Knowledge that Transforms

= 2,890, adult participants) conducted in the field, in the lab, and online documented opportunity neglect: a tendency to reject opportunities with low probability of success even when they come with little or no objective cost (e.g., time, money, reputation). Participants rejected a low-probability opportunity in an everyday context (Study 1). Participants also rejected incentive-compatible gambles with positive expected value-for both goods (Study 2) and money (Studies 3-7)-even with no possibility of monetary loss and nontrivial rewards (e.g., a 1% chance at $99). Participants rejected low-probability opportunities more frequently than high-probability opportunities with equal expected value (Study 3). Although taking some real-life opportunities comes with costs, we show that people are even willing to incur costs to opt out of low-probability opportunities (Study 4). Opportunity neglect can be mitigated by highlighting that rejecting an opportunity is equivalent to choosing a zero probability of success (Studies 6-7).

Recent studies have made clear that Black drivers in the United States are more likely to be stopped by police than White drivers and that the size of the disparity varies widely from one place to another. Now, two research teams have independently analyzed the same large data sets to investigate the role of racial bias in explaining the geographical patterning of racial disparities. The two teams’ findings are illuminating, both in their agreements and in their differences. First, the agreements. Both Stelter and colleagues (2022) and Ekstrom and colleagues (2022) found that counties with higher average levels of racial bias tend to have larger racial disparities in traffic stops. Both teams found that the association is significant for both explicitly measured and implicitly measured racial bias. And both teams found that disparities are higher in counties with larger White populations. As both teams note in different ways, these county-wide associations are unlikely to be explained by “a few bad apples” responsible for stopping Black drivers. Instead, these findings call for explanations at the level of communities. But what, exactly, explains these effects? Here the teams diverge in the questions they ask. Stelter and colleagues contrasted (a) measures of stereotypes linking Black Americans to weapons with (b) measures of evaluations linking Black and White people with “good” and “bad” in general. If disparate traffic stops resulted from stereotypes regarding disproportionate involvement of Black Americans in crime, they reason, then the stereotypes measure should be a stronger predictor than the evaluation measure. But it 1056641 PSSXXX10.1177/09567976211056641Payne, RuckerPsychological Science, 33(4) research-article2022

In popular belief, emotions are regarded as deeply subjective and thus as lacking truth value. Is this reflected at the behavioral or brain level? This work compared counter-normative emotion reports with perceptual-decision errors. Participants (university students; N = 29, 16, 40, and 60 in Experiments 1–4, respectively) were given trials comprising two tasks and were asked to (a) report their pleasant or unpleasant feelings in response to emotion-invoking pictures (emotion report) and (b) indicate the gender of faces (perceptual decision). Focusing on classical error markers, we found that the results of both tasks indicated (a) post-error slowing, (b) speed/accuracy trade-offs, (c) a heavier right tail of the reaction time distribution for errors or counter-normative responses relative to correct or normative responses, and (d) inconclusive evidence for error-related negativity in electroencephalograms. These results suggest that at both the behavioral and the brain levels, the experience of reporting counter-normative emotions is remarkably similar to that accompanying perceptual-decision errors.

Numerous studies have revealed that an enriched environment can enhance the survival-related behaviors and brain functions of animals. However, the effects and specific roles of the enrichment characteristics on animals’ innovative capability, a cognitive ability crucial for survival in nature, are still not well known. In this study, we assigned mice to environment-manipulation groups ( n = 15 each) to investigate the specific effects of environmental novelty (novel vs. familiar) and environmental complexity (complex vs. normal) on innovative problem solving and its possible neural mechanisms. Results showed that mice in only the novel-environment group performed better at innovative-problem-solving tasks and showed greater numbers of novel explorations and dopaminergic projections from the ventral tegmental area to the nucleus accumbens in the brain. These findings indicate that an enriched environment has the potential to promote the innovative capability of mice by enhancing their novel exploratory motivation, which depends on the novelty of the environment but not its complexity.

