Knowledge that Transforms

Edith Penrose's (1959) classic book, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, made a substantial impact on strategic management research, especially in the context of the resource‐based view of the firm, and the ripple effects of her impact continue to unfold today in various disciplines. The book serves as a remarkably rich source of inspiration for scholarly research and a generative source of ideas, which are poised to be further developed. In this study, we examine Penrose's (1959) classic and provide: (1) the process by which this book came about; (2) a summary of its key ideas; (3) some implications for operations management research; (4) the subsequent impact of the book, in which we focus on mathematical models; and (5) a discussion of some of the research lessons learned from this exemplar of engaged scholarship. We invite management science and operations scholars to discover the rich scientific world of Edith Penrose and experience the product and process of her research creativity.

Stockpiling inventory is an essential strategy for building supply chain resilience. It enables firms to continue operating while finding a solution to an unexpected event that causes a supply disruption or demand surge. While extremely valuable when actually deployed, stockpiles incur large holding costs and usually provide no benefits until such a time. To help to reduce this cost, this study presents a new approach for managing stockpiles. We show that if leveraged intelligently, stockpiles can also help an organization better meet its own regular demand by enabling a type of virtual pooling we call virtual stockpile pooling (VSP). The idea of VSP is to first integrate the stockpile into several locations’ regular inventory buffers and then dynamically reallocate the stockpile among these locations in reaction to the demand realizations to achieve a kind of virtual transshipment. To study how to execute VSP and determine when it can provide the most value, we formulate a stylized multi‐location stochastic inventory model and solve for the optimal stockpile allocation and inventory order policies. We show that VSP can provide significant cost savings: in some cases nearly the full holding cost of the stockpile (i.e., VSP effectively maintains the stockpile for free), in other cases nearly the savings of traditional physical inventory pooling. Last, our results prescribe implementing VSP with many locations for large stockpiles, but only a few locations for small stockpiles.

What motivates the geographic footprint of the supply chains that multinational firms (MNFs) deploy? Traditional research in the operations and supply chain management literature tends to recommend locations primarily based on differentials in production costs and the ramifications of physical distance ignoring the role of taxation. MNFs that strategically position parts of their supply chains in low‐tax locations can allocate the profits across the divisions to improve post‐tax profits. For the profit allocation to be defensible to tax authorities, the divisional operations must possess real decision authority and bear meaningful risks. Generally speaking, the greater the transfer of risk and control, the larger the allowable allocation of profit. These transfers may also create inefficiencies due to misalignment of business goals and attitudes toward risk. We model these trade‐offs in the context of placing in a low‐tax region a subsidiary that oversees product distribution (as a limited risk distributor commissionnaire, limited risk distributor, or fully fledged distributor). Our analysis demonstrates that the MNF's preferences regarding the operating structures are not necessarily an obvious ordering based on the amount of risk and decision authority transferred to the division in the low‐tax jurisdiction. We derive and analyze threshold values of the performance parameters that describe the main trade‐offs involved in selecting an operating structure. We find some of the optimal decisions to exhibit interesting non‐monotone behavior. For instance, profits can increase when the tax rate in the low‐tax jurisdiction increases. Numerical analysis shows that the Limited‐Risk Distributor structure is rarely optimal and quantifies when each alternative dominates it.

Despite high demand and resource limitations, humanitarian organizations (HOs) typically do not share resources and/or coordinate in the field. While coordination enhances operational performance and saves costs, the general perception is that it dilutes the media attention that individual organizations might receive, and negatively influences their future donation income. In this study, we empirically unveil the impact of media exposure and operational performance on the donations obtained by HOs. Then, based on the empirical results, we develop a stylized model to characterize the structure of preferred coordination policies with respect to an organization's funding source and main mandate. Our findings shed light on the incentives and dynamics that drive behaviors in humanitarian operations and provide insights for policy makers on designing and implementing mechanisms that encourage humanitarian coordination.

Material IQ (MiQ) is a new decision tool designed by GreenBlue to help suppliers safely share sensitive chemical‐toxicity data with their customers. As GreenBlue takes MiQ to market, it must determine under what market conditions to promote the use of MiQ and when to recommend that a buyer uses its implementation as an opportunity to work with an existing supplier. We study GreenBlue's problem in two parts. First, we investigate when a buyer can use a wholesale price premium and/or buyer–supplier cost sharing to improve a supplier's environmental performance. Based on our findings, we then develop insights into GreenBlue's strategy. We model both a single‐supplier and a supplier‐competition setting. We find that in the single‐supplier setting, if the buyer's optimal strategy is to offer the supplier a premium, then he also fully subsidizes her investment cost to build quality. By developing the supplier's capabilities, the buyer can increase the impact of the premium he offers. In the supplier‐competition setting, although cost sharing is less effective as a lever, cases can occur in which the buyer chooses to share costs and prevent the incumbent supplier from having to compete. From GreenBlue's perspective, promoting the use of MiQ and cost sharing are often viable strategies when there exists a one‐to‐one relationship between a buyer and a supplier. However, GreenBlue's strategy becomes more restricted when competition exists between suppliers. Only when the relative market awareness of quality is high and there is a dominant party in the supply chain should GreenBlue recommend the use of MiQ.

