Knowledge that Transforms

We investigated 1-year-old infants' ability to infer an adult's focus of attention solely on the basis of her voice direction. In Studies 1 and 2, 12- and 16-month-olds watched an adult go behind a barrier and then heard her verbally express excitement about a toy hidden in one of two boxes at either end of the barrier. Even though they could not see the adult, infants of both ages followed her voice direction to the box containing the toy. Study 2 showed that infants could do this even when the adult was positioned closer to the incorrect box while she vocalized toward the correct one (and thus ruled out the possibility that infants were merely approaching the source of the sound). In Study 3, using the same methods as in Study 2, we found that chimpanzees performed the task at chance level. Our results show that infants can determine the focus of another person's attention through auditory information alone-a useful skill for establishing joint attention.

How does the visual system recognize a camouflaged object? Obviously, the brain cannot afford to learn all possible camouflaged scenes or target objects. However, it may learn the general statistical properties of backgrounds of interest, which would enable it to break camouflage by comparing the statistics of a background with a target versus the statistics of the same background without a target. To determine whether the brain uses this strategy, we digitally created novel camouflaged scenes that had only the general statistical properties of the background in common. When subjects learned to break camouflage, their ability to detect a camouflaged target improved significantly not only for previously unseen instances of a camouflaged scene, but also for scenes that contained novel targets. Moreover, performance improved even for scenes that did not contain an actual target but had the statistical properties of backgrounds with a target. These results reveal that learning backgrounds is a powerful, versatile strategy by which the brain can learn to break camouflage.

Imitation of facial gestures requires the cognitive system to equate the seen-but-unfelt with the felt-but-unseen. Rival accounts propose that this "correspondence problem" is solved either by an innate supramodal mechanism (the active intermodal-mapping, or AIM, model) or by learned, direct links between the corresponding visual and proprioceptive representations of actions (the associative sequence-learning, or ASL, model). Two experiments tested these alternative models using a new technology that permits, for the first time, the automated objective measurement of imitative accuracy. Euclidean distances, measured in image-derived principal component space, were used to quantify the accuracy of adult participants' attempts to replicate their own facial expressions before, during, and after training. Results supported the ASL model. In Experiment 1, participants reliant solely on proprioceptive feedback got progressively worse at self-imitation. In Experiment 2, participants who received visual feedback that did not match their execution of facial gestures also failed to improve. However, in both experiments, groups that received visual feedback contingent on their execution of facial gestures showed progressive improvement.

Recognizing and categorizing behavior is essential for animals (e.g., during mate selection, courtship, and avoidance of predators). In a study examining if and how animals classify different actions, a go/no-go procedure was used to train 4 pigeons to discriminate among "walking" and "running" digital animal models (each portrayed from 12 different viewpoints). Action discrimination acquired for two models significantly transferred to six novel animal models moving in novel and biomechanically characteristic ways. Randomization of frame order in the animated sequences, stimulus inversion, and static presentation all disrupted this discrimination, whereas changes in the direction and speed (both increases and decreases) of the actions did not. These results suggest that the pigeons discriminated the behaviors on the basis of generalized recognition of the models' sequence of poses across time and provide the best evidence yet that animals use action categories to identify contrasting behavioral units.

Processes of proactive interference were explored using the pigeon as a model system of memory. This study shows that proactive interference extends back in time at least 16 trials (and as many minutes), revealing a continuum of interference and providing a framework for studying memory. Pigeons were tested in a delayed same/different task containing trial-unique pictures. On interference trials, sample pictures from previous trials reappeared as test pictures on different trials. Proactive-interference functions showed greatest interference from the most recent trial and with the longer of two delays (10 s vs. 1 s). These interference functions are accounted for by a time-estimation model based on signal detection theory. The model predicts that accuracy at test is determined solely by the ratio of the elapsed time since the offset of the current-trial sample to the elapsed time since the offset of the interfering sample. Implications for comparing memory of different species and different types of memory (e.g., familiarity vs. recollection) are discussed.

In multistable perception, the brain alternates between several perceptual explanations of ambiguous sensory signals. It is unknown whether multistable processes can interact across the senses. In the study reported here, we presented subjects with unisensory (visual or tactile), spatially congruent visuotactile, and spatially incongruent visuotactile apparent motion quartets. Congruent stimulation induced pronounced visuotactile interactions, as indicated by increased dominance times for both vision and touch, and an increased percentage bias for the percept already dominant under unisensory stimulation. Thus, the joint evidence from vision and touch stabilizes the more likely perceptual interpretation and thereby decelerates the rivalry dynamics. Yet the temporal dynamics depended also on subjects' attentional focus and was generally slower for tactile than for visual reports. Our results support Bayesian approaches to perceptual inference, in which the probability of a perceptual interpretation is determined by combining visual, tactile, or visuotactile evidence with modality-specific priors that depend on subjects' attentional focus. Critically, the specificity of visuotactile interactions for spatially congruent stimulation indicates multisensory rather than cognitive-bias mechanisms.

Visual perception starts with localized filters that subdivide the image into fragments that undergo separate analyses. The visual system has to reconstruct objects by grouping image fragments that belong to the same object. A widely held view is that perceptual grouping occurs in parallel across the visual scene and without attention. To test this idea, we measured the speed of grouping in pictures of animals and vehicles. In a classification task, these pictures were categorized efficiently. In an image-parsing task, participants reported whether two cues fell on the same or different objects, and we measured reaction times. Despite the participants' fast object classification, perceptual grouping required more time if the distance between cues was larger, and we observed an additional delay when the cues fell on different parts of a single object. Parsing was also slower for inverted than for upright objects. These results imply that perception starts with rapid object classification and that rapid classification is followed by a serial perceptual grouping phase, which is more efficient for objects in a familiar orientation than for objects in an unfamiliar orientation.

In two scenario-based studies, we found that women and men evaluate glass-cliff positions (i.e., precarious leadership positions at organizations in crisis) differently depending on the social and financial resources available. Female and male participants evaluated a hypothetical leadership position in which they would have both social and financial resources, financial resources but no social resources, or social resources but no financial resources. Women evaluated the position without social resources most negatively, whereas men evaluated the position without financial resources most negatively. In study 2, we found that women and men considered different issues when evaluating these leadership positions. Women's evaluations and expected levels of influence as leaders depended on the degree to which they expected to be accepted by subordinates. In contrast, men's evaluations and expected levels of acceptance by subordinates depended on the degree to which they expected to be influential in the position. Our findings have implications for the understanding of the glass-cliff phenomenon and gendered leadership stereotypes.