Knowledge that Transforms

I. Introduction, 73.—II. A difficulty in the single profile social preference ordering approach, 75.—III. Pareto-extension rules, 81.—IV. A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decision, 83.—V. Conclusion, 85.

Introduction, 281.—Methods of analysis, 282.—Results, 287.—The distribution of net benefits, 293.—Policy implications and conclusions, 298.

I. The theory of social security and life cycle savings, 234.—II. Social security and the steady state capital stock in a life cycle economy, 237.—III. Partial equilibrium effect, 239.—IV. General equilibrium changes in capital intensity, 241.—V. Alternative specifications and some macro issues, 247.—VI. Summary and conclusion, 248.—Appendix A, 249.—Appendix B, 251.

I. Introduction, 325.—II. Absolute and relative approaches for evaluating growth and distribution, 326.—III. A general welfare approach for assessing dualistic development, 328.—IV. Welfare economic analysis of dualistic development: the general case, 334.—V. Welfare economic analysis of dualistic development: special cases, 337.—VI. Extensions of the methodology, 346.—VII. Conclusions and implications, 348.—VIII. Empirical significance, 351.

I. The basic model, 615.—II. Tax rate interdependence, 620.—III. Foreign borrowing, 626.—IV. Conclusion, 628.

I. Introduction, 47.—II. The model, 49.—III. Conclusions, 54. The universal form of conscious behavior is thus action designed to change a future situation inferred from a present one. It involves perception and, in addition, twofold inference. We must infer what the future situation would have been without our interference, and what change will be wrought in it by our action. Fortunately or unfortunately, none of these processes is infallible, or indeed ever accurate and complete (Knight, 1921, pp. 201–02). The correspondence of expectations that makes it possible for all parties to achieve what they are striving for is in fact brought about by a process of learning by trial and error which must involve a constant disappointment of some expectations. The process of adaptation operates, as do the adjustments of any self-organizing system, by what cybernetics has taught us to call negative feedback: responses to the differences between the expected and the actual results of actions so that these differences will be reduced (Hayek, 1976, pp. 124–25).

I. Introduction, 1.—II. Context of the model, 3.—III. Consumer specifications and market equilibrium in the case of fixed breakdown probabilities, 5.—IV. Breakdown probabilities set by profit considerations, 11.—V. Conclusion, 19.—Appendix, 20.

The demand for gambling, 155.—Elasticity of demand, 156.—Demand for bookmaking in Nevada, 157.—Parimutuel betting, 158.—Price, tax, and state revenue, 160.

I. Introduction, 189.—II. Equilibria in models without learning—the case of knowledge, 191.—III. Equilibrium in models with learning, 196.—IV. Empirically observed distributions of prices quoted by different sellers, 204.—V. Qualifications, implications, and conclusions, 205.

I. An example, 473.—II. The generality of the Henry George Theorem, 477.—III. On using land rents as a measure of the benefits from public goods, 490.—IV. Competitive attainability of a Pareto optimal distribution of economic activity, 496.—V. Concluding comments, 498.