Knowledge that Transforms

Does overconfidence really confer adaptive benefits to children’s learning? Through a tripartite investigation involving a preregistered replication (Study 1; N = 30, children aged 6–8 years), computational simulation (Study 2), and an experimental intervention (Study 3; N = 64, children aged 6–8 years), we first replicated previous findings that highly overconfident (HO) children exhibited less negative performance change across a memory task than their low-overconfidence (LO) counterparts. However, this pattern was driven by participant-selection bias and regression-to-the-mean effects rather than by adaptive benefits of childhood overconfidence. When experimentally manipulating children’s overconfidence levels to eliminate these methodological drawbacks, the difference in performance changes between HO and LO children disappeared. These findings challenge an influential hypothesis about the adaptive nature of childhood overconfidence, underscore the risks of median-split designs with difference scores, highlight the necessity of causal experimental approaches in developmental research, and raise concerns about educational practices promoting positive illusions in children.

Context drives our interpretations of music as surprising, frightening, or awe-inspiring. However, it remains unclear how formal musical training affects our ability to hierarchically integrate complex tonal information to efficiently predict, remember, and segment music. We scrambled naturalistic music at multiple timescales to manipulate coherent tonal context while controlling for multiple acoustic cues. Memory (Experiment 1; n = 108, age range = 19–41 years) and prediction (Experiment 2; n = 108, age range = 20–41 years) improved with more intact context for both musicians and nonmusicians. Listeners’ event boundaries were influenced by the amount of tonal context but also reflected nested phrase structure, and musicians were more sensitive to longer-timescale “hyperphrase” structure (Experiment 3; n = 95, age range = 20–42 years) and could better identify the amount of scrambling (Experiment 4; n = 108, age range = 19–41 years). These results indicate that listeners integrate tonal context across complex phrases to efficiently encode, predict, and segment naturalistic music and that in general, training has surprisingly little impact on this integration.

A fundamental underlying question about the nature of overconfidence has continued to be subject to scholarly dispute: Is overconfidence a genuine psychological trait? To advance this contested research topic, we engaged in an adversarial collaboration in which two research teams agreed upon a set of critical tests and preregistered their analyses and predictions prior to data collection. Our study ( N = 942; U.S. adults from CloudConnect) leverages a methodological innovation: To measure trait overconfidence absent task-related confounds, we developed a set of novel tasks in which performance is ostensibly random. When we assess confidence this way, we find robust relationships across tasks as measured by both confirmatory factor analyses and raw correlations. This indicates that some people do believe that they are able to perform relatively well on tasks even when there is little reason for that confidence. Our results support the claim that overconfidence might be a trait.

Can nonnative English accents become barriers to garnering attention in public discourse? The current study examined this question. Analyzing 5,367 TED Talks through computational methodologies such as voice recognition, natural language processing, and vision models, we investigated the relationship between speakers’ accents and online engagement. After adjusting for various control variables with a series of robustness checks, we found a sizeable disparity in public discourse: Speakers with nonnative accents received less engagement than speakers with native accents. To complement our findings, we conducted a controlled social-psychological experiment among English-speaking American adults ( N = 462) and a direct replication ( N = 916) that corroborated our computational analyses and highlighted stereotyping and processing disfluency as key factors driving reduced engagement in accented speakers. Our research highlights the pervasive impact of accent discrimination in global communication and emphasizes the need for strategies to mitigate its detrimental effects on knowledge exchange across cultural and linguistic boundaries.

Scholars have extolled the virtues of rationality for centuries while also debating what rationality is and who is rational. Advancing these debates, we used word embeddings trained on 840 billion words of internet text-and validated with Prolific workers in the United States-to uncover the representation, group stereotypes, and occupational correlates of rationality at scale in naturalistic language. Four results emerged. First, rather than being synonymous with competence, representations of rationality included both an analytic/logic component and an interpersonal/trust component. Second, irrationality was not merely the opposite of rationality but contained its own unique subcomponents (volatility and unfairness). Third, rationality was consistently ascribed to high-power targets across 66 social groups. Last, rationality (especially its analytic component) was consistently associated with both earnings and wage gaps across 101 occupations. Associations with demographic representation were less consistent. Complementing normative approaches, these descriptive findings advance canonical debates about rationality, extending understanding of its components, stereotypes, and correlates.