Courts in seven U.S. states have removed children with “obesity” from parental custody until children could maintain “healthy weights.” These rulings—alongside qualitative reports from parents of children with high weight (PoCHs)—suggest that PoCHs are judged as bad parents. Yet little work has tested whether people genuinely stigmatize PoCHs or what drives this phenomenon. In three experiments with U.S. online community participants ( N = 1,011; two preregistered), we tested an attribution theory model: Social perceivers attribute children’s weights to parents and thus stigmatize those parents. Experiments 1 and 2 support this model (across parent and child gender). Experiment 3 manipulated attributions of parental responsibility for child weight, revealing attenuated stigma with low attributions of responsibility. Findings are among the first to describe and explain stigma toward a large demographic (parents of children with obesity)—with real-world implications (e.g., for family separation, health care)—and may additionally illuminate the psychology underlying stigma toward parents of children with other potentially stigma-evoking identities.

The meaning of places is socially constructed, often informed by the groups that seem pervasive there. For instance, the University of Pennsylvania is sometimes pejoratively called “Jew-niversity of Pennsylvania,” and the city of Decatur, Georgia, is disparagingly nicknamed “Dyke-atur,” connoting the respective pervasiveness of Jewish students and gay residents. Because these pervasiveness perceptions meaningfully impact how people navigate the social world, it is critical to understand the factors that influence their formation. Across surveys, experiments, and archival data, six studies ( N = 3,039 American adults) revealed the role of symbolic threat (i.e., perceived differences in values and worldviews). Specifically, holding constant important features of the group and context, we demonstrated that groups higher in symbolic threat are perceived as more populous in a place and more associated with that place than groups lower in symbolic threat. Ultimately, this work reveals that symbolic threat can both distort how people understand their surroundings and shape the meaning of places.

Everyone knows that if you want to learn how to do something, you should get advice from people who do it well. But is everyone right? In a series of studies ( N = 8,693), adult participants played a game after receiving performance advice from previous participants. Although advice from the best-performing advisors was no more beneficial than advice from other advisors, participants believed that it had been—and they believed this despite the fact that they were told nothing about their advisors’ performance. Why? The best performers did not give better advice, but they did give more of it, and participants apparently mistook quantity for quality. These studies suggest that performing and advising may often be unrelated skills and that in at least some domains, people may overvalue advice from top performers.

= 1,495 adults), I found that paying people to engage in moralistic punishment reduces their willingness to do so. In an economic game with real stakes, providing a monetary bonus for engaging in third-party punishment of unfair offers nearly cut participants' willingness to do so in half. In judgments of hypothetical transgressions, participants viewed punishers who accepted payment as having worse character and rated the punishers' punitive actions as less morally acceptable. Willingness to engage in punishment was restored if participants were offered large enough payments or were told that punishment accompanied by payment still signals moral virtue. Data were consistent with a signal-corruption mechanism whereby payment interferes with the prosocial signal that moralistic punishment provides about a punisher's motives. These findings have implications for the cultural evolution of punishment and suggest that understanding perpetrators' sociomoral incentives is essential to implementing conflict-reduction policies.

Cultures around the world organize stars into constellations, or asterisms, and these groupings are often considered to be arbitrary and culture specific. Yet there are striking similarities in asterisms across cultures, and groupings such as Orion, the Big Dipper, the Pleiades, and the Southern Cross are widely recognized across many different cultures. Psychologists have informally suggested that these shared patterns are explained by Gestalt laws of grouping, but there have been no systematic attempts to catalog asterisms that recur across cultures or to explain the perceptual basis of these groupings. Here, we compiled data from 27 cultures around the world and found that a simple computational model of perceptual grouping accounts for many of the recurring cross-cultural asterisms. Our results suggest that basic perceptual principles account for more of the structure of asterisms across cultures than previously acknowledged and highlight ways in which specific cultures depart from this shared baseline.

Examining how informal knowledge systems change after formal instruction is imperative to understanding learning processes and conceptual development and to implementing effective educational practices. We used network analyses to determine how the organization of informal knowledge about multidigit numbers in kindergartners ( N = 279; mean age = 5.76 years, SD = 0.55; 135 females) supports and is transformed by a year of in-school formal instruction. The results show that in kindergarten, piecemeal knowledge about the surface properties of reading and writing multidigit numbers and the use of base-10 units to determine large quantities are strongly associated with each other and connected in a stringlike manner to other emerging skills. After a year of instruction, each skill becomes connected to the “hub” abilities of reading and writing multidigit numbers, which also become strongly connected to more advanced knowledge of base-10 principles. These findings provide new insights into how partial knowledge provides the backbone on which explicit principles are learned.