Abstract This article uses linked worker-firm data in the United States to estimate the transitional costs associated with reallocating workers from newly regulated industries to other sectors of the economy in the context of new environmental regulations. The focus on workers rather than industries as the unit of analysis allows me to examine previously unobserved economic outcomes such as nonemployment and long-run earnings losses from job transitions, both of which are critical to understanding the reallocative costs associated with these policies. Using plant-level panel variation induced by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), I find that the reallocative costs of environmental policy are significant. Workers in newly regulated plants experienced, in aggregate, more than $5.4 billion in forgone earnings for the years after the change in policy. Most of these costs are driven by nonemployment and lower earnings in future employment, highlighting the importance of longitudinal data for characterizing the costs and consequences of labor market adjustment. Relative to the estimated benefits of the 1990 CAAA, these one-time transitional costs are small.

Journal Article Capacity Costs, Heterogeneous Users, and Peak-Load Pricing Get access W. John Jordan W. John Jordan Seton Hall University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 100, Issue 4, November 1985, Pages 1335–1337, https://doi.org/10.2307/1885687 Published: 01 November 1985

The principal finding of this paper is that the conventional pricing solution for the peak load pricing problem must be modified to be applicable to a joint facility that is utilized by heterogeneous groups of users. The paper indicates how extending the conventional model through a multidimensional approach to capacity, accounting for its physical dimensions as well as its time dimension, will require specific capacity charges to users independent of the time of consumption. Any additional congestion charges levied will not perform the conventional role of covering replacement capacity costs, but will be used to reduce current congestion costs.

A manufacturing firm can increase its capacity through expansion at existing sites, opening new plants, or relocating to new, larger space. These options are in fact not very good substitutes for one another. This paper argues why one might be preferred to the others and supports its view of the capacity choice with detailed evidence from over 400 plants in New England.

I. Introduction, 168. – II. The trend: 1948–1964, 168. — III. Conclusion, 172.

Journal Article Linear Decision Rules for Economic Stabilization and Growth: Comment Get access W. Lynn Holmes W. Lynn Holmes Temple University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 82, Issue 3, August 1968, Pages 514–518, https://doi.org/10.2307/1879524 Published: 01 August 1968

I. Introduction, 1. — II. The model, 3. — III. Full optimization and complete specialization, 8. — IV. Full optimization and incomplete specialization, 10. — V. Optimal tax policy with free trade, 16. — VI. Optimal tariff policy with mobile capital, 23. — VII. Summary and conclusions, 31.

Journal Article The Politics of Political Economists: Comment Get access A. W. Coats A. W. Coats University of Nottingham Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 74, Issue 4, November 1960, Pages 666–669, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884364 Published: 01 November 1960

The occurrence of oil and gas, 544. — Steps in the exploratory process, 545. — Industry concentration, 546. — The success ratio, 550. — Risk, 554. — Access and risk preference, 556. — Uncertainty and information, 559. — The flow of information, 565. — The oil deal, 566. — Entry, 569.

Introduction, 1. — I. The problem of “explanation,” 3. — II. Shackle's hypothesis, 4. — III. An alternative hypothesis. The “most likely” gain outcome, 7. — IV. The “most likely” loss outcome, 15. — V. Evaluating net prospective satisfactions; “gambler preference maps,” 16. — VI. Holding money; alternative investments; marginal equalities, 19. — VII. Limitations, 24. — VIII. Business decisions, 25. — IX. Waves of optimism and pessimism, 27.