I. Introduction, 416. — II. The dynamic input-output system, 420. — III. Stability of the dynamic input-output system: investment policy, 423. — IV. Stability of the dynamic input-output system: output policy, 430. — V. Summary and conclusion, 434.
I. The restrictive nature of conventional analysis, 65. — II. The derivation of the international offer curve without these restrictive assumptions, 69. — III. The income-subsidy case, 71. — IV. The possible changes in domestic and international prices, 73. — V. Summary, 78.
Journal Article State and Regional Payments Mechanisms: Comment Get access Richard L. Pfister Richard L. Pfister Dartmouth College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 74, Issue 4, November 1960, Pages 641–648, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884359 Published: 01 November 1960
I. Facts and theory, 189. — II. Elements of the model, 192. — III. The operation of the model: nonmathematical, 193. — IV. Capital requirements, 197. — V. Mathematical recapitulation, 198. — VI. A numerical illustration, 204.
Journal Article A Note on Social Overhead and a Dynamic Analysis of Industry Get access Arthur H. Cole Arthur H. Cole Harvard University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 74, Issue 3, August 1960, Pages 413–415, https://doi.org/10.2307/1883058 Published: 01 August 1960
Journal Article The Politics of Political Economists: Comment Get access A. W. Coats A. W. Coats University of Nottingham Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 74, Issue 4, November 1960, Pages 666–669, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884364 Published: 01 November 1960
Introduction, 614. — I. Equilibrium growth in an open economy, 615; — aggregate relationships, 615; — equilibrium growth conditions, 619. — II. International economic dependence, 621; — relation of domestic to foreign growth rate, 621; — role of net balance of international indebtedness, 625. — III. Monetary-fiscal policy and growth, 627; — role of monetary-fiscal instruments, 627; — alternative combinations and limits, 629. — IV. Conclusions, 632.
I. Relation of the Report to component reports and to the majority and minority reports of the Joint Economic Committee. Criticisms of the Report; “the numbers game,” 374. — II. Comparison of recent rates of economic growth with past rates and with rates of other countries, 375. — III. The attempt at price stability at the expense of growth. Critique of attempt to promote growth by fighting inflation. No simple relationship between changes in output and changes in prices, 376. — IV. Movements of GNP over time show long periods in which demand rather than supply determined growth of output, 379. — V. The problem of market power in attempting to control inflation, 380. — VI. Upward movements in prices have, however, been in services rather than products, 381. — VII. Antitrust action against corporations but not against labor organizations advocated to control market power, 382. — VIII. Relative increase in both private and public saving rather than in private consumption advocated, 383. — IX. Inflationary bias inherent in downward rigidity of prices. Constant rate of increase in money supply as a means of stabilizing rate of growth rejected. Selective credit controls recommended, 387. — X. U. S. position in world trade. Evidence does not indicate we are pricing ourselves out of the world market, 390. — XI. Rate of growth of 4.5 per cent annually attainable within our present economic system, 391.
I. Introduction, 79. — II. Expectations and conventional models of growth, 82. — III. A linear, variable accelerator, 87. — IV. Simple models of growth with variable accelerator, 90. — V. Conclusions, 92. — VI. Mathematical analysis, 95.
I. Introduction, 437. — II. A jurisprudential hypothesis, 438. — III. The emphasis on form in the antitrust laws, 438. — IV. Significance of the stress upon form; the implied norms, 444. — V. The revolt against formalism; oligopoly anticipated, 449. — VI. The revolt against formalism; oligopoly recognized, 453. — VII. Conclusions, 463.