Knowledge that Transforms

Using case study data, we describe how a large personal computer manufacturer changed its supply‐chain management strategy after outsourcing the majority of its design and manufacturing activities to a network of focused suppliers. To cope with this new structure, the firm created highly skilled generalists, “supply‐chain integrators,” who coordinate product development, marketing, production, and logistics from product concept to delivery across firm boundaries. We particularly focus on the skill‐set that characterizes these integrators. Finally, we use the case evidence, combined with previous theory, to suggest a specific program of research into coordinating product development across disaggregated supply chains.

This paper presents a methodology and a case study for supply chain management in the clothing industry that makes extensive use of the virtual enterprise paradigm. The main research goal was to design and implement a prototype e‐business software component and carry out tests in several industrial users. The research effort resulted in the extended production data management system (epms), which supported the business processes of customer order management, subcontractor selection, and multi‐site/multi‐firm production orders release. The enablers of this software application were business‐to‐business (b2b) e‐commerce technologies in the operating context of application service providers (asps).

We consider an inventory model with a supplier offering discounts to a reseller at random epochs. The offer is accepted when the inventory position is lower than a threshold level. We compare three different pricing policies in which demand is induced by the resellers price variation. Policy 1 is the EOQ policy without discount offers. Policy 2 is a uniform price, stock‐independent policy. Policy 3 is a stock level‐dependent, discriminated price policy. Assuming constant demand rates, expressions are obtained for the optimal order quantities, prices, and profits. The numerical experiments show that if it is better to accept a suppliers discount, then it benefits the reseller to transfer the discount to downstream customers.

We consider a supply chain with one manufacturer in the upstream and two competing retailers in the downstream. The retailers sell differentiated goods and are endowed with some private demand information. The paper shows that the manufacturer's optimal strategy is independent of the type of downstream competition, Cournot or Bertrand, and that no information will be shared with the manufacturer on a voluntary basis. However, complete information sharing, which benefits all three parties, can be achieved through side payment when the retailers' information is statistically less accurate or when the leakage effect is more beneficial to the retailers.