Knowledge that Transforms

The contracting view of CEO pay assumes that pay is used by shareholders to solve an agency problem. Simple models of the contracting view predict that pay should not be tied to luck, where luck is defined as observable shocks to performance beyond the CEO's control. Using several measures of luck, we find that CEO pay in fact responds as much to a lucky dollar as to a general dollar. A skimming model, where the CEO has captured the pay-setting process, is consistent with this fact. Because some complications to the contracting view could also generate pay for luck, we test for skimming directly by examining the effect of governance. Consistent with skimming, we find that better governed firms pay their CEO less for luck.

Many technologies used by the LDCs are developed in the OECD economies and are designed to make optimal use of the skills of these richer countries' workforces. Differences in the supply of skills create a mismatch between the requirements of these technologies and the skills of LDC workers, and lead to low productivity in the LDCs. Even when all countries have equal access to new technologies, this technology-skill mismatch can lead to sizable differences in total factor productivity and output per worker. We provide evidence in favor of the cross-industry productivity patterns predicted by our model, and also show that technology-skill mismatch could account for a large fraction of the observed output per worker differences in the data.

This paper documents changing inequality in employer-provided fringe benefits in the United States using much more comprehensive data than previously available. Inequality growth in broader measures of compensation slightly exceeds wage inequality growth over the 1981–1997 period. Employer costs due to paid leave, pensions, and health insurance fell for low wage labor and rose for high wage labor over this period. The findings suggest income effects as a contributory factor in the relative decline of fringe benefits among low wage workers.

We extend expected utility theory to situations in which agents experience feelings of anticipation prior to the resolution of uncertainty. We show how these anticipatory feelings may result in time inconsistency. We provide an example from portfolio theory to illustrate the potential impact of anticipation on asset prices.

We examine short-run impacts of changes in residential neighborhoods on the well-being of families residing in high-poverty public housing projects who received Section 8 housing vouchers through a random lottery. Households offered vouchers experienced improvements in multiple measures of well-being relative to a control group, including increased safety, improved health among household heads, and fewer behavior problems among boys. There were no significant short-run impacts of vouchers on the employment, earnings, or welfare receipt of household heads. Children in households offered vouchers valid only in low poverty neighborhoods also had reduced likelihood of injuries, asthma attacks, and victimizations by crime.

Data from downtown Boston in the 1990s show that loss aversion determines seller behavior in the housing market. Condominium owners subject to nominal losses 1) set higher asking prices of 25–35 percent of the difference between the property's expected selling price and their original purchase price; 2) attain higher selling prices of 3–18 percent of that difference; and 3) exhibit a much lower sale hazard than other sellers. The list price results are twice as large for owneroccupants as investors, but hold for both. These findings suggest that sellers are averse to realizing (nominal) losses and help explain the positive price-volume correlation in real estate markets.

This paper uses data from a randomized housing-mobility experiment to study the effects of relocating families from high- to low-poverty neighborhoods on juvenile crime. Outcome measures come from juvenile arrest records taken from government administrative data. Our findings seem to suggest that providing families with the opportunity to move to lower-poverty neighborhoods reduces violent criminal behavior by teens.

Theoretical models predict that overconfident investors trade excessively. We test this prediction by partitioning investors on gender. Psychological research demonstrates that, in areas such as finance, men are more overconfident than women. Thus, theory predicts that men will trade more excessively than women. Using account data for over 35,000 households from a large discount brokerage, we analyze the common stock investments of men and women from February 1991 through January 1997. We document that men trade 45 percent more than women. Trading reduces men's net returns by 2.65 percentage points a year as opposed to 1.72 percentage points for women.

This paper considers a simple "three-goods" model and focuses attention on the expectational stability of its equilibria. The setting allows us to describe stylized general equilibrium macro interactions: firms hire workers and then sell production to buyers whose purchasing power depends on the firms' previous decisions. We assess expectational stability from an "eductive" learning procedure that reflects basic rationality considerations. From our viewpoint on coordination, we compare the merits of fixed wages versus flexible wages. Although in both cases the same factors—supply and demand elasticities, marginal propensity to save—are effective, expectational coordination is often more successful with flexible wages.

We study a model in which perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. Experts are biased and thus may wish to pull the decision maker in different directions and to different degrees. When the decision maker consults only a single expert, the expert withholds substantial information from the decision maker. We ask whether this situation is improved by having the decision maker sequentially consult two experts. We first show that there is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which full revelation occurs. When both experts are biased in the same direction, it is never beneficial to consult both. In contrast, when experts are biased in opposite directions, it is always beneficial to consult both. Indeed, in this case full revelation may be induced in an extended debate by introducing the possibility of rebuttal.