Increasing demographic diversity is undoubtedly important and can aid in debiasing decision makers. Yet, the promises of demographic diversity are not always realized due to social integration problems. We consider why and for whom differences combined with homogeneity make a difference for groups in terms of integratively complex thinking and ideological decision making. Although research has shown that decision makers often rely on political biases, that work has not addressed when and why decision-making groups are able to overcome these biases—a pervasive concern in today’s politically polarized social milieu. Drawing on the common in-group identity model and research on integrative complexity, we theorize that demographic diversity ultimately yields less ideological decision making because it prompts integrative complexity; however, demographic diversity only accrues this benefit in the presence of ideological homogeneity. We also reason that the relationship between integrative complexity and reduced ideological decision making emerges for more conservative (versus more liberal) groups. We find support for our expectations using a natural experiment of judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Supplemental analyses indicate that working within a demographically diverse and ideologically homogeneous group also positively predicts integrative complexity in future decision-making groups. Finally, we find that demographic and ideological diversity can substitute for one another, but no additional integrative complexity benefits accrue when both are present. We discuss implications of this research in light of the ongoing conversation about the value of diversity and today’s polarized political climate. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.1647 .

This paper explores how executives’ prior employment ties to interlocking directors, or those who hold additional board seats or executive positions at outside firms, influence individual executive interfirm mobility. As organizational boundary spanners, interlocking directors may be able to influence executive outcomes both within and outside of executives’ current firms. But given natural constraints on internal promotion for executives, we suggest most executives will tend to leverage ties to interlocking directors to access external opportunities, as manifested by movement to outside firms. Analysis of interfirm mobility among a sample of Standard & Poor’s 1500 executives between 2000 and 2014 offer support for this idea. We find a positive association between individual executives’ prior employment ties to interlocking directors and their hazard of movement to outside firms, including to the other firms where these directors serve. At the same time, we argue and find that the strength of this latter relationship will further depend on directors’ competing motivations owing to their specific positions in the focal and interlocking firms. Whereas holding a lead position on the focal firm’s board (i.e., as chairperson or lead independent director) weakens this relationship, holding the position of chief executive officer in the interlocking firm strengthens it. Our theory and findings highlight the unique and important role of interlocking directors in executive interfirm mobility and, in doing so, contribute novel insights regarding how ties to boundary spanners can influence individual outcomes for those to whom they are linked. Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.1638 .

We study the connection between communication network structure and an organization’s collective adaptability to a shifting environment. Research has shown that network centralization—the degree to which communication flows disproportionately through one or more members of the organization rather than being more equally distributed—interferes with collective problem-solving by obstructing the integration of existing ideas, information, and solutions in the network. We hypothesize that the mechanisms responsible for that poor integration of ideas, information, and solutions would nevertheless prove beneficial for problems requiring adaptation to a shifting environment. We conducted a 1,620-subject randomized online laboratory experiment, testing the effect of seven network structures on problem-solving success. To simulate a shifting environment, we designed a murder mystery task and manipulated when each piece of information could be found: early information encouraged an inferior consensus, requiring a collective shift of solution after more information emerged. We find that when the communication network within an organization is more centralized, it achieves the benefits of connectivity (spread of novel better solutions) without the costs (getting stuck on an existing inferior solution). We also find, however, that these benefits of centralization only materialize in networks with two-way flow of information and not when information only flows from the center of the network outward (as can occur in hierarchical structures or digitally mediated communication). We draw on these findings to reconceptualize theory on the impact of centralization—and how it affects conformity pressure (lock-in) and awareness of diverse ideas (learning)—on collective problem-solving that demands adaptation. History: This paper has been accepted for the Organization Science Special Issue on Experiments in Organizational Theory. Funding: The authors acknowledge financial support from the Division of Research at the Harvard Business School for making this research possible.

This paper adapts real options theory to explain how executives create and maintain real options portfolios within leadership pipelines. Hypotheses flowing from our theorizing predict that executives often make seemingly risky staffing decisions for leaders who occupy stepping-stone positions. Focusing on their option (future potential) rather than project (current productivity) value, executives laterally transfer leaders in stepping-stone positions frequently, despite it resulting in lower short-term job performance, but often promote these leaders at lower levels of performance and sooner. Once leaders are promoted to destination positions where they may stay indefinitely, executives tend to transfer high-performing leaders more often but not when they are still improving the effectiveness of their current unit. We present evidence suggesting that executives make these decisions to improve other units and maintain a flexible system, possibly recapturing previous investments in developing those leaders. We provide empirical support for our hypotheses using eight years of data in a large retail organization (n = 25,004) where executives overseeing thousands of units made internal mobility decisions. These findings refine real options theory, show that it explains these phenomena better than existing theories, and provide important and immediately usable practical implications for executives. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.1608 .