I. Introduction, 87. — II. The business firm as organization, 89. — III. Control and costs, 91. — IV. Standard costs, 94. — V. Agent behavior, 98. — VI. Multiple commodity production and multiple agents — horizontal case, 103. — VII. Multiple agents — vertical case, 105. — VIII. Conclusion, 109.

I. Relation between the effects of foreign trade and the structural characteristics of the national economy, 171. — Allocation of imports, 172. — Relation between "ultimate" demand and derived output and employment, 174. — Exports as an independent variable, 175. — Dependent and secondary exports, 177. — II. Formulation in precise quantitative terms, 178. — III. Relation between exports and employment in the United States in 1939: entire exports as part of final demand, including household consumption and domestic investment, 184; demand for consumers' goods not independent, 185; net terms of trade allowed for, 186. — General observations, 186.

I. Introduction, 131. — II. Scope of the model, 132. — III. Mathematical statement of the model, 134. — IV. Profit maximization, 140. — V. Cost-quantity silhouettes, 145.

Journal Article The Expectations Hypothesis, the Yield Curve, and Monetary Policy: Comment Get access Jack W. Cox, Jack W. Cox Federal Reserve Bank of New York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Frederick W. Deming Frederick W. Deming Federal Reserve Bank of New York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 80, Issue 2, May 1966, Pages 333–335, https://doi.org/10.2307/1880697 Published: 01 May 1966

I. Subject and methods of the inquiry: Industries covered and questions asked, 1. — A pre-war period selected, 7. — Arrangement of the returns by classes and groups, 9. — II. Stock ownership by executives: Their salaries, 11. — Extent to which executives hold stock in large concerns, 12. — In moderate and small concerns, 14. — Stockholdings by relatives or friends of the executives, 18. — Executive salaries, by classes and groups, 19. — Fixity of salaries; only in the long run adjusted to corporate earnings, 20. — Proportion of management expense to capital, 23. — Proportion in close corporations and in those widely owned, 27. — Rarity of arrangements for bonus or profit-sharing, 28. — III. Earnings and surpluses, for all classes, 30. — For the first class, 33. — For the second class, 34. — Earnings in the first class more regular but less high, 35. — Dividends and surpluses, 37. — Significance of surplus, 39. — IV. The theory of profits: Contrast between American and European practice, 40. — Two views on theory: the one regarding business profits as a form of wages, the other as distinct from wages, 40. — American practice in accord with the second view, 42. — European practice, especially on the Continent, implies more nearly the first view: The tantième, 43. — The merits and demerits of the two practices, 48. — Conclusion, 59.

Journal Article Agricultural Syndicates in France Get access Henry W. Wolff Henry W. Wolff Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 8, Issue 1, October 1893, Pages 98–102, https://doi.org/10.2307/1882880 Published: 01 October 1893

I. Practice of discriminating monopolists often under conditions at variance with the common theoretical assumptions, 490. — II. The theoretical problem of unlimited and limited discrimination in its simplest form, 491. — III. Limiting conditions, 491. — IV. Fixed price difference, 492. — V. Varying price difference, 493. — VI. Adjusting the price difference to maximize profit, 495. — VII. Increase or decrease of prescribed price difference might increase profits, 496. — VIII. Comparison of discriminating monopoly and monopoly without discrimination, 496. — IX. The necessary restrictive assumptions, 497. — X. Illustration of proposition II, 499. — XI. Conclusion, 500.

Journal Article The Concluding Volume of Marx's Capital Get access W. Lexis W. Lexis Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 10, Issue 1, October 1895, Pages 1–33, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884938 Published: 01 October 1895

This article uses linked worker-firm data in the United States to estimate the transitional costs associated with reallocating workers from newly regulated industries to other sectors of the economy in the context of new environmental regulations. The focus on workers rather than industries as the unit of analysis allows me to examine previously unobserved economic outcomes such as nonemployment and long-run earnings losses from job transitions, both of which are critical to understanding the reallocative costs associated with these policies. Using plant-level panel variation induced by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), I find that the reallocative costs of environmental policy are significant. Workers in newly regulated plants experienced, in aggregate, more than $5.4 billion in forgone earnings for the years after the change in policy. Most of these costs are driven by nonemployment and lower earnings in future employment, highlighting the importance of longitudinal data for characterizing the costs and consequences of labor market adjustment. Relative to the estimated benefits of the 1990 CAAA, these one-time transitional costs are small.