I. Introduction, 25.--II. The basic model, 27.--III. Determination of the level of investment in a mean variance model, 32.--IV. Choice of technique, 47.--V. Remarks on alternative models of market equilibrium, 52.--VI. Concluding remarks, 55.--Appendix, 57.

Raaj K. Sah, Joseph E. Stiglitz; The Quality of Managers in Centralized Versus Decentralized Organizations*, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 106, Iss

In the field of economics, perhaps the most important break with the past—one that leaves open huge areas for future work—lies in the economics of information. It is now recognized that information is imperfect, obtaining information can be costly, there are important asymmetries of information, and the extent of information asymmetries is affected by actions of firms and individuals. This recognition deeply affects the understanding of wisdom inherited from the past, such as the fundamental welfare theorem and some of the basic characterization of a market economy, and provides explanations of economic and social phenomena that otherwise would be hard to understand.