Knowledge that Transforms

This study is the first proposing allocatively efficient multi‐attribute auctions for the procurement of multiple items. In the B2B e‐commerce logistics problem (ELP), the e‐commerce platform is the shipper generating a large number of online orders between product sellers and buyers, and third‐party logistics (3PL) providers are carriers that can deliver these online orders. This study focuses on the ELP with multiple attributes (ELP‐MA), which is generally the problem of matching the shipper's online orders and 3PL providers given that price and other attributes are jointly evaluated. We develop a one‐sided Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (O‐VCG) auction for the ELP‐MA. The O‐VCG auction leads to incentive compatibility (on the sell side), allocative efficiency, budget balance, and individual rationality. We next introduce the concept of universally unsatisfied set to construct a primal‐dual algorithm, also called the primal‐dual Vickrey (PDV) auction. We prove that the O‐VCG auction can be viewed as a single‐attribute multi‐unit forward Vickrey (SA‐MFV) auction. Both PDV and SA‐MFV auctions realize VCG payments and truthful bidding for general valuations. This result reveals the underlying link not only between single‐attribute and multi‐attribute auctions, but between static and dynamic auctions in a multi‐attribute setting.

Cooperation among humanitarian organizations has attracted increasing attention to enhance effectiveness and efficiency of relief supply chains. Our research focuses on horizontal cooperation in inventory management which is currently implemented in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) network. The present work follows a two‐step research approach, which involves collection of empirical data and quantitative modeling to examine and overcome the coordination challenges of the network. Our interviews with members of the network identified several managerial issues for sustainable cooperative inventory management that the UNHRD network pursues. Using a newsvendor model in the context of non‐cooperative game theory, our research has explored member humanitarian organizations' incentive of joining the network, a coordination mechanism which achieves system optimality, and impacts of members' decisions about stock rationing. Our results indicate that behaviors of member HOs do not necessarily align with the UNHRD's expectation. Our results suggest that for system optimality, a system coordinator should carefully assess the circumstances, including demand coefficient and stock rationing. Our research also proposes a policy priority for the first‐best system optimal inventory management.

This article seeks to encourage scholars to conduct research that is more relevant to the decisions faced by managers and policymakers, and addresses why research relevance matters, what relevance means in terms of a journal article, and how scholars can increase the relevance of their research. I define relevant research papers as those whose research questions address problems found (or potentially found) in practice and whose hypotheses connect independent variables within the control of practitioners to outcomes they care about using logic they view as feasible. I provide several suggestions for how scholars can enhance research relevance, including engaging practitioners in on‐campus encounters, at managerial conferences, and at crossover workshops; conducting site visits and practitioner interviews; working as a practitioner; and developing a practitioner advisory team. I describe several ways that scholars can convey relevant research insights into practitioners, including presenting at practitioner conferences, writing for practitioners in traditional crossover journals and in shorter pieces like op‐eds and blogs, and attracting the interest of those who write columns, blogs, and articles about research for practitioners. I conclude by describing a few ways that academic institutions can encourage more relevant research, focusing on journals, professional societies, and doctoral programs.

Innovation contests are increasingly adopting a format where submissions are viewable by all contestants and the information structure changes during the contest. In such an “unblind” format, contestants must weigh the costs of revealing their submissions against the benefits of improving their submissions through emerging information. We take a closer look at how contestants solve problems in innovation contests with public submission of solutions—that is, unblind contests, by examining the implications of their submission behavior for contest outcomes. We analyze the submission behavior in terms of three dimensions: the position of first submission by the contestant, the number of submissions the contestant makes, and the length of active participation by the contestant. The econometric analysis of a large dataset of unblind innovation contests and participating contestants indicates that, despite the potential for free riding and intellectual property loss from disclosure of submissions, contestants who have a lower position of first submission are more likely to succeed in the contest. Further, we find some evidence of a curvilinear relationship between a contestant's number of submissions and her likelihood of success, indicating a potential “quality–quantity” trade‐off in unblind innovation contests. Finally, our findings indicate that increasing the length of participation in a contest has a positive effect on a contestant's likelihood of success. Departing from prior studies on innovation contests, where a contestant's success is assumed to be a function of her prior experience and problem‐solving skills, our study provides new empirical evidence that, in innovation contests with public submissions, the submission behavior of a contestant also plays an explanatory role in a contestant's success.

This paper studies the optimal component procurement strategies of two competing OEMs selling substitutable products. The OEMs outsource their production to a common contract manufacturer, who in turn needs an input from a component supplier. Each OEM may either directly procure the input from the component supplier, or delegate the procurement task to the contract manufacturer. We first analyze the OEMs' procurement game under a non‐strategic supplier whose component price is exogenously given. It is found that symmetric equilibria arise for most situations, that is, both OEMs either control or delegate their component procurement in equilibrium. Interestingly, despite the commonly‐held belief that the contract manufacturer would be worse off as OEMs gain component procurement control, we show that the contract manufacturer may enjoy a higher profit. Then we study the OEMs' procurement game under a strategic supplier who can set its component price. We find that the supplier's strategic pricing behavior plays a critical role in the equilibrium procurement structure. In particular, in the equilibrium under strategic supplier, the larger OEM always uses delegation while the smaller OEM may use either delegation or control. By identifying the driving forces behind the OEMs' procurement choices, this research helps explain observed industry practices and offer useful guidelines for firms' component sourcing decisions.

