Knowledge that Transforms

In this study, we examine the impact of a new mobile-based, dockless bike-sharing service on public transportation usage. This new bike-sharing model removes the constraint of having fixed stations and gives users full flexibility on where to pick up and return bikes. This innovative feature of dockless bike sharing potentially disrupts the current norms of how people commute. The dockless shared bikes offer easy connections between destinations and public transportation stations. They can potentially promote public transportation, by improving its flexibility and outreach. To examine this impact, we collaborate with one of the largest dockless bike-sharing companies in China and collect unique daily-station-level panel data of shared-bike rides and subway traffic. Our findings indicate that a 1% increase in shared-bike rides leads to an increase of 0.35% in subway traffic. Further analyses show that this positive effect is stronger when people need to travel a longer distance to reach subway stations. These results suggest one potential underlying mechanism for the positive relationship we observe, that is, dockless shared bikes alleviate the “last-mile problem” for public transportation, making it a more appealing mode of transportation, compared with alternatives. Overall, we find that dockless shared bikes, in contrast to ridesharing or traditional bike sharing, act as a complement, rather than a substitute, for public transportation. Dockless shared bikes present a greener way of commuting, with significant environmental and societal impacts.

We postulate that the study of diversity, equity, and inclusion can deepen and add relevance to research in operations management (OM). Specifically, the role of gender is little studied in the existing OM literature—to the detriment of the field. This article considers OM issues by employing the theories, data, and topics from the field of Women's Studies. Our findings indicate that incorporating viewpoints from Women's Studies can change what is considered research, improve the accuracy of OM research, extend existing studies in the field through new parameters, and open new areas of inquiry.

Access to contraceptives empowers women to not only exercise their reproductive rights and avert unintended pregnancies, but also to prevent a spectrum of adverse societal and health outcomes (e.g., unfulfilled career aspirations, unsafe abortions, maternal deaths.) However, in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where resources are limited and women are under-represented as decision-makers in national governments, reproductive health has not traditionally been prioritized. Motivated by past research showing that female decision-makers tend to prioritize issues in ways that align more closely with women's needs and preferences, we examine the relationship between female decision-makers in national governments and contraceptive procurement. Specifically, we focus on female decision-makers at two levels, as health ministers and parliamentarians, and examine their impact on the procurement quantity of contraceptives by LMICs. Our empirical analysis, based on a comprehensive compilation of data across six distinct sources, shows that a female (vs. male) health minister is associated with an average 66% increase in the procurement quantity of contraceptives. Notably, this relationship is strengthened with an increase in the proportion of female representatives in national parliaments. Together, these findings demonstrate that female (vs. male) decision-makers exhibit greater commitment to contraceptive procurement, an issue that has a disproportionate impact on women's health and well-being. As ensuring good health and well-being for all and increasing gender parity in leadership positions are two of the key United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, our study on examining the relationship between female decision-makers and contraceptive procurement constitutes a timely and consequential line of inquiry.

Should an incumbent for-profit retailer deter a “socially responsible” store from entering the market? As a differentiation strategy to avoid direct price competition with well-established retailers, some socially responsible stores (or brands) enter the market with a “pre-commitment” to donate a certain proportion of their (A) profits or (B) revenues to charities. Because these charitable donations generate a “warm-glow” effect for consumers, these socially responsible stores can use pre-committed donations to gain market access. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic model in which a socially responsible retailer enters the market to compete with an incumbent for-profit retailer. We determine and compare the incumbent retailer’s deterrence strategies (i.e., deter or tolerate) across different types of socially responsible stores. Our equilibrium analysis generates the following insights. First, the incumbent retailer’s deterrence strategy depends on its cost advantage over the socially responsible store, and hinges upon the socially responsible store’s entry cost, pre-commitment level, and its warm-glow effect. Second, even if the incumbent retailer can profitably deter the socially responsible retailer’s entry, the incumbent retailer can actually be better off by tolerating instead of deterring its entry when the socially responsible store’s entry cost is low and the incumbent store’s cost advantage is not significant. Third, relatively speaking, a type (B) store that donates a portion of its revenue is more vulnerable unless it can generate a much higher warm-glow effect. We extend our analysis numerically to examine the case when the pre-committed proportion is endogenously determined and obtain similar structural results.

The role and impact of females in supply chain management have received insufficient attention in extant research. In addition, research investigating the relationship between upper-echelon leadership and supply chain phenomena is extremely scant. To address these limitations, we collected archival data from 433 publicly traded Fortune 500 firms from 2007 to 2015 (3464 firm-year observations) and analyzed them using fixed-effect regressions. Our findings indicate that female top management team representation directly and positively influences a firm's supplier orientation. This influence of female representation is attenuated for firms that have a Chief Supply Chain Officer present in their top management team and for firms operating in environments characterized by high dynamism and low munificence. Furthermore, our findings show that supplier orientation mediates the impact of female top management team representation on firm performance. We put forth several interesting theoretical and managerial contributions. Most importantly, we hope that our findings, highlighting the positive impact of female executives on supplier orientation and providing additional evidence regarding women's managerial capabilities, will contribute towards eliminating bias and discrimination faced by women in the area of supply chain management and business in general.

