Knowledge that Transforms

We develop a framework for welfare analysis of interventions designed to increase take-up of social safety net programs in the presence of potential behavioral biases. We calibrate the key parameters using a randomized field experiment in which 30,000 elderly individuals not enrolled in—but likely eligible for—the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) are either provided with information that they are likely eligible, provided with this information and offered assistance in applying, or are in a “status quo” control group. Only 6% of the control group enrolls in SNAP over the next nine months, compared to 11% of the Information Only group and 18% of the Information Plus Assistance group. The individuals who apply or enroll in response to either intervention have higher net income and are less sick than the average enrollee in the control group. We present evidence consistent with the existence of optimization frictions that are greater for needier individuals, which suggests that the poor targeting properties of the interventions reduce their welfare benefits.

Using the Consumption Activities Mail Survey (CAMS) module in the HRS, we document how individual time allocations change when one or more household members transitions from full-time work to not working. We find that the ratio of home production to leisure time is approximately constant for both family members. Using a model of household labor supply to understand the implications of this finding, we conclude that the elasticity of substitution between the leisure of the two members is quite large. This elasticity plays a key role in models of household labor supply and is important for understanding how changes in relative wages and taxes affect household labor supply.

In setting prices for physician services, Medicare solicits input from a committee that evaluates proposals from industry. The committee itself comprises members from industry; we investigate whether this arrangement leads to regulatory capture with prices biased toward industry interests. We find that increasing a measure of affiliation between the committee and proposers by one standard deviation increases prices by 10%. We then evaluate whether employing a biased committee as an intermediary may nonetheless be desirable, if greater affiliation allows the committee to extract information needed for regulation. We find industry proposers more affiliated with the committee produce less hard evidence in their proposals. However, on soft information, we find evidence of a trade-off: private insurers set prices that more closely track Medicare prices generated under higher affiliation.

This article examines the long-term consequences of a historical human capital intervention. The Jesuit order founded religious missions in 1609 among the Guaraní, in modern-day Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. Before their expulsion in 1767, missionaries instructed indigenous inhabitants in reading, writing, and various crafts. Using archival records, as well as data at the individual and municipal level, I show that in areas of former Jesuit presence—within the Guaraní area—educational attainment was higher and remains so (by 10%–15%) 250 years later. These educational differences have also translated into incomes that are 10% higher today. The identification of the positive effect of the Guaraní Jesuit missions emerges after comparing them with abandoned Jesuit missions and neighboring Franciscan Guaraní missions. The enduring effects observed are consistent with transmission mechanisms of structural transformation, occupational specialization, and technology adoption in agriculture.

We analyze a large data set of commercial records produced by Assyrian merchants in the nineteenth century BCE. Using the information from these records, we estimate a structural gravity model of long-distance trade in the Bronze Age. We use our structural gravity model to locate lost ancient cities. In many cases, our estimates confirm the conjectures of historians who follow different methodologies. In some instances, our estimates confirm one conjecture against others. We also structurally estimate ancient city sizes and offer evidence in support of the hypothesis that large cities tend to emerge at the intersections of natural transport routes, as dictated by topography. Finally, we document persistent patterns in the distribution of city sizes across four millennia, find a distance elasticity of trade in the Bronze Age close to modern estimates, and show suggestive evidence that the distribution of ancient city sizes, inferred from trade data, is well approximated by Zipf’s law.

Many developing economies adopt industrial policies favoring selected sectors. Is there an economic logic to this type of intervention? I analyze industrial policy when economic sectors form a production network via input-output linkages. Market imperfections generate distortionary effects that compound through backward demand linkages, causing upstream sectors to become the sink for imperfections and have the greatest size distortions. My key finding is that the distortion in sectoral size is a sufficient statistic for the social value of promoting that sector; thus, there is an incentive for a well-meaning government to subsidize upstream sectors. Furthermore, sectoral interventions’ aggregate effects can be simply summarized, to first order, by the cross-sector covariance between my sufficient statistic and subsidy spending. My sufficient statistic predicts sectoral policies in South Korea in the 1970s and modern-day China, suggesting that sectoral interventions might have generated positive aggregate effects in these economies.

We show that most U.S. food, drugstore, and mass-merchandise chains charge nearly uniform prices across stores, despite wide variation in consumer demographics and competition. Demand estimates reveal substantial within-chain variation in price elasticities and suggest that the median chain sacrifices $16 million of annual profit relative to a benchmark of optimal prices. In contrast, differences in average prices between chains are broadly consistent with the optimal benchmark. We discuss a range of explanations for nearly uniform pricing, highlighting managerial inertia and brand image concerns as mechanisms frequently mentioned by industry participants. Relative to our optimal benchmark, uniform pricing may significantly increase the prices paid by poorer households relative to the rich, dampen the response of prices to local economic shocks, alter the analysis of mergers in antitrust, and shift the incidence of intranational trade costs.

In this article, we analyze how inflation affects firms’ price-setting behavior. For a class of menu cost models, we derive several predictions about how price-setting changes with inflation at very high and at near-zero inflation rates. Then, we present evidence supporting these predictions using product-level data underlying Argentina’s consumer price index from 1988 to 1997—a unique experience where monthly inflation ranged from almost 200% to less than zero. For low inflation rates, we find that (i) the frequency and absolute size of price changes as well as the dispersion of relative prices do not change with inflation, (ii) the frequency and size of price increases and decreases are symmetric around zero inflation, and (iii) aggregate inflation changes are mostly driven by changes in the frequency of price increases and decreases, as opposed to the size of price changes. For high inflation rates, we find that (iv) the elasticity of the frequency of price changes with respect to inflation is close to two-thirds, (v) the frequency of price changes across different products becomes similar, and (vi) the elasticity of the dispersion of relative prices with respect to inflation is one-third. Our findings confirm and extend available evidence for countries that experienced either very high or near-zero inflation. We conclude by showing that a hyperinflation of 500% a year is associated with a cost of approximately 8.5% of aggregate output a year as a result of inefficient price dispersion alone.

We show that grit, a skill that has been shown to be highly predictive of achievement, is malleable in childhood and can be fostered in the classroom environment. We evaluate a randomized educational intervention implemented in two independent elementary school samples. Outcomes are measured via a novel incentivized real-effort task and performance in standardized tests. We find that treated students are more likely to exert effort to accumulate task-specific ability and hence more likely to succeed. In a follow up 2.5 years after the intervention, we estimate an effect of about 0.2 standard deviations on a standardized math test.

We study the causes of “nutritional inequality”: why the wealthy eat more healthfully than the poor in the United States. Exploiting supermarket entry and household moves to healthier neighborhoods, we reject that neighborhood environments contribute meaningfully to nutritional inequality. We then estimate a structural model of grocery demand, using a new instrument exploiting the combination of grocery retail chains’ differing presence across geographic markets with their differing comparative advantages across product groups. Counterfactual simulations show that exposing low-income households to the same products and prices available to high-income households reduces nutritional inequality by only about 10%, while the remaining 90% is driven by differences in demand. These findings counter the argument that policies to increase the supply of healthy groceries could play an important role in reducing nutritional inequality.