate if, for a particular issue, role-based stakeholder group members have similar priorities. Individual and collective self-interest provides a rationale for this assumption. However, an important problem with this approach arises in situations in which self-interest is not the primary motivator of individuals' priorities. In these instances, subgroups within different role-based stakeholder groups might have more similar priorities than either subgroup has with others within their role-based stakeholder group. In these situations the role primacy approach impedes, rather than facilitates, an understanding of our environment. Our second concern is related to insufficient rigor in the application of stakeholder analysis. Most stakeholder studies, both theoretical and empirical, fall short in the determination of relevant interests and the subsequent subdivision of role-based stakeholder groups into rigorously defined specific stakeholder groups. Having suggested that the role primacy approach to stakeholder definition is less than ideal, we examine the extent to which, and the conditions under which, roles are likely to determine priorities, and thus, the likelihood of relatively homogeneous priorities within role-based stakeholder groups. In addition, we present an illustrative empirical analysis of stakeholder group priorities. The illustrative study is conducted within the context of intercollegiate athletics. Related literature and our empirical results indicate that role-based self-interest frequently is not a sufficient "binding tie" of stakeholder groups. Given this background, we present an alternative approach to stakeholder analysis that borrows heavily from the customer segmentation literature of marketing. Our alternative approach can accommodate heterogeneous priorities within role-based stakeholder groups.

This study examines environmental and organizational factors that influence a multinational enterprise's (MNE's) capability exploitation and building in a complex foreign market. Analysis of data from 167 MNE subunits in the People's Republic of China suggests that capability exploitation and capability building are inversely associated with environmental complexity and industrial uncertainty. Business cultural specificity impedes capability exploitation but not capability building. While capability exploitation is associated with the use of wholly owned entry mode, capability building is linked to the joint venture mode. MNEs seeking local market expansion also deploy greater capability exploitation and building than those seeking export market growth. Our analysis further suggests that the threats of environmental hazards on capability building are reduced when the joint venture entry mode is used. An appropriate alignment of capability exploitation or building with its identified determinants is found to be associated with high performance.

The study of foreign entry-mode choice has been based almost exclusively on transaction-cost theory. This theory focuses mainly on the impacts of firm- and industry-specific factors on the choice of entry mode, taking the effects of country-specific contextual factors as constant or less important. In contrast, the institutional perspective emphasizes the importance of the influence of both institutional forces embedded in national environments and decision makers' cognitive constraints on the founding conditions of new ventures. Still, this theoretical perspective has yet to provide insights into how institutional factors influence the choice of foreign entry mode. The primary goal of the present study is to provide a unifying theoretical framework to examine this relationship. We synthesize transaction-cost and institutional perspectives to analyze a sample of 364 Japanese overseas subsidiaries. Our results support the notion that institutional theory provides incremental explanatory power of foreign entry-mode choice in addition to transaction-cost theory. In particular, we found that multinational enterprises tend to conform to the regulative settings of the host-country environment, the normative pressures imposed by the local people, and the cognitive mindsets as bounded by counterparts' and multinational enterprises' own entry patterns when making foreign entry-mode choices.

Managers evaluate the organizational performance by comparing it with historical aspiration levels, and are more likely to make strategic changes when the performance falls below the aspiration level. Historical aspiration levels can be updated with different speed, because a focus on current performance will lead to quickly adjusting aspiration levels where historical performance has low weight, while a focus on past performance will lead to slowly adjusting performance levels where the current performance has low weight. A simulation model of aspiration-level learning and strategic change under uncertainty yields the following findings: (1) Slow adjustments of an aspiration level gives higher performance across different levels of environmental uncertainty, (2) slow adjustments of aspirations will dominate in populations with different adjustment levels if low-performing organizations are removed and replaced by organizations of the form currently performing best, and (3) stronger selection leads to faster domination by slow adjusters. Empirical analysis of format changes in radio stations finds slow adjustment of aspiration levels to be prevalent, and finds slower adjustment in competitive markets, as predicted.

