Knowledge that Transforms

I. Introduction, 161. — II. The discrete time model, 162. — III. Definitions, 162. — IV. Some theorems on the linear stochastic model, 163. — V. Application to Walrasian and Marshallian stability, 164. —VI. Conclusion, 166.

I. Introduction, 590. — II. Effective tariff rates, 591. — III. Regression studies, 600. — IV. Summary, 603. — Appendix, 604.

I. The basic model, 217. — II. Multiplicative demand curves and steady growth expectations, 222. — III. Equilibrium solutions, 226. — IV. Nonconstant returns to scale, 230. — V. Rule-of-thumb decision making and steady growth solutions, 232. — VI. Summary and conclusions, 234.

I. Introduction, 254. — II. The model, 255. — III. Relative prices and tax incidence, 257. — IV. The analysis of the model, 259. — V. Concluding remarks, 265.

X-Efficiency, 236. — Incentive pricing, 243. — Incentive pricing applied to regulated utilities, 244. — Calibration, 247. — The regulatory lag, 251. — Conclusion,

In a recent issue of this Journal, Professor D. G. Luckett maintained that D. Meiselman's results cannot be considered as discriminating evidence in favor of the first variant of the expectations model, which is based on long-term expectations of future shortterm rates.' While his conclusion may be right, the demonstration he offers does not seem to be correct. The present comment falls into three sections. In Section I Luckett's arguments are briefly reviewed. In Section II it is formally shown why his analysis is not fully acceptable. The empirical relevance of the theoretical arguments put forward in the second section is examined in Section III, with reference to the Italian experience.

Journal Article Rejoinder Get access James Tobin James Tobin Yale University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 84, Issue 2, May 1970, Pages 328–329, https://doi.org/10.2307/1883018 Published: 01 May 1970

Introduction, 85. — The conventional bilateral monopoly, 86. — The government procurement process, 88. — Sole source contracts, 89. — Multisource procurement, 95.

The economic setting, 71. — The human capital model, 73. — Factors inhibiting human capital development, 79. — Secular trends in the parameters, 80. — Conclusions, 83.

The flexible accelerator concept has provided the rationale for the regression equations used in several recent econometric studies of inventory behavior. In such a model a desired (or equilibrium) level of inventories is defined, but because of costs involved in changing the level of stocks only a partial adjustment of inventories to their desired level is achieved in any time period. This leads to the familiar decision rule in which current inventory is a linear function of the previous period's stock plus a variable or set of variables representing current demand. The purpose of this note is to question whether there are any significant costs specifically associated with changing the level of inventories other than those directly associated with changes in the level of production which may (or may not) be required to bring about the necessary stock adjustment. If none exist, it is shown that a given time pattern of demand can lead a firm which acts according to the flexible accelerator to behave "irrationally" and incur unnecessary costs. Finally, an amended version of the flexible accelerator is presented, and the resulting equation for inventories is compared with that derived from the original model.