We find consistent evidence of negative autocorrelation in decision making that is unrelated to the merits of the cases considered in three separate high-stakes field settings: refugee asylum court decisions, loan application reviews, and Major League Baseball umpire pitch calls. The evidence is most consistent with the law of small numbers and the gambler’s fallacy—people underestimating the likelihood of sequential streaks occurring by chance—leading to negatively autocorrelated decisions that result in errors. The negative autocorrelation is stronger among more moderate and less experienced decision makers, following longer streaks of decisions in one direction, when the current and previous cases share similar characteristics or occur close in time, and when decision makers face weaker incentives for accuracy. Other explanations for negatively autocorrelated decisions such as quotas, learning, or preferences to treat all parties fairly are less consistent with the evidence, though we cannot completely rule out sequential contrast effects as an alternative explanation.

Using data on over a million land transactions during 2004–2016 where local governments are the sole seller, we find that firms linked to members of China's supreme political elites—the Politburo—obtained a price discount ranging from 55.4% to 59.9% compared with those without the same connections. These firms also purchased slightly more land. In return, the provincial party secretaries who provided the discount to these “princeling” firms are 23.4% more likely to be promoted to positions of national leadership. To curb corruption, President Xi Jinping stepped up investigations and strengthened personnel control at the province level. Using a spatially matched sample (e.g., within a 500-meter radius), we find a reduction in corruption of between 42.6% and 31.5% in the provinces either targeted by the central inspection teams or whose party secretary was replaced by one appointed by Xi. Accordingly, this crackdown on corruption has also significantly reduced the promotional prospects of those local officials who rely on supplying a discount to get ahead.

We study how people’s beliefs about the economy covary with household-level events, utilizing a unique link between Danish administrative data and a large-scale survey of consumer expectations. We find that compared to actual inflation, people’s inflation forecasts covary much more strongly (and negatively) with both recently realized household income changes and measures of expected future household income changes. We formally establish that these findings are stark deviations from the Bayesian rational expectations benchmark. Similar results hold for perceptions of past inflation (“backcasts” ), suggesting that imperfect recall is a key mechanism for biased forecasts. Building on this, a series of additional tests, some of which utilize data on adverse health events, suggests that the forecast biases are at least partly due to affect-cued recall. That is, negative (positive) household-level events cue negative (positive) recollections, which lead to pessimistic (optimistic) forecasts.

This article empirically studies the effects of the early law and economics movement on the U.S. judiciary. We focus on the Manne Economics Institute for Federal Judges, an intensive economics course that trained almost half of federal judges between 1976 and 1999. Using the universe of published opinions in U.S. Circuit Courts and 1 million District Court criminal sentencing decisions, we estimate the within-judge effect of Manne program attendance. Selection into attendance was limited, as the program was popular among judges of all backgrounds, frequently oversubscribed, and admitted participants on a first-come, first-served basis. We find that after attending economics training, participating judges use more economics language in their opinions, rule against regulatory agencies more often, and impose more severe criminal sentences. We argue that economics, as a rigorous social science, was especially effective in persuading judges.

Frictions that impede the mobility of workers across occupations and space are a prominent feature of developing countries. We disentangle the role of insecure property rights from other labor-mobility frictions for the reallocation of labor from agriculture to nonagriculture and from rural to urban areas. We combine rich household and individual-level panel data from China and an equilibrium quantitative framework featuring sorting of workers across locations and occupations. We explicitly model the farming household and the endogenous decisions of who operates the family farm and who potentially migrates, capturing an additional channel of selection in the household. We find that land insecurity has substantial negative effects on agricultural productivity and structural change, raising the share of rural households operating farms by over 40 percentage points and depressing agricultural productivity by more than 20%. Comparatively, these quantitative effects are as large as those from all residual labor-mobility frictions. We measure a sharp reduction in overall labor-mobility barriers over 2004–2018 in the Chinese economy, all accounted for by improved land security, consistent with reforms covering rural land in China during the period. JEL Codes: O11, O14, O4, E02, Q1.