Knowledge that Transforms

Lack of coordination between machinery fault diagnosis and inventory management for spare parts can lead to increased inventory costs and disruptions in production activity. We develop a framework for incorporating real‐time condition monitoring information into inventory decisions for spare parts. We consider a manufacturer who periodically replenishes inventory for a machine part that is subject to deterioration. The deterioration is captured via condition monitoring and modeled using a Wiener process. The resulting degradation model is used to derive the life distribution of a functioning part and to estimate the demand distribution for spare parts. This estimation is periodically updated, in a Bayesian manner, as additional information on part deterioration is obtained. We develop an inventory model that incorporates this updated demand distribution and demonstrate that a dynamic base‐stock policy, in which the optimal base‐stock level is a function of some subset of the observed condition monitoring information, is optimal. We propose a myopic critical fractile policy that captures the essence of the optimal policy, but is easier to compute. Computational experiments indicate that this heuristic performs quite well relative to the optimal policy. Adaptive inventory policies such as these can help manufacturers to increase machine availability and reduce inventory costs.

We consider a two‐echelon supply chain with a manufacturer supplying to multiple downstream retailers engaged in differentiated Cournot competition. Each retailer has private information about uncertain demand. The manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader who sets the contract terms with the retailers, and benefits from retailers sharing their private information. When all retailers are given the same wholesale price, truthful information sharing is not an equilibrium outcome. We propose two variants of differential pricing mechanisms that induce truthful information sharing by all retailers. The first variant rewards a retailer for providing optimistic information and achieves truthful information sharing as a unique equilibrium. The differential pricing mechanism is optimal in the class of linear‐price, incentive‐compatible, direct mechanisms. The second variant, which incorporates provision for a fixed payment in addition to wholesale prices, preserves all the equilibrium properties of the first variant and additionally “nearly coordinates” the supply chain. Our analysis of differential pricing with a fixed payment provides interesting observations regarding the relationship between product substitutability, number of retailers, information precision, and market power. As products become closer substitutes and/or number of retailers increase, the manufacturer's market power increases, enabling her to extract a larger fraction of the supply chain surplus.

We study a supply chain with two suppliers competing over a contract to supply components to a manufacturer. One of the suppliers is a big company for whom the manufacturer's business constitutes a small part of his business. The other supplier is a small company for whom the manufacturer's business constitutes a large portion of his business. We analyze the problem from the perspective of the big supplier and address the following questions: What is the optimal contracting strategy that the big supplier should follow? How does the information about the small supplier's production cost affect the profits and contracting decision? How does the existence of the small supplier affect profits? By studying various information scenarios regarding the small supplier's and the manufacturer's production cost, we show, for example, that the big supplier benefits when the small supplier keeps its production cost private. We quantify the value of information for the big supplier and the manufacturer. We also quantify the cost (value) of the alternative‐sourcing option for the big supplier (the manufacturer). We determine when an alternative‐sourcing option has more impact on profits than information. We conclude with extensions and numerical examples to shed light on how system parameters affect this supply chain.

This paper examines the roles of three elements of intellectual capital in implementing process innovations. Building upon prior literature, we develop a model describing how worker expertise, information sharing quality, and psychological safety work together as elements of the human, structural, and social dimensions of intellectual capital to influence the technical success of manufacturing process innovation (MPI) projects. Results of an analysis of data describing 179 MPI projects in US firms strongly support a multidimensional, process‐oriented view of intellectual capital's effects on MPI project technical performance. We also find that the incrementalness of an MPI project plays a moderating role over the relationship between worker expertise and MPI performance. Our study provides insights on how intellectual capital can be more effectively accumulated in a project environment.

We study two prevailing types of take‐back schemes for electrical and electronic equipment waste recycling: monopolistic and competitive. We address key market and operating factors that make one scheme preferable to the other from the viewpoints of recyclers, manufacturers, and consumers. To this end, we model competitive decision making in both take‐back schemes as two‐stage sequential games between competing manufacturers and recyclers. Deriving and computing equilibria, we find that the competitive take‐back scheme often accomplishes a win–win situation, that is, lower product prices, and higher recycler and manufacturer profits. Exceptionally, recyclers prefer the monopolistic scheme when the substitutability level between the manufacturers' original products is high or economies of scale in recycling are very strong. We show that consolidation of the recycling industry could benefit all stakeholders when the economies of scale in recycling are strong, provided that manufacturer's products are not highly substitutable. Higher collection rates also render recycler consolidation desirable for all stakeholders. We also identify a potential free rider problem in the monopolistic scheme when recyclers differ in operational efficiency, and propose mechanisms to eliminate the discrepancy. We show that our results and insights are robust to the degree of competition within the recycling industry.

