I. Introduction, 194.--II. The model, 196.--III. The market equilibrium, 205.--IV. Optimal allocation of labor and determination of urban wage level, 207.--V. Wage subsidies, 214.--VI. Wages and shadow price of labor in the public sector, 218.--VII. Urban income taxes, 220.--VIII. Concluding comments and summary, 222.--Appendix: "nominal" and "expected" urban wages and the unemployment rate, 223.

I. Introduction and summary, 592.--II. The one-sector two-capital model, 593.--III. Dynamic analysis, 597.--IV. Market structure, 603.--V. Rationality and irrationality, 607.--VI. Concluding comments, 609.

This paper undertakes three sets of tasks: (i) it analyzes positive and normative aspects of price scissors (the domestic terms of trade between agriculture and industry) within nonsocialist as well as socialist LDCs. The critical role of the economy's institutional features (e.g., external trade environment, wage and income determination, and wage-productivity effects) is emphasized. Certain aspects of the Soviet Industrialization Debate and subsequent collectivization are interpreted, (ii) It develops simple rules to delineate who gains and who loses (within agriculture) from changes in terms of trade, (iii) It presents powerful (and informationally parsimonious) rules for Pareto-improving price reforms for cash crops and agricultural inputs.

I. Introduction, 537.--II. Building blocks, 539.--III. The working of the model, 545.--IV. Displacement of short-run equilibrium, 554.--V. Effective demand and the distribution of income, 557.--VI. Next steps, 559.

A two-period model of temporary equilibrium with rationing is presented, paying particular attention to agents' expectations of future constraints. It is shown that with arbitrary constraint expectations many different types of current equilibrium may be consistent with the same set of (current and expected future) wages and prices, and that constraint expectations exhibit "bootstraps" properties (e.g., a higher expectation of Keynesian unemployment tomorrow increases the probability that it will prevail today). In addition, the concept of rational constraint expectations (i.e., perfect foresight of future constraints) is introduced and shown to enhance rather than reduce the effectiveness of government policy.

This paper analyzes the effect of commodity price stabilization on producers and consumers, both in the short run, and in the long run, when producers have adjusted their production decisions to take account of the change in the price distribution. We derive conditions under which (a) both producers and consumers may be better off; and (b) both producers and consumers may be worse off. Moreover, we show that the long-run effects may differ not only quantitatively but also qualitatively from the short-run effects. The anomalous results may occur even with reasonable assumptions concerning production functions and utility functions of producers and consumers.