Knowledge that Transforms

Scope of the paper: systematic analysis of the causes of rigid union wage policies, 522. — Union objectives: income, 523; philosophy, 524. — Demand schedules for union labor: oligopoly, 525; product price rigidity, 527; partial unionization, 528; relative importance of labor cost, 529. — Misinterpretation of the demand schedules: imperfect knowledge, 530; socio-economic structure of unionism, 531; method of negotiating wage agreements, 533. — Arbitrators' decisions, 536. — Employers' attitudes and policies, 539.

Three definitions of consumer's surplus, 422. — The assumption of universal independence, 422. — The "marginal-utility demand curve, " 423. — Open-topped marginal utility curves, 426. — Interpersonal and intertemporal comparisons of utility, 426. — Marshall's first version: extra expenditure, 427. — Its diagrammatic analysis, 429. — Nicholson's criticism of Marshall, 432. — Marshall's second version: the demand curve, 433. — Cannan's criticism, 435. — A necessary condition of independence, 437. — Relaxing the independence assumption: (1) One utility independent of all others, 438. — Alternative tests of independence, complementarity, competitiveness, 442. — (2) Independence between groups, 443. — (3) The case of "least independence, " 444. — Summary of basic tests, 447. — Conclusions, 448.

Four different schools now to be found among economists, 398. — Assumptions made here, 399. — Conflicting views where the total demand for houses is inelastic, 400. — Brown's position substantially correct, 401. — But the "partial equilibrium" approach is open to certain objections, 404. — Separability of the tax into a tax on site value and a tax on building value, 405. — Houses in different locations not quantities of a single commodity but different competing commodities, 409. — Summary of conclusions, 411. — Mathematical appendix, 412.

The problem, 91. — Groping for a policy, 92. — The case goes to the country, 98. — Demobilization speeds on, 101. — Conclusions, 103.

Introduction, 169. — I. Structural controls: the Agricultural Estate, 171; the Estate of Industry and Trade, 173; the Transport Organization, 174; the Labor Front, 174; the Estate of German Handicrafts, 175; control boards for imports, 175; the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 176; the Reich Defense Council, 176. — II. Industrial concentration and the control structure, 178. — Small business, 183. — Rationalization, 184. — III. Price control, 185. — IV. Fiscal and related controls, 190. — Control of the capital market, 192. — Dividend distributions, 196. — V. The dispersion of German enterprise, 199. — VI. Conclusions, 204.

Individual goods and social goods compared, 27. — Quantitative measurement of social goods, 28. — Ideal output of social goods, 30. — Individual voting on outputs, 32. — Individual voting on increments to existing outputs, 40. — Alternatives to voting, 42. — Distributing the cost of social goods, 44. — Social goods not equally available to all voters, 47.