Channel rebates and returns policies are common mechanisms for manufacturers to entice retailers to increase their order quantities and sales ultimately. However, when the underlying demand depends on the retail price, it has been known that channel coordination cannot be achieved if only one of these mechanisms is deployed. In this article, we show that a policy that combines the use of wholesale price, channel rebate, and returns can coordinate a channel with both additive and multiplicative price‐dependent demands. In addition to determining the sufficient conditions for the contract parameters associated with the equilibrium policy, we show that multiple equilibrium policies for channel coordination exist. We further explore how the equilibrium policy can be adjusted to achieve Pareto improvement. Other issues such as the maximum amount of expected profit that the manufacturer can share under the coordinated channel, the structural properties of the contracts under both the additive and multiplicative price‐dependent demand functions are also discussed.

Under group buying, quantity discounts are offered based on the buyers' aggregated purchasing quantity, instead of individual quantities. As the price decreases with the total quantity, buyers receive lower prices than they otherwise would be able to obtain individually. Previous studies on group buying focus on the benefit buyers receive in reduced acquisition costs or enhanced bargaining power. In this paper, we show that buyers can instead get hurt from such cooperation. Specifically, we consider a two‐level distribution channel with a single manufacturer and two retailers who compete for end customers. We show that, under linear demand curves, group buying is always preferable for symmetric (i.e., identical) retailers. For asymmetric retailers (i.e., differing in market base and/or efficiency), group buying is beneficial to the smaller (or less efficient) player. However, it can be detrimental to the larger (or more efficient) one. Despite the lower wholesale price under group buying, the manufacturer can receive a higher revenue. Interestingly, group buying is more likely to form when retailers are competitive in different dimensions. These insights are shown to be robust under general nonlinear demand curves, except for constant elastic demand with low demand elasticity.

The operations management literature on mass customization mainly focuses on the questions of whether and how manufacturers can efficiently deliver customization. Researchers have analyzed the trade‐offs between customization and dimensions of operational performance such as delivery times, quality, and costs. However, we argue that providing efficient customization is not sufficient per se to assess the value of mass customization. From this perspective, this paper focuses on complementary mechanisms for creating value: the benefits perceived by individual consumers. Two global components of perceived value within the context of mass customization are identified: mass‐customized product, with three dimensions, and mass customization experience, with two dimensions. The Consumer‐Perceived Value Tool (CPVT) is proposed to empirically measure the five perceived benefits related to the mass‐customized product and to the codesign process from the consumer viewpoint. The psychometric properties of the CPVT are assessed using three samples. The implications of this approach are discussed, along with directions for further research.

We examine the effects of product variety and inventory levels on store sales. Using 4 years of data from stores of a large retailer, we show that increases in product variety and inventory levels are both associated with higher sales. We also show that increasing product variety and inventory levels has an indirect negative effect on store sales through their impact on phantom products—products that are physically present at the store, but only in storage areas where customers cannot find or purchase them. Our study highlights a consequence of increased product variety and inventory levels that has previously been overlooked in studies of retail product variety and inventory management. It also quantifies the impact of phantom products on store sales. In addition, our study provides empirical evidence to support earlier claims that higher product variety and inventory levels lead to an increase in defect rate. We discuss the implications of our findings for retail inventory and assortment planning and for the design of retail stores.

Retailers often face a newsvendor problem. Advance selling helps retailers to reduce demand uncertainty. Consumers, however, may prefer not to purchase in advance unless given a discount because they are uncertain about their valuation for the product in advance. It is then unclear whether or when advance selling to pass some uncertainty risk to consumers is optimal for the retailer. This paper examines the advance selling price and inventory decisions in a two‐period setting, where the first period is the advance selling period and the second is the selling (and consumption) period. We find that an advance selling strategy is not always optimal, but is contingent on parameters of the market (e.g., market potential and uncertainty) and the consumers (e.g., valuation, risk aversion, and heterogeneity). For example, we find that retailers should sell in advance if the consumers' expected valuation exceeds consumers' expected surplus when not buying early by a certain threshold. This threshold increases with the degree of risk aversion but decreases with stock out risk. If the degree of risk aversion varies across consumers, then a retailer should sell in advance if the probability for a consumer to spot buy is less than a critical fractile.