Knowing the similarities among others is critical for navigating our social environments and building relationships. However, people can evaluate the similarity among others using two perspectives: other-to-other differences (allocentric similarity) or self-to-other differences (egocentric similarity). Here, we use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to test whether the similarity of brain-response patterns when thinking of others and the self is predicted by behavioral models of allocentric and egocentric similarity in the representations of acquainted peers from 20 independent groups of adults (total N = 108; within-subjects design). Results show that both allocentric and egocentric similarity during person representation are reflected in brain-response similarity patterns when thinking of others, but they do so differentially and in nonoverlapping brain systems. These results suggest that the brain independently processes both allocentric and egocentric reference frames to encode trait information about conspecifics that we use to represent person knowledge about others within real-world social networks.

Biased media content shapes children's social concepts and identities. We examined gender bias in a large corpus of scripts from 98 children's television programs from the United States spanning the years 1960 to 2018 (6,600 episodes, ~2.7 million sentences, ~16 million words). We focused on agency and communion, the fundamental psychological dimensions underlying gender stereotypes. At the syntactic level, words referring to men or boys (vs. women or girls) appear more often in the agent (vs. patient) role. This syntactic bias remained stable between 1960 and 2018. At the semantic level, words referring to men or boys (vs. women or girls) co-occurred more often with words denoting agency. Words denoting communion showed both stereotypical and counterstereotypical associations. Some semantic gender biases have remained unchanged or have weakened over time; others have grown. These findings suggest that gender stereotypes are built into the core of children's stories. Whether we are closer today to gender equality in children's media depends on where one looks.

Most biased comments people experience are from friends. However, little is known about how people process experiences in which a friend expresses bias and how the relationship might be affected. The current research examines the anticipated relational effects of confronting (vs. not confronting) a friend’s bias, using adult participants in the United States. Asian participants who imagined confronting a White friend’s biased comment (or a stranger’s: see Study 1) anticipated higher friendship or relationship quality compared with those who imagined not having that confrontation. This effect remained regardless of whether bias was directed toward participants’ in-group or toward an out-group (see Study 2). The closer people felt to their friend, the more confronting (vs. not confronting) elicited higher friendship quality. Experimentally testing for mechanism demonstrated that the effect of confronting is driven by greater anticipated understanding (see Study 3). This work reveals that Asian people expect that confronting a friend’s bias will elicit greater understanding and buffer against negative interpersonal effects. Statement of Relevance The majority of biased comments people hear are from friends (Dickter & Newton, 2013), and 40% of Americans report confronting a friend or family member for a biased comment (Horowitz et al., 2019). Yet, how people think about confronting a friend (or not) is unknown. Relationship quality can be improved by mutual understanding (Reis et al., 2017), and confronting can provide an opportunity to express oneself and establish understanding with close others. Further, a proposed starting point for healing racial division is to start a conversation and talk to one’s friends (Song, 2019). Thus, it is essential to understand how racial minorities expect their interracial relationships to be impacted when they confront others about bias. Ultimately, our research helps explain why minority-group members might choose to confront bias from a close friend—namely, that they expect it to be less detrimental for their friendship than to stay silent.

Effective learning involves not only the ability to quickly acquire knowledge and skills, but also the capacity to accurately monitor one’s ongoing learning progress. The present research probed the relation between learning ability and monitoring accuracy. A meta-analysis (Study 1, N = 2,406) counterintuitively found that individuals with superior learning ability exhibited slightly poorer monitoring accuracy (measured as the resolution of judgments of learning). Study 2 reanalyzed the meta-analysis data and observed that expert learners remembered more items they erroneously believed they would not remember, and this underconfidence in expert learners led to a negative association between learning ability and monitoring accuracy. Studies 3 ( N = 102, adults aged 18–23) and 4 ( N = 481, adults aged 18–59) conceptually replicated the findings of Studies 1 and 2 in controlled experiments. These findings challenge the conventional wisdom that good learners are also good monitors, suggesting instead that expert learners are actually the ones with monitoring deficits.

Overconfidence is thought to be a fundamental cognitive bias, but it is typically studied in environments where people lack accurate information about their abilities. We conducted a preregistered survey experiment and replication to learn whether overconfidence persists among tournament chess players who receive objective, precise, and public feedback about their skill. Our combined sample comprised 3,388 rated players aged 5 to 88 years from 22 countries with an average of 18.8 years of tournament experience. On average, participants asserted that their ability was 89 Elo rating points higher than their observed ratings indicated-expecting to outscore an equally rated opponent by nearly 2 to 1. One year later, only 11.3% of overconfident players achieved their asserted ability rating. Low-rated players overestimated their skill the most, and top-rated players were calibrated. Patterns consistent with overconfidence emerged in every sociodemographic subgroup we studied. We conclude that overconfidence persists in tournament chess, a real-world information environment that should be inhospitable to it.