Knowledge that Transforms

In this paper, we study the profitability of service‐level‐based price differentiation (SLBPD) in an inventory‐rationing context. SLBPD implies that a company offers several combinations of prices and guaranteed service levels, from which customers self‐select; different customers choose different offerings because they incur different shortage costs if an order is not fulfilled immediately. We develop an analytical model for SLBPD and explore if and when such a service differentiation strategy yields higher profits than a single undifferentiated offering. The results of our analyses suggest that SLBPD is profitable only if a company faces pricing restrictions, e.g., because of competitive pressure or regulatory restrictions. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions under which a specific and relevant form of SLBPD (called “service‐level‐based upselling”) is profitable, and provide an algorithm to compute the optimal parameters of such a policy. Based on this algorithm we carry out numerical analyses that allow us to characterize the profit increment of service‐level‐based upselling. We derive managerial insights into the attractiveness of SLBPD and explain how our basic analytical framework can be extended to account for more complex practical features.

We provide an exact myopic analysis for an N‐stage serial inventory system with batch ordering, linear ordering costs, and nonstationary demands under a finite planning horizon. We characterize the optimality conditions of the myopic nested batching newsvendor (NBN) policy and the myopic independent batching newsvendor (IBN) policy, which is a single‐stage approximation. We show that echelon reorder levels under the NBN policy are upper bounds of the counterparts under both the optimal policy and the IBN policy. In particular, we find that the IBN policy has bounded deviations from the optimal policy. We further extend our results to systems with martingale model of forecast evolution (MMFE) and advance demand information. Moreover, we provide a recursive computing procedure and optimality conditions for both heuristics which dramatically reduces computational complexity. We also find that the NBN problem under the MMFE faced by one stage has one more dimension for the forecast demand than the one faced by its downstream stage and that the NBN policy is optimal for systems with advance demand information and stationary problem data. Numerical studies demonstrate that the IBN policy outperforms on average the NBN policy over all tested instances when their optimality conditions are violated.

In this study, we consider a two‐retailer, one‐supplier supply chain in which retailers satisfy excess demand by offering to directly ship out‐of‐stock items on an expedited basis at no extra cost to customers. This practice is referred to as the fast‐ship option. We consider two scenarios along with the fast‐ship option. In the first scenario, retailers transship when out of stock, whereas in the second scenario, they do not. If they do not transship, some customers may perform the search on their own. In each scenario, the wholesale prices are either exogenous, or chosen endogenously by the supplier. For both cases, we determine the supplier's and the retailers’ optimal decisions. The key research question we ask and answer is the following: which of the two scenarios is preferred by either player when all decisions are made optimally? We show that when fewer customers are willing to search on their own and wholesale prices are exogenous, both the supplier and the retailers prefer to transship. In addition, the decision maker in a centralized chain will have the exact same preference as that of players in a decentralized setting when the retailers’ and the supplier's preferences coincide and wholesale prices are exogenous. This preference concordance does not hold if wholesale prices are endogenous.

In industries where firms perform dangerous (but necessary) operations, liability costs—due to potential harm to third parties—can be significant. Firms may therefore find it optimal to exit the market, and this may lead to an inefficiently low number of incumbents. A social planner can discourage exit by offering appropriately designed subsidies. Ex ante subsidies defray the costs associated with making operations safer (e.g., funds to subsidize the purchase of safety equipment). Ex post subsidies mitigate the financial damages caused by an accident (e.g., funds to defray the cost of cleaning up a toxic spill). We consider a model where (i) firms have private information about their ability to improve reliability and (ii) reliability investments are unobservable. We demonstrate that when the social value of reliability outweighs the benefit of increased competition, it is optimal to offer ex ante subsidies alone (i.e., to subsidize the cost of making operations safer). Conversely, when the benefits of competition outweigh the benefits of reliability, a combination of ex ante and ex post subsidies is optimal (i.e., not only to subsidize safer operations, but also to share the costs of a potential accident).

We study dual sourcing inventory systems with backordering and with stationary, stochastic demands. The two supply sources differ in their unit prices and lead times. We focus on the option of making costless returns to the cheaper, longer leadtime supplier. We show that the value of this option is zero. Our analysis leading to this result includes the derivation of several structural properties of the optimal policies for dual sourcing systems with and without the return option.

