Knowledge that Transforms

Technology entrepreneurship is an important driver of economic growth, although entrepreneurs must maintain cooperative ties with the owners of any technology they hope to bring to market. Existing studies show that fairness perceptions have a great influence on this cooperation, but no research investigates its precise mechanisms or dynamic patterns. This study explores the development of 17 ventures that cooperated with a university‐owner of technology and thereby identifies different cooperation patterns in which fairness perceptions influence the degree of cooperation. These perceptions also change over time, partly as a function of accumulated experience and learning. A system dynamics model integrates insights from existing literature with the empirical findings to reveal which cooperation mechanisms relate to venture development over time; the combinations of individual experience, fairness perceptions, and market circumstances lead to four different patterns. This model can explain changes in entrepreneurial cooperation as a result of changes in fairness perceptions, which depend on learning effects and entrepreneurial experience. Each identified cooperation pattern has implications for research and offers insights for practitioners who need to manage relationships in practice.

This paper studies the impact of logistics performance on global bilateral trade. Taking a supply chain perspective, logistics performance refers to cost, time, and complexity in accomplishing import and export activities. We draw on a data set compiled by the World Bank containing specific quantitative metrics of logistics performance in terms of time, cost, and variability in time. Numerous researchers have shown that logistics performance is statistically significantly related to the volume of bilateral trade. Our research calibrates the impact of specific improvements in logistics performance (time, cost, and reliability) on increased trade. Our findings can spur public and private agencies that have direct or indirect influence over logistics performance to focus attention on altering the most relevant aspects of logistics performance to improve their country's ability to compete in today's global economy. Moreover, as our logistics metrics are directly related to operational performance, countries can use these metrics to target actions to improve logistics and monitor their progress.

Quality‐related incidents involving contract manufacturers (CMs) are becoming increasingly prevalent. The quality management (QM) literature, however, has focused mostly on QM within a single firm. Thus, the need for data‐driven research on managing quality with outsourced production is evident. We investigate the use and effectiveness of external failure penalties and audits of CMs’ facilities to manage inter‐firm quality. Building on agency theory and extant QM literature, this study addresses two research questions: (i) whether the control mechanisms of quality audits and contractual external quality failure penalties are substitutes or complements in use and (ii) whether they are substitutes or complements in their effectiveness at aligning the quality interests of customers and their CMs. Our analysis uses dyadic data gathered from brand‐owning firms and their CMs representing 95 contract manufacturing relationships in Food and Drug Administration (FDA)‐regulated industries. The results indicate that more severe external failure penalties correspond to a lower use of facility audits (i.e., they are substitutes‐in‐use). We also find that both external failure penalties and facility audits have a unique positive effect on the CM's perception of relative quality importance. Finally, some evidence supports the hypothesis that each mechanism is more effective in the presence of the other (i.e., they are complements‐in‐effectiveness).

We study several important aspects of using environmental taxes to motivate the choice of innovative and “green" emissions‐reducing technologies as well as the role of fixed cost subsidies and consumer rebates in this process. In our model, a profit‐maximizing monopolistic firm facing price‐dependent demand selects emissions control technology, production quantity, and price in response to the tax, subsidy, and rebate levels set by the regulator. The available technologies vary in environmental efficiency as well as in the fixed and variable costs. Both the optimal policy for the firm and the social‐welfare maximizing policy for the regulator are analyzed. We find that the firm's reaction to an increase in taxes may be non‐monotone: while an initial increase in taxes may motivate a switch to a greener technology, further tax increases may motivate a reverse switch. For the regulator, we compare the social welfare achievable in the centralized system (which serves as an upper bound) to the highest level achievable under different classes of environmental policies. If the regulator is limited to a tax‐only policy, then when the regulator is moderately concerned with environmental impacts, the tax level that maximizes social welfare simultaneously motivates the choice of clean technology and closes the gap to the upper bound; however, both low and high levels of societal environmental concerns may lead to the choice of dirty technology and significant welfare losses as compared to the centralized case. Supplementing the environmental taxation with fixed cost subsidies and consumer rebates can eliminate this effect, expanding the range of parameters over which the green technology is chosen and often closing the welfare gap to the centralized solution.

