Knowledge that Transforms

People like having options when choosing, but having too many options can lead to negative decision-related consequences. The present study focused on how social-relational factors--common aspects of daily life--can maintain or attenuate the appeal of choice. Study 1 examined the effect of a supportive- or nonsupportive-relationship prime on the decision to pay for having more options in choosing a consumer product. People who thought of supportive relationships, compared with those who thought of nonsupportive ones (and control participants), were less willing to pay for a larger choice set. Study 2 showed that the activation of thoughts of security and calmness in participants recalling supportive relationships (compared with participants recalling nonsupportive relationships) mediated the appeal of choice. This finding offers one possible explanation for the reduced desire for options when people are reminded of supportive relationships.

We investigated people's ability to decide how much time to spend on the task at hand. To make such decisions well, one must take into account, among other things, the cost of failing and how one's task performance changes as a function of time. We first investigated timing decisions when the underlying task was perceptual. Decisions were highly efficient and suggested that people can make good use of perceptual knowledge and abstract reward information. Previous studies have found that perceptual decisions are generally optimal, but that cognitive decisions are generally suboptimal--a perception-cognition gap. Does a similar gap exist for timing decisions? We compared timing decisions for a perceptual task with timing decisions for more cognitive tasks. Performance was highly similar across the tasks, which suggests that knowledge can be acquired, and used to make timing decisions, in an equally efficient way regardless of whether that knowledge is derived through perceptual or cognitive experience.

Visual rivalry has been extensively characterized in the literature. It is thought to require spatial conflict between overlapping visual presentations, even in studies that have found nonspatial (i.e., nonretinal) influences on rivalry. Unexpectedly, we identified visual rivalry in the complete absence of spatial conflict. Participants experienced visual rivalry when we placed a nonambiguous motion stimulus in a nonspatial (in our case, object-based) reference frame. Moreover, a stimulus that was displaced within a nonspatial reference frame did not induce rivalry despite the presence of spatial conflict. This finding shows that nonspatial, object-based processing can overrule retinotopic processing and prevent rivalry from occurring when a perceived stimulus exists unambiguously in an object-based reference frame. Our results identify a potent high-level conflict-resolution stage independent of low-level spatial visual conflict. This independence of spatial overlap provides an advantage to the visual system, allowing conflict resolution when an object is nonstationary on the retina (e.g., during frequently occurring eye movements).

The visual system is intelligent--it is capable of recovering a coherent surface from an incomplete one, a feat known as perceptual completion or filling in. Traditionally, it has been assumed that surface features are interpolated in a way that resembles the fragmented parts. Using displays featuring four circular apertures, we showed in the study reported here that a distinct completed feature (horizontal motion) arises from local ones (oblique motions)-we term this process emergent filling in. Adaptation to emergent filling-in motion generated a dynamic motion aftereffect that was not due to spreading of local motion from the isolated apertures. The filling-in motion aftereffect occurred in both modal and amodal completions, and it was modulated by selective attention. These findings highlight the importance of high-level interpolation processes in filling in and are consistent with the idea that during emergent filling in, the more cognitive-symbolic processes in later areas (e.g., the middle temporal visual area and the lateral occipital complex) provide important feedback signals to guide more isomorphic processes in earlier areas (V1 and V2).

In the research reported here, I examined whether the verbs applied to descriptions of past emotional experiences influence present mood and happiness. Participants who described a positive experience using the imperfective aspect, which implies ongoing progression, subsequently reported more positive mood and greater happiness than did participants who described a positive experience using the perfective aspect, which implies completion; likewise, participants who described a negative experience using the imperfective aspect subsequently reported more negative mood and less happiness than did participants who described a negative experience using the perfective aspect. These effects were traced to enhanced memory for the described emotional experience in the imperfective condition relative to the perfective condition. The findings demonstrate how formal features of language shape both the reinstatement of past affective reactions and happiness judgments, and may have practical applications for improving subjective well-being.

Language and concepts are intimately linked, but how do they interact? In the study reported here, we probed the relation between conceptual and linguistic processing at the earliest processing stages. We presented observers with sequences of visual scenes lasting 200 or 250 ms per picture. Results showed that observers understood and remembered the scenes' abstract gist and, therefore, their conceptual meaning. However, observers remembered the scenes at least as well when they simultaneously performed a linguistic secondary task (i.e., reading and retaining sentences); in contrast, a nonlinguistic secondary task (equated for difficulty with the linguistic task) impaired scene recognition. Further, encoding scenes interfered with performance on the nonlinguistic task and vice versa, but scene processing and performing the linguistic task did not affect each other. At the earliest stages of conceptual processing, the extraction of meaning from visually presented linguistic stimuli and the extraction of conceptual information from the world take place in remarkably independent channels.

The time spent choosing between temporally extended behaviors cannot, in general, last as long as the behaviors themselves; otherwise, the tiger on your tail would have you for lunch. Previous reaction time studies provide little information on this topic, which was explored in the study reported here by showing participants images of scenes for which they could choose a left or right walking-and-reaching path. The paths they chose were nearly identical to ones chosen by participants who actually performed the task in a previous study. Moreover, the times participants took to choose the actions were about 5 times shorter than the times it took to perform them. The choice-time data were inconsistent with the idea that participants picked the path with a lower cost after mentally simulating the paths one after the other. Showing real-world scenes and having participants choose actions for them holds promise for future research in cognitive psychology, ecological psychology, and behavioral ecology.

Similarity plays a critical role in many judgments and choices. Traditional models of similarity posit that increasing the number of differences between objects cannot increase judged similarity between them. In contrast to these previous models, the present research shows that introducing a small difference in an attribute that previously was identical across objects can increase perceived similarity between those objects. We propose an explanation based on the idea that small differences draw more attention than identical attributes do and that people's perceptions of similarity involve averaging attributes that are salient. We provide evidence that introducing small differences between objects increases perceived similarity. We also show that an increase in similarity decreases the difficulty of choice and the likelihood that a choice will be deferred.

Decision makers typically overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities. However, there are recent reports that when probability is presented in the form of relative frequencies, this typical pattern reverses. We tested this hypothesis by comparing decision making in two tasks: In one task, probability was stated numerically, and in the other task, it was conveyed through a visual representation. In the visual task, participants chose whether a "stochastic bullet" should be fired at either a large target for a small reward or a small target for a large reward. Participants' knowledge of probability in the visual task was the result of extensive practice firing bullets at targets. In the classical numerical task, participants chose between pairs of lotteries with probabilities and rewards matched to the probabilities and rewards in the visual task. We found that participants' probability-weighting functions were significantly different in the two tasks, but the pattern for the visual task was the typical, not the reversed, pattern.