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Skill-Biased Organizational Change? Evidence from A Panel of British and French Establishments

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2001 116(4), 1449-1492
This paper investigates the determination and consequences of organizational changes (OC) in a panel of British and French establishments. Organizational changes include the decentralization of authority, delayering of managerial functions, and increased multitasking. We argue that OC and skills are complements. We offer support for the hypothesis of “skill-biased” organizational change with three empirical findings. First, organizational changes reduce the demand for unskilled workers in both countries. Second, OC is negatively associated with increases in regional skill price differentials (a measure of the relative supply of skill). Third, OC leads to greater productivity increases in establishments with larger initial skill endowments. Technical change is also complementary with human capital, but the effects of OC is not simply due to its correlation with technological change but has an independent role.

Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2001 116(2), 681-704
This paper uses a unique data set to measure peer effects among college roommates. Freshman year roommates and dormmates are randomly assigned at Dartmouth College. I find that peers have an impact on grade point average and on decisions to join social groups such as fraternities. Residential peer effects are markedly absent in other major life decisions such as choice of college major. Peer effects in GPA occur at the individual room level, whereas peer effects in fraternity membership occur both at the room level and the entire dorm level. Overall, the data provide strong evidence for the existence of peer effects in student outcomes.

Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution: The Poum Hypothesis

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2001 116(2), 447-487 open access
This paper examines the often stated idea that the poor do not support high levels of redistribution because of the hope that they, or their offspring, may make it up the income ladder. This "prospect of upward mobility" (POUM) hypothesis is shown to be fully compatible with rational expectations, and fundamentally linked to concavity in the mobility process. A steady-state majority could even be simultaneously poorer than average in terms of current income, and richer than average in terms of expected future incomes. A first empirical assessment suggests, on the other hand, that in recent U. S. data the POUM effect is probably dominated by the demand for social insurance.<br> "In the future, everyone will be world-famous for fifteen minutes"<br> [Andy Warhol 1968]. © 2001 the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Is Addiction "Rational"? Theory and Evidence

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2001 116(4), 1261-1303
This paper makes two contributions to the modeling of addiction. First, we provide new and convincing evidence that smokers are forward-looking in their smoking decisions, using state excise tax increases that have been legislatively enacted but are not yet effective, and monthly data on consumption. Second, we recognize the strong evidence that preferences with respect to smoking are time inconsistent, with individuals both not recognizing the true difficulty of quitting and searching for self-control devices to help them quit. We develop a new model of addictive behavior that takes as its starting point the standard “rational addiction” model, but incorporates time-inconsistent preferences. This model also exhibits forward-looking behavior, but it has strikingly different normative implications; in this case optimal government policy should depend not only on the externalities that smokers impose on others but also on the “internalities” imposed by smokers on themselves. We estimate that the optimal tax per pack of cigarettes should he at least one dollar higher under our formulation than in the rational addiction case.

Prospect Theory and Asset Prices

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2001 116(1), 1-53
We study asset prices in an economy where investors derive direct utility not only from consumption but also from fluctuations in the value of their financial wealth. They are loss averse over these fluctuations, and the degree of loss aversion depends on their prior investment performance. We find that our framework can help explain the high mean, excess volatility, and predictability of stock returns, as well as their low correlation with consumption growth. The design of our model is influenced by prospect theory and by experimental evidence on how prior outcomes affect risky choice.

A Model of Financial Crises in Emerging Markets

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2001 116(2), 489-517
We develop a model in which financial crises in emerging markets may occur when domestic banks are internationally illiquid. Runs on domestic deposits may interact with foreign creditor panics, depending on the maturity of the foreign debt and the possibility of international default. Financial liberalization and increased inflows of foreign capital, especially if short term, can aggravate the illiquidity of banks and increase their vulnerability. The primary role of illiquidity is consistent with the existence of asset price booms and crashes and of government distortions.

Institutional Investors and Equity Prices

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2001 116(1), 229-259
This paper analyzes institutional investors' demand for stock characteristics and the implications of this demand for stock prices and returns. We find that "large" institutional investors nearly doubled their share of the stock market from 1980 to 1996. Overall, this compositional shift tends to increase demand for the stock of large companies and decrease demand for the stock of small companies. The compositional shift can, by itself, account for a nearly 50 percent increase in the price oflarge-company stock relative to small-company stock and can explain part of the disappearance of the historical small-company stock premium.

Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International Economic Institutions

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2001 116(2), 519-562
To what extent must nations cede control over their economic and social policies if global efficiency is to be achieved in an interdependent world? This question is at the center of the debate over the future role of the WTO (formerly GATT) in the realm of labor and environmental standards. In this paper we establish that the market access focus of current WTO rules is well equipped to handle the problems associated with choices over labor and environmental standards. In principle, with relatively modest changes that grant governments more sovereignty, not less, these rules can deliver globally efficient outcomes.

The Impact of Mass Migration on the Israeli Labor Market

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2001 116(4), 1373-1408
Immigration increased Israel's population by 12 percent between 1990 and 1994, after emigration restrictions were lifted in an unstable Soviet Union. Following the influx, occupations that employed more immigrants had substantially lower native wage growth and slightly lower native employment growth than others. However, because the immigrants' postmigration occupational distribution was influenced by relative labor market conditions across occupations in Israel, Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the immigrants' impact on those conditions are biased. Instrumental Variables estimation, exploiting information on the immigrants' former occupations abroad, suggests no adverse impact of immigration on native outcomes.

Choice and Procrastination

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2001 116(1), 121-160
Recent models of procrastination due to self-control problems assume that a procrastinator considers just one option and is unaware of her self-control problems. We develop a model where a person chooses from a menu of options and is partially aware of her self-control problems. This menu model replicates earlier results and generates new ones. A person might forgo completing an attractive option because she plans to complete a more attractive but never-to-be-completed option. Hence, providing a nonprocrastinator additional options can induce procrastination, and a person may procrastinate worse pursuing important goals than unimportant ones.