We report on results of several laboratory experiments that investigate on‐line procurement auctions in which suppliers bid on price, but exogenous bidder quality affects winner determination. In procurement auctions, bidder quality may or may not be publicly known to all bidders, and the effect of this quality transparency on the auction outcome is one aspect of auction design that we examine. The second aspect of auction design that we examine is the effect of price visibility on the auction outcome, and the interaction between price visibility and quality transparency. In terms of price visibility, we consider two extreme cases: the sealed bid request for proposals (RFPs), and the open‐bid dynamic auction event. In terms of bidder quality transparency, we also consider two extreme cases: a setting in which bidder qualities are publicly known and the case in which they are private. We find that in our laboratory experiments, the RFP format is consistent in generating higher buyer surplus levels than does the open‐bid dynamic format. This advantage is independent of the quality transparency. In contrast, the open‐bid format is highly sensitive to quality transparency, generating significantly lower buyer surplus levels when the information about bidder quality is public.

This study examines the effect that verbal scripts have on customer perceived service quality for two distinct service process types. We designed a video experiment that varied the level of verbal scripting for standardized and customized service encounters. We found that in standardized service encounters, an increase in the level of verbal scripting had no effect on perceived service quality. However, for customized encounters, perceived service quality was impacted. More specifically, a predominantly scripted encounter for customized service processes, on average, resulted in the lowest perception of service quality by respondents. Since verbal scripting was shown to impact customer perceptions of service quality, we suggest that a service provider's decision regarding the degree of verbal scripting is an important service design consideration.

The use of screening contracts is a common approach to solve supply chain coordination problems under asymmetric information. One main assumption in this context is that managers without specific incentives would rather use their private information strategically than reveal it truthfully. This harms supply chain performance. This study investigates the impact of information sharing in a principal‐agent setting that is typical for many supply chain transactions. We conduct a laboratory experiment to test whether information sharing has an influence on supply chain coordination. We find that information sharing within the supply chain has two positive effects. First, information sharing reduces the inefficiencies resulting from information deficits if there is a certain amount of trust in the supply chain. Second, communication can limit out‐of‐equilibrium behavior with a small impact on the firm's own payoff, but a large impact on the supply chain partner. Furthermore, we find that both effects are amplified when communication takes place in an environment that allows the less informed supply chain party to punish or to reward the better informed party. Although our extended mechanisms substantially enhance the poor performance of the theoretically optimal coordination contract menu, we find no mechanism that implements supply chain performance superior to the theoretically predicted second‐best level.

As the global competitive landscape intensifies, firms have looked to their supply chain organizations to improve cost, visibility, and cycle time performance across functions, products, and markets. As a result, the scope of supply chain related operations have increasingly cut across organizational boundaries. To understand and capture such cross‐organizational activities, researchers have broadened the focus of their studies and included multiple stakeholders in their analysis (e.g., integration, sustainability, and buyer‐supplier relationships). However, multi‐stakeholder research has also increased the complexity and effort required to conduct studies across organizational boundaries. Unfortunately, many studies that use multi‐stakeholder constructs fail to fully address their multi‐sided nature during both construct conceptualization and data collection. Several studies suggest that neglecting the multi‐sided nature of certain constructs can affect the research validity and reliability and may invalidate research inferences and results, although such concerns have not been empirically demonstrated. The current study addresses this gap by performing a series of tests using data from 105 matched pairs of buyers and their suppliers to illustrate key methodological considerations for conducting multi‐stakeholder research. This study also offers practical guidance regarding assumptions routinely made in single rater research and proposes when single rater data may be appropriate for multi‐stakeholder research.