Knowledge that Transforms

It is well established that emotion and cognition interact in humans, but such an interaction has not been extensively studied in nonhuman primates. We investigated whether emotional value can affect nonhuman primates' processing of stimuli that are only mentally represented, not visually available. In a short-term memory task, baboons memorized the location of two target squares of the same color, which were presented with a distractor of a different color. Through prior long-term conditioning, one of the two colors had acquired a negative valence. Subjects were slower and less accurate on the memory task when the targets were negative than when they were neutral. In contrast, subjects were faster and more accurate when the distractors were negative than when they were neutral. Some of these effects were modulated by individual differences in emotional disposition. Overall, the results reveal a pattern of cognitive avoidance of negative stimuli, and show that emotional value alters cognitive processing in baboons even when the stimuli are not physically present. This suggests that emotional influences on cognition are deeply rooted in evolutionary continuity.

Despite the ubiquitous use of Pavlovian fear conditioning as a model for fear learning, the highly predictable conditions used in the laboratory do not resemble real-world conditions, in which dangerous situations can lead to unpleasant outcomes in unpredictable ways. In the current experiments, we varied the timing of aversive events after predictive cues in rodents and discovered that temporal ambiguity of aversive events greatly enhances fear. During fear conditioning with unpredictably timed aversive events, pharmacological inactivation of the dorsal hippocampus or optogenetic silencing of cornu ammonis 1 cells during aversive negative prediction errors prevented this enhancement of fear without affecting fear learning for predictable events. Dorsal hippocampal inactivation also prevented ambiguity-related enhancement of fear during auditory fear conditioning under a partial-reinforcement schedule. These results reveal that information about the timing and occurrence of aversive events is rapidly acquired and that unexpectedly timed or omitted aversive events generate hippocampal signals to enhance fear learning.

Cognitive-control theories attribute action control to executive processes that modulate behavior on the basis of expectancy or task rules. In the current study, we examined corticospinal excitability and behavioral performance in a go/no-go task. Go and no-go trials were presented in runs of five, and go and no-go runs alternated predictably. At the beginning of each trial, subjects indicated whether they expected a go trial or a no-go trial. Analyses revealed that subjects immediately adjusted their expectancy ratings when a new run started. However, motor excitability was primarily associated with the properties of the previous trial, rather than the predicted properties of the current trial. We also observed a large latency cost at the beginning of a go run (i.e., reaction times were longer for the first trial in a go run than for the second trial). These findings indicate that actions in predictable environments are substantially influenced by previous events, even if this influence conflicts with conscious expectancies about upcoming events.

When engaging in joint activities, humans tend to sacrifice some of their own sensorimotor comfort and efficiency to facilitate a partner's performance. In the two experiments reported here, we investigated whether ownership-a socioculturally based nonphysical feature ascribed to objects-influenced facilitatory motor behavior in joint action. Participants passed mugs that differed in ownership status across a table to a partner. We found that participants oriented handles less toward their partners when passing their own mugs than when passing mugs owned by their partners (Experiment 1) and mugs owned by the experimenter (Experiment 2). These findings indicate that individuals plan and execute actions that assist their partners but do so to a smaller degree if it is the individuals' own property that the partners intend to manipulate. We discuss these findings in terms of underlying variables associated with ownership and conclude that a self-other distinction can be found in the human sensorimotor system.

A recent study has linked individual differences in face recognition to rs237887, a single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) of the oxytocin receptor gene ( OXTR; Skuse et al., 2014). In that study, participants were assessed using the Warrington Recognition Memory Test for Faces, but performance on Warrington's test has been shown not to rely purely on face recognition processes. We administered the widely used Cambridge Face Memory Test-a purer test of face recognition-to 370 participants. Performance was not significantly associated with rs237887, with 16 other SNPs of OXTR that we genotyped, or with a further 75 imputed SNPs. We also administered three other tests of face processing (the Mooney Face Test, the Glasgow Face Matching Test, and the Composite Face Test), but performance was never significantly associated with rs237887 or with any of the other genotyped or imputed SNPs, after corrections for multiple testing. In addition, we found no associations between OXTR and Autism-Spectrum Quotient scores.

