Knowledge that Transforms

When faced with risky decisions, people typically choose to diversify their choices by allocating resources across a variety of options and thus avoid putting “all their eggs in one basket.” The current research revealed that this tendency is reversed when people face an important cue to mating-related risk: skew in the operational sex ratio, or the ratio of men to women in the local environment. Counter to the typical strategy of choice diversification, findings from four studies demonstrated that the presence of romantically unfavorable sex ratios (those featuring more same-sex than opposite-sex individuals) led heterosexual people to diversify financial resources less and instead concentrate investment in high-risk/high-return options when making lottery, stock-pool, retirement-account, and research-funding decisions. These studies shed light on a key process by which people manage risks to mating success implied by unfavorable interpersonal environments. These choice patterns have important implications for mating behavior as well as other everyday forms of decision making.

We explore how preferences for attributes are constructed when people choose between multiattribute options. As found in prior research, we observed that while people make decisions, their preferences for the attributes in question shift to support the emerging choice, thus enabling confident decisions. The novelty of the studies reported here is that participants repeated the same task 6 to 8 weeks later. We found that between tasks, preferences returned to near their original levels, only to shift again to support the second choice, regardless of which choice participants made. Similar patterns were observed in a free-choice task (Study 1) and when the favorableness of options was manipulated (Study 2). It follows that preferences behave in an elastic manner: In the absence of situational pressures, they rest at baseline levels, but during the process of reaching a decision, they morph to support the chosen options. This elasticity appears to facilitate confident decision making in the face of decisional conflict.

Humans can communicate even with few existing conventions in common (e.g., when they lack a shared language). We explored what makes this phenomenon possible with a nonlinguistic experimental task requiring participants to coordinate toward a common goal. We observed participants creating new communicative conventions using the most minimal possible signals. These conventions, furthermore, changed on a trial-by-trial basis in response to shared environmental and task constraints. Strikingly, as a result, signals of the same form successfully conveyed contradictory messages from trial to trial. Such behavior is evidence for the involvement of what we term joint inference, in which social interactants spontaneously infer the most sensible communicative convention in light of the common ground between them. Joint inference may help to elucidate how communicative conventions emerge instantaneously and how they are modified and reshaped into the elaborate systems of conventions involved in human communication, including natural languages.

The degree of punishment assigned to criminals is of pivotal importance for the maintenance of social order and cooperation. Nonetheless, the amount of punishment assigned to transgressors can be affected by factors other than the content of the transgressions. We propose that sleep deprivation in judges increases the severity of their sentences. We took advantage of the natural quasi-manipulation of sleep deprivation during the shift to daylight saving time in the spring and analyzed archival data from judicial punishment handed out in the U.S. federal courts. The results supported our hypothesis: Judges doled out longer sentences when they were sleep deprived.

When people cannot get what they want, they often satisfy their desire by consuming a substitute. Substitutes can originate from within the taxonomic category of the desired stimulus (i.e., within-category substitutes) or from a different taxonomic category that serves the same basic goal (i.e., cross-category substitutes). Both a store-brand chocolate (within-category substitute) and a granola bar (cross-category substitute), for example, can serve as substitutes for gourmet chocolate. Here, we found that people believe that within-category substitutes, which are more similar to desired stimuli, will more effectively satisfy their cravings than will cross-category substitutes (Experiments 1, 2a, and 2b). However, because within-category substitutes are more similar than cross-category substitutes to desired stimuli, they are more likely to evoke an unanticipated negative contrast effect. As a result, unless substitutes are equivalent in quality to the desired stimulus, cross-category substitutes more effectively satisfy cravings for the desired stimulus (Experiments 3 and 4).

To advance cognitive theory, researchers must be able to parse the performance of a task into its significant mental stages. In this article, we describe a new method that uses functional MRI brain activation to identify when participants are engaged in different cognitive stages on individual trials. The method combines multivoxel pattern analysis to identify cognitive stages and hidden semi-Markov models to identify their durations. This method, applied to a problem-solving task, identified four distinct stages: encoding, planning, solving, and responding. We examined whether these stages corresponded to their ascribed functions by testing whether they are affected by appropriate factors. Planning-stage duration increased as the method for solving the problem became less obvious, whereas solving-stage duration increased as the number of calculations to produce the answer increased. Responding-stage duration increased with the difficulty of the motor actions required to produce the answer.

Plural societies require individuals to forecast how others-both in-group and out-group members-will respond to gains and setbacks. Typically, correcting affective forecasts to include more relevant information improves their accuracy by reducing their extremity. In contrast, we found that providing affective forecasters with social-category information about their targets made their forecasts more extreme and therefore less accurate. In both political and sports contexts, forecasters across five experiments exhibited greater impact bias for both in-group and out-group members (e.g., a Democrat or Republican) than for unspecified targets when predicting experiencers' responses to positive and negative events. Inducing time pressure reduced the extremity of forecasts for group-labeled but not unspecified targets, which suggests that the increased impact bias was due to overcorrection for social-category information, not different intuitive predictions for identified targets. Finally, overcorrection was better accounted for by stereotypes than by spontaneous retrieval of extreme group exemplars.

Do people appear more attractive or less attractive depending on the company they keep? A divisive-normalization account-in which representation of stimulus intensity is normalized (divided) by concurrent stimulus intensities-predicts that choice preferences among options increase with the range of option values. In the first experiment reported here, I manipulated the range of attractiveness of the faces presented on each trial by varying the attractiveness of an undesirable distractor face that was presented simultaneously with two attractive targets, and participants were asked to choose the most attractive face. I used normalization models to predict the context dependence of preferences regarding facial attractiveness. The more unattractive the distractor, the more one of the targets was preferred over the other target, which suggests that divisive normalization (a potential canonical computation in the brain) influences social evaluations. I obtained the same result when I manipulated faces' averageness and participants chose the most average face. This finding suggests that divisive normalization is not restricted to value-based decisions (e.g., attractiveness). This new application to social evaluation of normalization, a classic theory, opens possibilities for predicting social decisions in naturalistic contexts such as advertising or dating.

According to Bayesian models, perception and cognition depend on the optimal combination of noisy incoming evidence with prior knowledge of the world. Individual differences in perception should therefore be jointly determined by a person's sensitivity to incoming evidence and his or her prior expectations. It has been proposed that individuals with autism have flatter prior distributions than do nonautistic individuals, which suggests that prior variance is linked to the degree of autistic traits in the general population. We tested this idea by studying how perceived speed changes during pursuit eye movement and at low contrast. We found that individual differences in these two motion phenomena were predicted by differences in thresholds and autistic traits when combined in a quantitative Bayesian model. Our findings therefore support the flatter-prior hypothesis and suggest that individual differences in prior expectations are more systematic than previously thought. In order to be revealed, however, individual differences in sensitivity must also be taken into account.

Do people know when, or whether, they have made a conscious choice? Here, we explore the possibility that choices can seem to occur before they are actually made. In two studies, participants were asked to quickly choose from a set of options before a randomly selected option was made salient. Even when they believed that they had made their decision prior to this event, participants were significantly more likely than chance to report choosing the salient option when this option was made salient soon after the perceived time of choice. Thus, without participants' awareness, a seemingly later event influenced choices that were experienced as occurring at an earlier time. These findings suggest that, like certain low-level perceptual experiences, the experience of choice is susceptible to "postdictive" influence and that people may systematically overestimate the role that consciousness plays in their chosen behavior.