Knowledge that Transforms

To alleviate poverty in developing countries, governments and non‐governmental organizations disseminate two types of information: (i) agricultural advice to enable farmers to improve their operations (cost reduction, quality improvement, and process yield increase); and (ii) market information about future price/demand to enable farmers to make better production planning decisions. This information is usually disseminated free of charge. While farmers can use the market information to improve their production plans without incurring any (significant) cost, adopting agricultural advice to improve operations requires upfront investment, for example, equipment, fertilizers, pesticides, and higher quality seeds. In this study, we examine whether farmers should use market information to improve their production plans (or adopt agricultural advice to improve their operations) when they engage in Cournot competition under both uncertain market demand and uncertain process yield. Our analysis indicates that both farmers will use the market information to improve their profits in equilibrium. Hence, relative to the base case in which market information is not available, the provision of market information can improve the farmers' total welfare (i.e., total profit for both farmers). Moreover, when the underlying process yield is highly uncertain or when the products are highly heterogeneous, the provision of market information is welfare‐maximizing in the sense that the maximum total welfare of farmers is attained when both farmers utilize market information in equilibrium. Furthermore, in equilibrium, whether a farmer adopts the agricultural advice depends on the size of the requisite upfront investment. More importantly, we show that agricultural advice is not always welfare improving unless the upfront investment is sufficiently low. This result implies that to improve farmers' welfare, governments should consider offering farmer subsidies.

The use of government incentives tied to market prices as means of boosting corporate social responsibility (CSR) has expanded notably in recent decades. Enhanced business tax deductions for charitable donations and credits for conservation easements are notable cases. While providing incentives for socially desirable behavior to achieve legislative goals has intuitive appeal, the broader economic consequences are not always fully understood. In this study, we examine such wider consequences for supply chains when subsidies for CSR are offered. One effect we identify is that since incentives are typically tied to market value, firms have not only an added incentive to achieve societal objectives (say by donating inventory) but also an incentive to raise output (retail) market prices. A second consequence is that since firms forgo potential revenues by engaging in socially desired behavior, they become increasingly sensitive to supplier pricing; in an uncoordinated supply chain this leads to input (wholesale) price concessions. Among other things, the results underscore that incentives put in place to meet broader societal objectives also have notable ramifications for suppliers, retailers, and consumers in primary markets.

We study the deferred payment and inspection mechanisms for mitigating supplier product adulteration, with endogenous procurement decision and general defect discovery process. We first derive the optimal deferred payment contract, which reveals that either entire or partial deferral can arise, depending on the moral hazard severity and the information accumulation rate. Because of the supplier's incentive to adulterate, the optimal procurement quantity under deferred payment generally is smaller than the first‐best quantity. We then investigate the inspection mechanism and characterize the equilibrium. We find that under the inspection mechanism, the optimal procurement quantity is no less than the first best. A comparison between these two mechanisms shows that the deferred payment mechanism generally can outperform the inspection mechanism when either the market size is small or the profit margin is low. However, we find that these two mechanisms can also be complementary, for which we characterize a necessary condition.

We study competition and coordination in a supply chain in which a single supplier both operates a direct channel and sells its product through multiple differentiated retailers. We study analytically the supply chain with symmetric retailers and find that the supplier prefers to have as many retailers as possible in the market, even if the retailers' equilibrium retail price is lower than that of the supplier, and even if the number of retailers and their cost or market advantage prevent sales through the direct channel. We find that the two‐channel supply chain may be subject to inefficiencies not present in the single‐channel supply chain. We show that several contracts known to coordinate a single‐channel supply chain do not coordinate the two‐channel supply chain; thus we propose a linear quantity discount contract and demonstrate its ability to perfectly coordinate the two‐channel supply chain with symmetric retailers. We provide some analytical results for the supply chain with asymmetric retailers and propose an efficient solution approach for finding the equilibrium. We find numerically that the supplier still benefits from having more retailers in the market and that linear quantity discount contracts can mitigate supply chain inefficiency, though they no longer achieve perfect coordination.

This study examines the antecedents of supply chain project success. We first propose and test a model that describes the role of relationship‐level factors (trust and asymmetric dependence) and project‐level factors (between‐firm communication and within‐firm commitment) in determining supply chain project success. We find that project‐level factors completely mediate the effect of trust on project success. We conclude that trust, despite being a stronger predictor compared to asymmetric dependence, is necessary but not sufficient for supply chain project success. We then proceed to further explore the role of these factors by introducing a categorical scheme that differentiates supply chain projects based on the decision rights configuration of each project. This categorization enables us to explore how relationship‐level and project‐level factors can have different impact on performance based on the characteristics of a supply chain project. The findings offer insights into how to effectively manage supply chain projects and inter‐firm alliances.