We discuss the optimal raw material acquisition strategy for a third party remanufacturer (3PR). We specifically investigate whether a 3PR should acquire used products or cores in bulk with uncertain quality levels, or in sorted grades with known quality levels; and whether to acquire and remanufacture cores before the demand is realized (planned acquisition), or after the demand is realized (reactive acquisition), or on both occasions (sequential acquisition). When only sorted cores are acquired, we find that, (i) it is optimal to acquire cores in multiple grades to balance acquisition and remanufacturing costs; (ii) if reactive acquisition is possible, it reduces the assortment size (number of grades in which cores are acquired) and the total inventory acquired in the planned acquisition; and (iii) the optimal portfolio of grades to acquire and the optimal acquisition and remanufacturing quantities of these grades can be determined analytically. When bulk cores are acquired in addition to sorted cores, the property of reduction in assortment size of the planned acquisition is preserved. We also show that the 3PR should acquire only a fraction of the demand in planned acquisition, and leave the rest for reactive acquisition. This fraction changes during the lifecycle of a remanufactured product. Using a combination of empirical and realistic data from a smartphone remanufacturer we show that sequential acquisition increases expected profit by up to 8% and 27% over only planned and only reactive acquisitions respectively, and reduces the inventory acquired by up to 21% over only planned acquisition.

We examine the relationship between Operational Productivity (OP), Corporate Social Performance (CSP), Financial Performance (FP), and risk. Our sample frame comprises 476 firms in nine US manufacturing industries during the period 1999–2009. We employ DEA‐based measures for OP and CSP, two operationalizations for FP to reflect current profitability and market value, and two operationalizations for risk to reflect bankruptcy risk and stock price volatility. We confirm that OP is essential for good financial performance and reduced risk (as expected), but the main effects of CSP are mixed. Importantly, we find that OP moderates the CSP–FP and CSP–risk relationships. Specifically, if OP is poor, CSP is of limited benefit to FP or risk. However, at or above a threshold level of OP, firms can use CSP to build upon it to yield further improvements in FP and reductions in risk. We discuss the implications of our findings for theory and practice.

Unlike advertising in traditional media, a mobile platform's in‐app advertising market exhibits two unique features—split structure of the mobile platform with a platform owner and an app developer jointly provisioning in‐app advertising, and agency pricing for app sales. We develop a two‐sided market model to analyze the role of these two unique features in determining the platform owner's optimal advertising revenue‐sharing contract. Our results reveal an interesting N‐shaped dynamic regarding the platform owner's optimal choice of her ad revenue share with respect to the overall advertisers’ valuation of in‐app ads. We identify a between‐agent subsidization strategy for the platform owner, where she finds it optimal to subsidize the developer via the advertising channel, leading to greater profits for both of them. We find that the advertising revenue‐sharing contract under agency pricing for app sales leads to a higher app price than would be offered by the integrated platform found in traditional advertising. However, the ad price is coordinated under the platform owner's optimal choice of ad revenue share when she obtains revenue from both the advertising and app sales channels, leading to an alignment of her interest with the app developer's on ad level.

Organizational learning includes processes of creating, retaining and transferring knowledge and has implications for the performance and competitiveness of organizations. Given the knowledge‐based view of resources inherent in management of technology (MOT), in this study, we adopt an organizational learning framework that considers knowledge to be embedded in three major components of organizations—members, tasks and tools—and the networks formed by crossing them. We present research related to these components that is most applicable to MOT. In suggesting future research in MOT, we explicate the framework further by proposing that learning occurs in an organizational context.

This study investigates the interactions between a manufacturer's information acquisition and quality disclosure strategies in a supply chain setting in which the manufacturer privately knows his product quality but is uncertain about consumer preferences. We argue that the manufacturer should treat his information acquisition and quality disclosure decisions as an integrated process because these decisions can significantly influence a retailer's rational inferences about product quality and can have conflicting effects on his own profitability. Although information acquisition helps a manufacturer subsequently craft better pricing and quality disclosure strategies, it also leaks certain product information to the retailer, thus helping the retailer better estimate product quality. Therefore, in equilibrium, a manufacturer may choose not to acquire any consumer information, even when such acquisition is costless. Moreover, we find that this adverse effect of acquisition is highly dependent on the cost of disclosure and consumers’ preference differentiation. Increased consumer preference differentiation may have a non‐monotonic relationship with the manufacturer's profit, and information acquisition can become detrimental to the manufacturer once the disclosure cost is sufficiently high.