Knowledge that Transforms

Journal Article A New Assessment of Openness and Inflation: Reply Get access David Romer David Romer University of California, Berkeley Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 113, Issue 2, May 1998, Pages 649–652, https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555612 Published: 01 May 1998

A common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and CEO pay. Using a new fifteen-year panel data set of CEOs in the largest, publicly traded U. S. companies, we document a strong relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation. This relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of CEO holdings of stock and stock options. In addition, we show that both the level of CEO compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980, largely because of increases in stock option grants.

Journal Article Growth Empirics: A Panel Data Approach—A Reply Get access Nazrul Islam Nazrul Islam Emory University and International Institute for Advanced Studies, Cambridge, MA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 113, Issue 1, February 1998, Pages 325–329, https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555513 Published: 01 February 1998

We model the electoral politics of redistribution when voters and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption and votes, respectively. Ideological concerns about income redistribution lead each party to adopt a general proportional income tax, adjusted to appeal to the ideological leanings of high “clout” groups, with disproportionately many “swing” voters, which the parties also ply with pork-barrel projects. Our results relate to “Director's Law,” which says that redistributive politics favors middle classes at the expense of both rich and poor.

This paper places the debate over using consumption or income in studies of inequality growth in a formal intertemporal setting. It highlights the importance of permanent and transitory income uncertainty in the evaluation of growth in consumption inequality. We derive conditions under which the growth of variances and covariances of income and consumption can be used to separately identify the growth in the variance of permanent and transitory income shocks. Household data from Britain for the period 1968–1992 are used to show a strong growth in transitory inequality toward the end of this period, while younger cohorts are shown to face significantly higher levels of permanent inequality.

This paper comments on recent developments in the literature on the econometric analysis of international growth and convergence. It notes that panel estimates of the neoclassical model, accommodating level effects for individual countries through heterogeneous intercepts, deal with some of the econometric difficulties arising in some of the earlier cross-sectional studies. But it notes that, in dynamic panels, heterogeneity in growth effects and in speeds of convergence renders this estimator inconsistent also. The pervasiveness of such heterogeneity is demonstrated in three samples of countries, and the effects of (incorrectly) imposing homogeneity on estimated parameters are illustrated and discussed.

Transactions take place in the rm rather than in the market because the rm o ers agents who make speci c investments power. Past literature emphasizes the allocation of ownership as the primary mechanism by which the rm does this. Within the contractibility assumptions of this literature, we identify a potentially superior mechanism, the regulation of access to critical resources. Access can be better than ownership because: i) the power agents get from access is more contingent on them making the right investment; ii) ownership has adverse e ects on the incentive to specialize. The theory explains the importance of internal organization and third party ownership. A preliminary version of this paper circulated with the title \\Implicit Property Rights in a Theory of the

Why are many of China's successful rural enterprises publically owned by local communities? Using a set of provincial data, we find that the share of community public firms (Township-Village Enterprises, or TVEs) relative to private enterprises is higher where the central government's influence is greater, the community government's power is stronger, and the level of market development is lower. We also find that TVEs help achieve the community government's goals of increasing government revenue, rural nonfarm employment, and rural income. However, TVEs do not increase rural income given the levels of nonfarm employment and local public goods provision, indicating possible inefficiency as compared with private enterprises.

In 1990 Wisconsin began providing vouchers to a small number of low-income students to attend nonsectarian private schools. Controlling for individual fixedeffects, I compare the test scores of students selected to attend a participating private school with those of unsuccessful applicants and other students from the Milwaukee public schools. I find that students in the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program had faster math score gains than, but similar reading score gains to, the comparison groups. The results appear robust to data imputations and sample attrition, although these deficiencies of the data should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.

The conventional wisdom is that postwar economic growth has been unpredictable. In the 1960s few observers accurately forecast which countries would grow quickly. In this paper we show that indexes of social development constructed in the early 1960s have considerable predictive power. These results indicate the importance of “social capability” for economic growth. We emphasize that social arrangements matter for reasons beyond those discussed in recent work on trust and social capital. However, we are also able to show that one of the indexes may be a useful proxy for social capital in developing countries.