Knowledge that Transforms

I. Suffocation by analytical definition, 377. — II. Rationality and the Individualist Exchange Economy, 387. — III. Scientific Precision and "the" Stationary State, 391. — IV. Pseudo-Positivism and the doctrine of "the logical gap, " 401. — V. The Mecca of twentieth century economics, 408. "… One day in looking over his books he discovered a remarkable law. For every item on the credit side an equal item appeared somewhere else on the debit side. ‘Ha!’ said the Bursar, ‘I have discovered one of the great laws controlling the college. It is a perfect and exact law of the real world. Credit must be called plus and debit minus; and so we have the law of conservation of £.s.d. This is the true way to find out things, and there is no limit to what may ultimately be discovered by this scientific method. I will pay no more heed to the superstitions held by some of the Fellows as to a beneficent spirit called the King or evil spirits called the University Commissioners. I have only to go on in this way and I shall succeed in understanding why prices are always going up.’" The Nature of the Physical World.

I. Railway rate theory developed to explain and justify rates not based on cost, 168.— Early analysis an overhead-cost theory, 173.— Terminology, 174.— Development of overhead-cost theory, 178.— Joint-cost explanation, 182.— Criticism of the analogy, 184.— Monopoly explanation, 185.— Grouping of later writers, 186.— The attack on the joint-cost theory, 189.— Back hauls, 197.— Defenders of the joint-cost theory, 199.— Classification of recent writers, 203.— Discrimination not always possible, 206. II. Do preferential rates burden other traffic? 208.— Charging what the traffic will bear and monopoly profits, 214.— Value of service leading to excessive rates, 220.— Arguments for cost of service, 224.— Are cost allocations practicable? 225.— The assumption of unused capacity, 228.— Differential charging will persist, 229.

Introduction, 449. — Brokerage office loan routine, 449. — Demand for funds inelastic at a given moment, 453; and over a period of time, 454. — Supply by “others” inelastic in 1927, 456. — Supply by banks elastic throughout 1927, 458. — New security issues the cause of increased demand for loans in 1928 and 1929, 460. — As a result of Federal Reserve policy, supply by banks inelastic after 1927, 461. — New security issues and high interest rates responsible for elasticity of supply by “others” in 1928 and 1929, 461. — Conclusion, 462.