It is generally believed that store brands hurt the manufacturers of competing national brands while benefiting retailers. In this study, we challenge this notion by studying the impacts of a store brand when it is introduced by a power retailer. We show that a store brand may benefit the manufacturer when the interaction between the manufacturer and retailer is modeled as a retailer‐led Stackelberg game. This phenomenon occurs because the store brand changes the nature of the strategic interaction between the manufacturer and retailer in our model. In particular, while the interaction is always vertical strategic substitutability without a store brand, it may become vertical strategic independence with one. With the store brand, the demand for the national brand becomes larger, and the wholesale price for the national brand may increase, both of which benefit the manufacturer. Finally, the store brand may lessen the double marginalization problem of the supply chain for the national brand in the retailer‐led Stackelberg game, but does so in an unconventional way: The reduction in the double marginalization effect may come from a lowered retail markup instead of a lowered wholesale price. Our results reconcile some discrepancies between theoretical predictions and empirical findings regarding the impacts of store brands on manufacturers.

We consider a supply chain with an upstream supplier who invests in innovation and a downstream manufacturer who sells to consumers. We study the impact of supply chain contracts with endogenous upstream innovation, focusing on three different contract scenarios: (i) a wholesale price contract, (ii) a quality‐dependent wholesale price contract, and (iii) a revenue‐sharing contract. We confirm that the revenue‐sharing contract can coordinate supply chain decisions including the innovation investment, whereas the other two contracts may result in underinvestment in innovation. However, the downstream manufacturer does not always prefer the revenue‐sharing contract; the manufacturer's profit can be higher with a quality‐dependent wholesale price contract than with a revenue‐sharing contract, specifically when the upstream supplier's innovation cost is low. We then extend our model to incorporate upstream competition between suppliers. By inviting upstream competition, with the wholesale price contract, the manufacturer can increase his profit substantially. Furthermore, under upstream competition, the revenue‐sharing contract coordinates the supply chain, and results in an optimal contract form for the manufacturer when suppliers are symmetric. We also analyze the case of complementary components suppliers, and show that most of our results are robust.

Dynamic pricing enables a firm to increase revenue by better matching supply with demand, responding to shifting demand patterns, and achieving customer segmentation. In the last 20 years, numerous success stories of dynamic pricing applications have motivated a rapidly growing research interest in a variety of dynamic pricing problems in the academic literature. A large class of problems that arise in various revenue management applications involve selling a given amount of inventory over a finite time horizon without inventory replenishment. In this study, we identify most recent trends in dynamic pricing research involving such problems. We review existing research on three new classes of problems that have attracted a rapidly growing interest in the last several years, namely, problems with multiple products, problems with competition, and problems with limited demand information. We also identify a number of possible directions for future research.

The objective of this study was to extend existing understanding of supplier encroachment to contexts in which there is information asymmetry and the supplier can use nonlinear pricing. Prior research has shown that supplier encroachment can mitigate double marginalization and thus benefit both the supplier and the reseller. However, under symmetric information, this benefit disappears if the supplier can use nonlinear pricing. In our model, the reseller observes the true market size while the supplier knows only the prior distribution, that is, a seemingly ideal setting for implementing mechanism design through nonlinear pricing. We first show that, because encroachment capability enables the supplier to make an ex post output decision, it fundamentally alters the structure of the optimal nonlinear pricing policy. In addition to the usual downward distortion effect, where the reseller may purchase less than the efficient quantity, we also have the possibility for upward distortion. Thus, under asymmetric information and nonlinear pricing, supplier encroachment has two opposing effects. On one hand, the ability to shift sales to the direct channel allows the supplier to reduce information rents with less sacrifice of efficiency; but on the other hand, by introducing the possibility of her own opportunistic behavior, it can result in upward distortion of the quantities sold through the reselling channel, which is a new source of inefficiency. Depending upon the relative efficiency of the reselling channel and the demand distribution, either of these two effects may dominate and the supplier's ability to encroach may either benefit or hurt both the supplier and the reseller.

Retailers are increasingly adopting a dual‐format model. In addition to acting as traditional merchants (buying and reselling goods), these retailers provide a platform for third‐party (3P) sellers to access and compete for the same customers. We investigate the strategic rationale for a retailer to introduce a 3P marketplace. Our analysis provides insights into the growing prevalence of 3P marketplaces. We show that by committing to having an active 3P marketplace, the retailer creates an “outside option” that improves its bargaining position in negotiations with the manufacturer. This can explain the increasing prevalence of such marketplaces. On the other hand, the manufacturer would prefer to eliminate the retailer's outside option and should seek to limit or prevent sales through 3P marketplaces. This is consistent with actions that several manufacturers have taken to limit such sales. Interestingly, if the manufacturer fails to eliminate sales of competing products through the 3P marketplace, then the best strategy for the manufacturer is to allow the retailer to dictate the terms of their contract. This is because a powerful retailer will rely less on its outside option in generating profit, and therefore it will increase the fees charged to 3P sellers and soften the competition between 3P sellers and the manufacturer. The decrease in competition will lead to an increase in the value of outside option of the manufacturer and improve its profit. Additionally, we find that the presence of a 3P marketplace benefits consumers, but this benefit diminishes as the retailer becomes more powerful.