Past research (along with our experience) suggests that a firm's supply chain (i.e., value chain) plays an integral role in its ability to not only reduce cost via process innovation, but also in its ability to develop new products and services. Evidence suggests the value chain is playing an ever‐more‐important role, with greater prevalence of distributed product development (spanning geographic, organizational, or firm boundaries) and open innovation (performed outside the firm). We discuss some of the trends with regard to supplier and customer involvement in the innovation process, and summarize some of the research exploring the rationale behind those trends and the research offering advice on how firms can use external resources to further improve their innovation performance. We present a number of examples that illustrate some best practices.

As a result of government budgetary limits and rapid market growth, many public service systems—such as health care—are characterized by extensive customer wait times that have become a serious problem. This problem might be solved by allowing private firms to enter these markets, which would provide customers with a choice between a free (governmental) public service provider (SP) and a fee‐charging (or “toll”) private SP. In such a two‐tier service system, the two SPs are differentiated by service quality and cost efficiency. This study focuses on the competition and coordination issues for two‐tier service systems with customers who are sensitive to both service quality and delay. The free system attempts to maximize its expected total customer utility with limited capacity, whereas the toll system attempts to maximize its profit. Neither goal is aligned with the social welfare goal of the public service. To achieve the social welfare goal, the government plays a crucial role in coordinating the two‐tier service system via the budget, the tradeoff of social members' goals, and tax‐subsidy policies. Using a mixed duopoly game, we establish Nash equilibrium strategies and identify the conditions for the existence of the two‐tier service system. We employ several interesting and counter‐intuitive managerial insights generated by the model to show that the public service can be delivered more efficiently via customer choice and SP competition. In addition, we show that a relatively low tax‐subsidy rate can almost perfectly coordinate the two SPs to achieve most of the maximum possible benefit of the two‐tier service system.

Idea generation and selection are fundamental activities in innovation. Scholars in many disciplines have written about these activities, addressing diverse perspectives. In this study, we synthesize the research findings most applicable to the management of technology. First, we present findings on the process of idea generation: the importance of problem recognition and the many decisions made in organizing the effort. Second, we present findings about the process of idea selection, focusing on the different types of information that can be used in that decision. Third, we turn our attention to the organizational context in which both idea generation and selection occur: the corporate culture, use of incentives, organizational structure, and use of teams. Finally, we conclude, emphasizing that although idea generation and selection are as old as human decision making, changes in technology still affect these fundamental processes.

This study analyzes the trade‐off between funding strategies and operational performance in humanitarian operations. If a Humanitarian Organization (HO) offers donors the option of earmarking their donations, HO should expect an increase in total donations. However, earmarking creates constraints in resource allocation that negatively affect HO's operational performance. We study this trade‐off from the perspective of a single HO that maximizes its expected utility as a function of total donations and operational performance. HO implements disaster response and development programs and it operates in a multi‐donor market with donation uncertainty. Using a model inspired by Scarf's minimax approach and the newsvendor framework, we analyze the strategic interaction between HO and its donors. The numerical section is based on real data from 15 disasters during the period 2012–2013. We find that poor operational performance has a larger effect on HO's utility function when donors are more uncertain about HO's expected needs for disaster response. Interestingly, increasing the public awareness of development programs helps HO to get more non‐earmarked donations for disaster response. Increasing non‐earmarked donations improves HO's operational efficiency, which mitigates the impact of donation uncertainty on HO's utility function.

Downstream firms increasingly recognize the importance of integrating social and environmental concerns with their businesses. As a consequence, they urge to create incentives for their suppliers to invest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Contracts to provide these incentives are rarely observed in practice. If not totally absent, contracts may be incomplete , in that unforeseen contingencies or some CSR attributes that are difficult to measure may not be included in the contract. We show that incentives for CSR investments can also be provided through the supply chain structure, which consists of the distribution of ownership rights over the firms' assets of production, and involves horizontal and/or vertical alliances among supply chain members. Motivated by examples in agricultural contexts, this study adopts the property rights approach to study the impact of supply chain structures on the adoption of CSR activities. We show that the structure that best incentivizes CSR investments depends on the interaction between CSR vertical synergy, free‐riding, and countervailing power. One of the main findings is that the alliance between suppliers is beneficial only if the revenues generated by a downstream investment are sufficiently high. In fact, only in this case, the suppliers can appropriate a sufficiently large stake of the revenues generated downstream, thanks to their countervailing power. When the upstream investment costs become high, however, the suppliers will invest in CSR only if the downstream distributor is vertically integrated. The resulting structure of a cooperative will best incentivize CSR investments only if the CSR vertical synergy between the two tiers of the supply chain is sufficiently high.