Equity investment in agricultural cooperatives (co-ops) is typically limited to farmer-members; yet farmers are usually cash-constrained. In addition to the common stock that is held by farmer-members, many co-ops are changing their financial structure by raising equity from external investors. This helps co-ops to collect capital, but also brings to the fore the conflicting benefits of farmers and external investors. In this paper, we develop a two-stage game-theoretic model to examine a start-up co-op’s farm-gate pricing and financing strategies, considering two types of external fund: preferred stock that bears a fixed return rate and outside stock that shares the net profit (in proportion to equity) with common stock. We characterize the co-op’s strategies in different scenarios and generate the following insights. First, while both types of external equity outperform the case with common stock only, the preferred stock generally outperforms outside stock due to its lower financial cost, higher tolerance for fund size limits, and flexibility in setting farm-gate prices. However, outside stock can outperform preferred stock if it allows a higher fund size limit. Second, the co-op’s financial strategy exhibits a similar structure in equilibrium regardless of whether it is preferred stock or outside stock, despite their distinct financial terms. Finally, farm-gate pricing has a unique role in co-ops affecting the returns to farmers and external investors, which also highlights the conflicting roles of farmers as both patrons and investors when external equity is used.

Extensive studies have revealed that newsvendor decisions by human decision-makers are often biased by cognitive limitations, and, therefore, fail to achieve optimal profits prescribed by normative models. These biases are typically considered as liabilities in individual inventory decision-making, and much research has focused on developing methods to debias the decision-maker—for example, by providing decision support tools. However, in competitive settings biases can provide a competitive advantage, such that a biased newsvendor may earn a higher profit than an unbiased one. This raises the question of whether and when firms should debias their decision-makers. In this paper, we analyze decision biases that are endogenous rather than exogenous in competing newsvendor games. Specifically, we develop a two-stage game-theoretic model in which competing firms first select their decision-makers typefied by their bias levels, and then engage in a classic inventory competition game. Our analysis confirms the positive effect of the decision-maker’s bias on a firm’s economic outcome. However, this effect only appears in competitions in which decision biases are exogenously given. When biases are endogenously selected, firms are always (weakly) worse off than if they all had rational decision-makers. Our results suggest that debiasing at the industry level (e.g., adopting advanced inventory planning software) could benefit all players; however, individual firms do not have the incentive to do so in the absence of coordination mechanisms.

This study examines how wholesale price discrimination (WD) by a supplier affects different parties in a supply chain involving a common supplier distributing homogeneous products through two competing retailers with different costs under wholesale price contracts. Especially, we allow for contract unobservability, where the contract terms between the supplier and each retailer are secret to the rival retailer. Intuitively, given the downstream asymmetry, WD should be more advantageous than the uniform wholesale price (UW) scheme for the supplier. This is true under observable contracts, as we show that WD benefits the supplier and less efficient retailer but hurts the more efficient retailer, supply chain, and consumers. Under unobservability, however, we find that the supplier may be better off by committing to UW. The intuition is that contract unobservability induces the supplier to set lower discretionary wholesale prices, which can outweigh the benefits of pricing flexibility. Consequently, a lack of commitment to UW can benefit both retailers, improve supply chain efficiency, and increase consumer surplus. Our findings suggest that policymakers should be cautious about imposing restrictions on WD. We also consider three extensions for robustness and offer new insights.

Consumer information sharing is considered an effective strategy to attract consumers, yet certain high-end retailers, such as Bergdorf Goodman and Farfetch, tend to hinder consumers from sharing information through online reviews. We study a retailer's strategy for consumer information sharing in a supply chain. We find that a retailer's information sharing strategy can prevent manufacturers from extracting excessive profit when consumers are heterogeneous in their valuations of the selling product. Specifically, a retailer can achieve a higher profit margin by targeting all consumer segments. By strategically choosing the information sharing strategy to influence consumer beliefs, the retailer can induce the manufacturer to conform to the retailer's preferred targeting segment through a low wholesale price. Thus, a high-end retailer, whose consumers have a high ex-ante quality belief, favors hindering information sharing among consumers because it enables the retailer to target all consumer segments. Interestingly, deterring consumers from learning about the product quality may generate more consumer surplus. Our main results are robust under extensions such as consumer search behavior, consumer waiting, and multiple product selling. When selling multiple products, a retailer with a large quality variation is better off hindering consumers from sharing information. Our work shows that strategically choosing a consumer information sharing strategy enables retailers to enhance profit margins in their interactions with upstream manufacturers.

This article investigates competition between a branded firm selling a durable good over two periods and a deceptive counterfeiter entering the market in the second period. The two firms engage in a price signaling game in which the branded firm designs its price strategy over two periods, and strategic consumers decide whether to buy the authentic product upfront or wait until the second period. We find that the branded firm may benefit from the counterfeit competition if the quality gap between the two products is sufficiently large. The intuition is that the branded firm would charge a high second-period price to signal its authenticity, inducing more consumers to buy the genuine product upfront. This strategy allows the branded firm to increase its first-period price and demand simultaneously, thus effectively mitigating the time-inconsistency problem. Otherwise, when the quality gap is small, counterfeit competition leads to reduced profits for the authentic product. These results remain robust throughout several extensions of the base model, including partially informed or naive consumers, asymmetric retail channels, post-purchase regret, and endogenized counterfeit.