Violations of spatiotemporal continuity disrupt performance in many tasks involving attention and working memory, but experiments on this topic have been limited to the study of moment-by-moment on-line perception, typically assessed by passive monitoring tasks. We tested whether persisting object representations also serve as underlying units of longer-term memory and active spatial navigation, using a novel paradigm inspired by the visual interfaces common to many smartphones. Participants used key presses to navigate through simple visual environments consisting of grids of icons (depicting real-world objects), only one of which was visible at a time through a static virtual window. Participants found target icons faster when navigation involved persistence cues (via sliding animations) than when persistence was disrupted (e.g., via temporally matched fading animations), with all transitions inspired by smartphone interfaces. Moreover, this difference occurred even after explicit memorization of the relevant information, which demonstrates that object persistence enhances spatial navigation in an automatic and irresistible fashion.

Selective attention not only influences which objects in a display are perceived, but also directly changes the character of how they are perceived--for example, making attended objects appear larger or sharper. In studies of multiple-object tracking and probe detection, we explored the influence of sustained selective attention on where objects are seen to be in relation to each other in dynamic multi-object displays. Surprisingly, we found that sustained attention can warp the representation of space in a way that is object-specific: In immediate recall of the positions of objects that have just disappeared, space between targets is compressed, whereas space between distractors is expanded. These effects suggest that sustained attention can warp spatial representation in unexpected ways.

Beyond processing individual features and objects, the visual system can also efficiently summarize scenes--for example, allowing observers to perceive the average size of a group of objects. Extraction of such statistical summary representations (SSRs) is fast and accurate, but researchers do not yet have a clear picture of the circumstances in which they operate. Previous studies have always used discrete input--either spatial arrays of shapes or temporal sequences of shapes presented one at a time. Real-world environments, in contrast, are intrinsically continuous and dynamic. We investigated the ability to compute average size in displays of objects (or sometimes a single object) that changed continuously, expanding and contracting over time. The results indicated that perceptual averaging can operate continuously in dynamic displays--sampling multiple times during a single continuous transformation with no discrete boundaries. Moreover, some dynamic changes (expansion) influence the resulting perceptual averages more than others (contraction), perhaps because of attentional capture. These results collectively illustrate how SSRs may be well adapted to dynamically changing real-world environments.

In motion-induced blindness (MIB), salient objects in full view can repeatedly fluctuate into and out of conscious awareness when superimposed onto certain global moving patterns. Here we suggest a new account of this striking phenomenon: Rather than being a failure of visual processing, MIB may be a functional product of the visual system's attempt to separate distal stimuli from artifacts of damage to the visual system itself. When a small object is invariant despite changes that are occurring to a global region of the surrounding visual field, the visual system may discount that stimulus as akin to a scotoma, and may thus expunge it from awareness. We describe three experiments demonstrating new phenomena predicted by this account and discuss how it can also explain several previous results.

A major challenge for visual recognition is to describe shapes flexibly enough to allow generalization over different views. Computer vision models have championed a potential solution in medial-axis shape skeletons-hierarchically arranged geometric structures that are robust to deformations like bending and stretching. In the experiments reported here, we exploited an old, unheralded, and exceptionally simple paradigm to reveal the presence and nature of shape skeletons in human vision. When participants independently viewed a shape on a touch-sensitive tablet computer and simply tapped the shape anywhere they wished, the aggregated touches formed the shape's medial-axis skeleton. This pattern held across several shape variations, demonstrating profound and predictable influences of even subtle border perturbations and amodally filled-in regions. This phenomenon reveals novel properties of shape representation and demonstrates (in an unusually direct way) how deep and otherwise-hidden visual processes can directly control simple behaviors, even while observers are completely unaware of their existence.

