Knowledge that Transforms

In this paper we report a generalization of the results of Foley and Guesnerie on the second welfare theorem to economies with arbitrary nonconvex production sets. The nature of marginal cost prices in such economies is clarified through the use of the Clarke tangent cones.

A computer simulation model in the tradition of evolutionary models of technical change is developed in this paper. It focuses on R&D competition in new product introductions and is based on data for the U. S. pharmaceutical industry during the 1970s. The sensitivity of innovation levels to the rate of generic competition, regulatory review time, and patent life is examined in the computer simulation experiments. These factors are found to have significant long-run effects on industry structure and innovation levels.

We consider two kinds of “outside opportunity” that a seller of an indivisible good might have: selling to a different buyer and consuming the good herself. In both models the seller is uncertain about the buyer's valuation, and becomes more pessimistic over time. When the seller becomes sufficiently pessimistic, she prefers the outside opportunity, so she will not bargain indefinitely with the current buyer. Despite the resulting finite-horizon nature of negotiations, the link between the buyer's willingness to accept an offer and the seller's eagerness to go “outside” generates multiple equilibria.

This study identifies part of the social loss attendant upon displacement as the remaining value of the assets specific to the severed employment relationship. A bargaining model is used to link wage-tenure profiles to the amount of information firms and workers possess about the duration of that relationship. If information is good, the profile will flatten as displacement approaches. Using PSID data for workers separated between 1977 and 1981, wage-tenure profiles are found not to change. This suggests that either workers, or both firms and workers, are surprised by the displacement. The present value of that part of the social loss attributable to the worker's share of firm-specific capital is around $7,000 (1980 dollars).

This paper undertakes three sets of tasks: (i) it analyzes positive and normative aspects of price scissors (the domestic terms of trade between agriculture and industry) within nonsocialist as well as socialist LDCs. The critical role of the economy's institutional features (e.g., external trade environment, wage and income determination, and wage-productivity effects) is emphasized. Certain aspects of the Soviet Industrialization Debate and subsequent collectivization are interpreted, (ii) It develops simple rules to delineate who gains and who loses (within agriculture) from changes in terms of trade, (iii) It presents powerful (and informationally parsimonious) rules for Pareto-improving price reforms for cash crops and agricultural inputs.

This paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward-looking wage-setters. If discretionary policies are followed, an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium. This cycle is significantly different from the traditional "political business cycle." Reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations.