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Longitudinal Field Research on Change: Theory and Practice

Organization Science 1990 1(3), 267-292
This paper reveals the author's theory of method for conducting longitudinal field research on change. The paper also discusses a range of practical problems in carrying out time-series research in organisational settings. The practical problems include dealing with time in longitudinal research; issues of site selection, choices about data collection and degrees of involvement the importance of clarifying research outputs, audience, and presentation; and finally handling problems of complexity and simplicity associated with longitudinal comparative case study research on change. The paper concludes by discussing some ethical issues of longitudinal research field research, and managing a community of researchers.

Alternate Approaches to Integrating Longitudinal Case Studies

Organization Science 1990 1(4), 393-405
In dealing with a large set of longitudinal case studies, researchers often assume that they can and should seek a single set of variables and explanatory theory to deal similarly with all the cases. This paper describes three approaches to the problems of cross-case integration and comparison. It also describes a set of comparative methods that can be used to diagnose case-study data-sets, to see which integrative approach is best.

Studying Changes in Organizational Design and Effectiveness: Retrospective Event Histories and Periodic Assessments

Organization Science 1990 1(3), 293-312
This paper describes assumptions, rationale, and track-offs involved in designing the research methodology used in a longitudinal study of the relationships among changes in organizational contexts, designs, and effectiveness. The basic research question concerns when how, and why do different types of organizational change occur. Given this research question and a desire to develop and test generalizable theory about changes in organizational design and effectiveness, we conducted a longitudinal study of over 100 organizations. Data concerning the changes were obtained through four interviews spaced six months apart with the top manager in each organization. Each interview provided a short-term retrospective event history over the preceding 6-month interval in aggregate, the four interviews provided a 24-month event history for each organization. Additionally, periodic assessments of the state of the organization's context, design, and effectiveness were collected with two questionnaires spaced one year apart. Finally, in each organization, the top manager's personal characteristics were assessed after all other data were obtained. This paper examines the alternatives, advantages, and disadvantages of the research design decisions. With some hindsight, we also offer some suggestions for future researchers with similar goals of developing and testing generalizable explanations of change processes in organizations.

Top Managerial Prestige and Organizational Bankruptcy

Organization Science 1990 1(2), 121-142
This paper extends earlier work on an alternative view of bankruptcy suggesting that bankruptcy occurs when creditors withdraw then support from a firm's top management team. It further proposes that support for the top team depends upon the team's prestige. Five characteristics measuring the relative status of top teams were tested for their association with bankruptcy. Three of the characteristics focused on items commonly associated with membership in economic elites elite educational backgrounds, board memberships, and previous employment as officers in other corporations. The fourth and fifth characteristics focused on membership in political and military elites. The results indicated that political and board connections were negatively associated with bankruptcy in the year of failure, even when financial factors and cooptive board linkages were controlled. The results also showed that failing firms attempted to improve their managerial prestige three to four years before they failed. They were, however, unable to hold onto their gains because of the “bailout” by prestigious managers in the last two years before bankruptcy.