Observers experience affordance-specific biases in visual processing for objects within the hands' grasping space, but the mechanism that tunes visual cognition to facilitate action remains unknown. I investigated the hypothesis that altered vision near the hands is a result of experience-driven plasticity. Participants performed motion-detection and form-perception tasks-while their hands were either near the display, in atypical grasping postures, or positioned in their laps-both before and after learning novel grasp affordances. Participants showed enhanced temporal sensitivity for stimuli viewed near the backs of the hands after training to execute a power grasp using the backs of their hands (Experiment 1), but showed enhanced spatial sensitivity for stimuli viewed near the tips of their little fingers after training to use their little fingers to execute a precision grasp (Experiment 2). These results show that visual biases near the hands are plastic, facilitating processing of information relevant to learned grasp affordances.

The most salient dimension of men's sexual orientation is gender: attraction to males versus females. A second dimension is sexual maturity: attraction to children versus adults. A less appreciated dimension is location: attraction to other individuals versus the sexual fantasy of being one of those individuals. Men sexually aroused by the idea or fantasy of being the kinds of individuals to whom they are sexually attracted have an erotic-target identity inversion (ETII). We conducted an online survey to investigate the prevalence and phenomenology of ETIIs among 475 men sexually attracted to children. Autopedophilia, or sexual arousal by the idea of being a child, was common. Furthermore, autopedophilic men tended to be sexually aroused by imagining themselves as the kinds of children (with respect to gender and age) to whom they are sexually attracted. Results support the concept of ETIIs and exemplify the simultaneous importance of three dimensions of male sexual orientation.

Previous research has demonstrated that emotional information processing can be modulated by what is being held in working memory (WM). Here, we showed that such content-based WM effects can occur even when the emotional information is suppressed from conscious awareness. Using the delayed-match-to-sample paradigm in conjunction with continuous flash suppression, we found that suppressed threatening (fearful and angry) faces emerged from suppression faster when they matched the emotional valence of WM contents than when they did not. This effect cannot be explained by perceptual priming, as it disappeared when the faces were only passively viewed and not held in WM. Crucially, such an effect is highly specific to threatening faces but not to happy or neutral faces. Our findings together suggest that WM can modulate nonconscious emotion processing, which highlights the functional association between nonconsciously triggered emotional processes and conscious emotion representation.

Brief verbal descriptions of people's bodies (e.g., "curvy," "long-legged") can elicit vivid mental images. The ease with which these mental images are created belies the complexity of three-dimensional body shapes. We explored the relationship between body shapes and body descriptions and showed that a small number of words can be used to generate categorically accurate representations of three-dimensional bodies. The dimensions of body-shape variation that emerged in a language-based similarity space were related to major dimensions of variation computed directly from three-dimensional laser scans of 2,094 bodies. This relationship allowed us to generate three-dimensional models of people in the shape space using only their coordinates on analogous dimensions in the language-based description space. Human descriptions of photographed bodies and their corresponding models matched closely. The natural mapping between the spaces illustrates the role of language as a concise code for body shape that captures perceptually salient global and local body features.

Two episodes of attentional selection cannot occur very close in time. This is the traditional account of the attentional blink, whereby observers fail to report the second of two temporally proximal targets. Recent analyses have challenged this simple account, suggesting that attentional selection during the attentional blink is not only (a) suppressed, but also (b) temporally advanced then delayed, and (c) temporally diffused. Here, we reanalyzed six data sets using mixture modeling of report errors, and revealed much simpler dynamics. Exposing a problem inherent in previous analyses, we found evidence of a second attentional episode only when the second target (T2) follows the first (T1) by more than 100 to 250 ms. When a second episode occurs, suppression and delay reduce steadily as lag increases and temporal precision is stable. At shorter lags, both targets are reported from a single episode, which explains why T2 can escape the attentional blink when it immediately follows T1 (Lag-1 sparing).