We demonstrate the need to view in a dynamic context any decision based on limited information. We focus on the use of product costs in selecting the product portfolio. We show how ex post data regarding the actual costs from implementing the decision leads to updating of product cost estimates and potentially trigger a revision of the initial decision. We model this updating process as a discrete dynamical system (DDS). We define a decision as informationally consistent if it is a fixed‐point solution to the DDS. We employ numerical analysis to characterize the existence and properties of such solutions. We find that fixed points are rare, but that simple heuristics find them often and quickly. We demonstrate the usefulness and robustness of our methodology by examining the interaction of limited information with multiple decision rules (heuristics) and problem features (size of product portfolio, profitability of product markets). We discuss implications for research on cost systems.

When firms evaluate their service system design choices, there is typically more uncertainty surrounding the value that a particular auxiliary service provides than there is on the cost of providing that service. To help inform this decision, we propose an approach where we compare the relative value of the segment of passengers who use an auxiliary service to the relative value of the segment that does not use it. We demonstrate this approach for a typical auxiliary service common to the airline industry. In 2008, most US airlines implemented checked baggage fee policies to decrease their costs by reducing the number of customer service agents needed in the check‐in and baggage handling processes. The success of this change has led to a current debate at many of these airlines on whether to make further staffing cuts in these areas, essentially making it even less attractive for passengers to check their baggage. Our proposed methodology helps answer whether passengers who continue to check bags in today's baggage‐fee era are more or less valuable than passengers who do not check bags. We explore this question empirically by examining, through a stated preference survey, if a history of checking or not checking bags can be used to segment passengers based on how their itinerary choices are influenced by common airline service attributes (on‐time performance, itinerary time, number of connections, airfare, and schedule delay). Contrary to the opinions of some top airline executives, we find that the passengers who continue to check bags at airlines that charge baggage fees are generally less sensitive to differences in three of these important service attributes and are less likely to switch airlines when a competing airline improves its offerings along these dimensions. Thus, airlines that charge for checked bags should consider improving the customer experience for their bag‐checking passengers, as they represent a potentially more valuable segment class to the airline.

Willingness To Pay (WTP) of customers plays an anchoring role in pricing. This study proposes a new choice model based on WTP, incorporating sequential decision making, where the products with positive utility of purchase are considered in the order of customer preference. We compare WTP‐choice model with the commonly used (multinomial) Logit model with respect to the underlying choice process, information requirement, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Using WTP‐choice model, we find and compare equilibrium and centrally optimal prices and profits without considering inventory availability. In addition, we compare equilibrium prices and profits in two contexts: without considering inventory availability and under lost sales. One of the interesting results with WTP‐choice model is the “loose coupling” of retailers in competition; prices are not coupled but profits are. That is, each retailer should charge the monopoly price as the collection of these prices constitute an equilibrium but each retailer's profit depends on other retailers' prices. Loose coupling fails with dependence of WTPs or dependence of preference on prices. Also, we show that competition among retailers facing dependent WTPs can cause price cycles under some conditions. We consider real‐life data on sales of yogurt, ketchup, candy melt, and tuna, and check if a version of WTP‐choice model (with uniform, triangle, or shifted exponential WTP distribution), standard or mixed Logit model fits better and predicts the sales better. These empirical tests establish that WTP‐choice model compares well and should be considered as a legitimate alternative to Logit models for studying pricing for products with low price and high frequency of purchase.

We extend the Clark–Scarf serial multi‐echelon inventory model to include procuring production inputs under short‐term take‐or‐pay contracts at one or more stages. In each period, each such stage has the option to order/process at two different cost rates; the cheaper rate applies to units up to the contract quantity selected in the previous period. We prove that in each period and at each such stage, there are three base‐stock levels that characterize an optimal policy, two for the inventory policy and one for the contract quantity selection policy. The optimal cost function is additively separable in its state variables, leading to conquering the curse of dimensionality and the opportunity to manage the supply chain using independently acting managers. We develop conditions under which myopic policies are optimal and illustrate the results using numerical examples. We establish and use a generic one‐period result, which generalizes an important such result in the literature. Extensions to cover variants of take‐or‐pay contracts are included. Limitations are discussed.