A tidal wave of recent research purports to have discovered that higher-level states such as moods, action capabilities, and categorical knowledge can literally and directly affect how things look. Are these truly effects on perception, or might some instead reflect influences on judgment, memory, or response bias? Here, we exploited an infamous art-historical reasoning error (the so-called "El Greco fallacy") to demonstrate that multiple alleged top-down effects (including effects of morality on lightness perception and effects of action capabilities on spatial perception) cannot truly be effects on perception. We suggest that this error may also contaminate several other varieties of top-down effects and that this discovery has implications for debates over the continuity (or lack thereof) of perception and cognition.

Recent research in vision science, infant cognition, and word learning suggests a special role for the processing of discrete objects. But what counts as an object? Answers to this question often depend on contrasting object-based processing with the processing of spatial areas or unbound visual features. In infant cognition and word learning, though, another salient contrast has been between rigid cohesive objects and nonsolid substances. Whereas objects may move from one location to another, a nonsolid substance must pour from one location to another. In the study reported here, we explored whether attentive tracking processes are sensitive to dynamic information of this type. Using a multiple-object tracking task, we found that subjects could easily track four items in a display of eight identical unpredictably moving entities that moved as discrete objects from one location to another, but could not track similar entities that noncohesively "poured" from one location to another-even when the items in both conditions followed the same trajectories at the same speeds. Other conditions revealed that this inability to track multiple "substances" stemmed not from violations of rigidity or cohesiveness per se, because subjects were able to track multiple noncohesive collections and multiple nonrigid deforming objects. Rather, the impairment was due to the dynamic extension and contraction during the substancelike motion, which rendered the location of the entity ambiguous. These results demonstrate a convergence between processes of midlevel adult vision and infant cognition, and in general help to clarify what can count as a persisting dynamic object of attention.

In addition to perceiving the colors, shapes, and motions of objects, observers can perceive higher-level properties of visual events. One such property is causation, as when an observer sees one object cause another object to move by colliding with it. We report a striking new type of contextual effect on the perception of such collision events. Consider an object (A) that moves toward a stationary object (B) until they are adjacent, at which point A stops and B starts moving along the same path. Such "launches" are perceived in terms beyond these kinematics: As noted in Michotte's classic studies, observers perceive A as being the cause of B's motion. When A and B fully overlap before B's motion, however observers often see this test event as a completely noncausal "pass": One object remains stationary while another passes over it. When a distinct launch event occurs nearby, however, the test event is "captured": It too is now irresistibly seen as causal. For this causal capture to occur, the context event need be present for only 50 ms surrounding the "impact," but capture is destroyed by only 200 ms of temporal asynchrony between the two events. We report a study of such cases, and others, that help define the rules that the visual system uses to construct percepts of seemingly high-level properties like causation.

The perception of shape, it has been argued, also often entails the perception of time. A cookie missing a bite, for example, is seen as a whole cookie that was subsequently bitten. It has never been clear, however, whether such observations truly reflect visual processing. To explore this possibility, we tested whether the perception of history in static shapes could actually induce illusory motion perception. Observers watched a square change to a truncated form, with a "piece" of it missing, and they reported whether this change was sudden or gradual. When the contours of the missing piece suggested a type of historical "intrusion" (as when one pokes a finger into a lump of clay), observers actually saw that intrusion occur: The change appeared to be gradual even when it was actually sudden, in a type of transformational apparent motion. This provides striking phenomenological evidence that vision involves reconstructing causal history from static shapes.

When staring at a blank grid, one can readily “see” simple shapes—a peculiar experience that does not occur when viewing an empty background. But just what does this “seeing” entail? Previous work has explored many cues to object-based attention (e.g., involving continuity and closure), but here we asked whether attention can be object based even when there are no cues to objecthood. Observers viewed simple grids and attended to particular squares until they could effectively “see” shapes such as a capital H or I. During this scaffolded attention, two probes appeared, and observers reported whether they were the same or different. Remarkably, this produced a traditional same-object advantage: In several experiments (including high-powered direct replications), performance was enhanced for probes presented on the same (purely imagined) object, compared with equidistant probes presented on different objects. We conclude that attention not only operates over objects but also can effectively create object representations.