Are multinational corporations (MNCs) superior to strategic alliances and markets in facilitating the flow of knowledge across borders? If so, what are the sources of this superiority? Despite their central importance to the theory and practice of international management, these questions have not been directly tested. Our paper seeks to address this gap in empirical research. Drawing upon recent research on multinational corporations and the knowledge-based view of the firm, we develop hypotheses regarding the relative superiority of alternative institutional arrangements as regards cross-border knowledge building. Analysis of patent citations by semiconductor companies points to the superiority of multinational firms over both alliances and markets in cross-border knowledge building. Interviews with engineers and managers in MNCs point to the intertwining of codified and tacit knowledge and; therefore, the need for both formal and informal mechanisms for successful knowledge building. Our findings suggest that the superiority of MNCs stems from the firms' ability to use multiple mechanisms of knowledge transfer flexibly and simultaneously to move, integrate, and develop technical knowledge. Our research, therefore, suggests that the challenge of knowledge management for MNCs extends beyond the creation of international information systems, to the design of organizational structures, systems, and culture capable of supporting the flow of knowledge.

In this paper we propose the notion of temporal structuring as a way of understanding and studying time as an enacted phenomenon within organizations. We suggest that through their everyday action, actors produce and reproduce a variety of temporal structures which in turn shape the temporal rhythm and form of their ongoing practices. A focus on temporal structuring, combined with a practice perspective, allows us to bridge the subjective-objective dichotomy that underlies much of the existing research on time in organizations. After developing the notion of temporal structuring, we illustrate its use in the context of a prior empirical study. We conclude by outlining some implications of temporal structuring for organizational research on time.

This paper provides a mathematical and economic analysis “Incentives and Computing Systems for Team-Based Organizations” by A. Barua, C. H. Sophie Lee, and A. B. Whinston, which was published in Organization Science in 1995. Several points were not adequately stated in the original article and one of the key definitions is not clear, nor is it in keeping with the classical theory of production. Although the Cobb-Douglas production function is often used in the article, it does not comply with the article's definitions. The two main contributions of this paper are (1) to provide a word of caution to other readers who might try to extend Barua et al. (1995) and (2) to suggest alternative formulations and directions for future research.

In this paper, I outline a perspective on knowing in practice which highlights the essential role of human action in knowing how to get things done in complex organizational work. The perspective suggests that knowing is not a static embedded capability or stable disposition of actors, but rather an ongoing social accomplishment, constituted and reconstituted as actors engage the world in practice. In interpreting the findings of an empirical study conducted in a geographically dispersed hightech organization, I suggest that the competence to do global product development is both collective and distributed, grounded in the everyday practices of organizational members. I conclude by discussing some of the research implications of a perspective on organizational knowing in practice.

A fundamental theme in comparative crosscountry research is the convergence of organizational forms in diverse national settings. In this paper we examine a special instance of this theme: the pattern of diversification across industries. A common argument is that technical and market forces compel firms to adopt “coherent” strategies of diversification. This thesis implies that there should be a convergence in the patterns of interindustry diversification in all market-based economies. An institutional approach offers an alternative view. From this perspective, when diversification across industries is seen as subject to nation-specific governance and resource constraints, countries should vary widely in their interindustry diversification patterns. To test these alternative views, we analyze the diversification patterns of large corporations from five countries: France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Our results do not support the hypothesis of a common pattern of diversification across countries, and thus reject the technological thesis. By comparing two case studies in which entrepreneurs attempted to diversify by acquisition in France and the United States, we examine how institutions and agents interact to permit different diversification patterns to arise in diverse national environments. The statistical results and case studies imply that, given the fixity of certain institutions, even if countries are subject to globalization, convergence in diversification patterns is not necessary. The results cast doubt upon the merits of stylizing the debate as a choice between technical and institutional theories of organizational choice. Rather, the study points to the importance of two theoretical statements. The first is to inquire under what conditions there is likely to be consensus on a given “means-end” rationality for a specific managerial decision (e.g., diversification). The second is to understand the structural opportunities available to entrepreneurs for diversifying through acquisitions. Iterating between these cognitive and structural considerations shifts the focus from the false debate between technological and institutional arguments to the study of entrepreneurship situated in historically given national environments.