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Inference by Believers in the Law of Small Numbers

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(3), 775-816 open access
Many people believe in the "Law of Small Numbers," exaggerating the degree to which a small sample resembles the population from which it is drawn. To model this, I assume that a person exaggerates the likelihood that a short sequence of i.i.d. signals resembles the long-run rate at which those signals are generated. Such a person believes in the "gambler's fallacy", thinking early draws of one signal increase the odds of next drawing other signals. When uncertain about the rate, the person over-infers from short sequences of signals, and is prone to think the rate is more extreme than it is. When the person makes inferences about the frequency at which rates are generated by different sources --- such as the distribution of talent among financial analysts --- based on few observations from each source, he tends to exaggerate how much variance there is in the rates. Hence, the model predicts that people may pay for financial advice from "experts" whose expertise is entirely ...

Information Technology, Workplace Organization, and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-Level Evidence

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(1), 339-376 open access
We investigate the hypothesis that the combination of three related innovations—1) information technology (IT), 2) complementary workplace reorganization, and 3) new products and services—constitute a significant skill-biased technical change affecting labor demand in the United States. Using detailed firm-level data, we find evidence of complementarities among all three of these innovations in factor demand and productivity regressions. In addition, firms that adopt these innovations tend to use more skilled labor. The effects of IT on labor demand are greater when IT is combined with the particular organizational investments we identify, highlighting the importance of IT-enabled organizational change.

Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(1), 39-84
Relational contracts—informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships—are prevalent within and between firms. We develop repeated-game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms (vertical integration) differ from those between (nonintegration). We show that integration affects the parties' temptations to renege on a given relational contract, and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain. In this sense, the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties' relationship. Our approach also has implications for joint ventures, alliances, and networks, and for the role of management within and between firms.

Noise Trading and Exchange Rate Regimes

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(2), 537-569
Policy-makers often justify their choice of fixed exchange rate regimes as a shelter against nonfundamental influences in the foreign exchange market. This paper proposes a framework, based on endogenous noise trading, which makes sense of the policy-makers' view. We show that as a result of multiple equilibria, the model violates Mundell's “Incompatible Trinity:” under some conditions, it is possible to reduce the volatility of the exchange rate without any sacrifice in terms of monetary autonomy. We provide empirical evidence supportive of the existence of a nonfundamental channel in the link between exchange rate regimes and exchange rate volatility. If … markets come to believe exchange rate stability is not itself a significant policy objective, we should not be surprised that snowballing cumulative movements can develop that appear widely out of keeping with current balance-of-payments prospects or domestic price movements. At that point, freely floating exchange rates, instead of delivering on the promise of money autonomy for domestic monetary or other policies, can greatly complicate domestic economic management [Paul Volcker 1978–79, p. 9].

Legal Origins

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(4), 1193-1229 open access
A central requirement in the design of a legal system is the protection of law enforcers from coercion by litigants through either violence or bribes. The higher the risk of coercion, the greater the need for protection and control of law enforcers by the state. Such control, however, also makes law enforcers beholden to the state, and politicizes justice. This perspective explains why, starting in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the relatively more peaceful England developed trials by independent juries, while the less peaceful France relied on state-employed judges to resolve disputes. It may also explain many differences between common and civil law traditions with respect to both the structure of legal systems and the observed social and economic outcomes.

The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(4), 1415-1451
The determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens is a key issue in political economy.Here we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems.Having a more informed an politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive.This suggests that there is a role both for democratic institutions and the mass media in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy.The ideas behind the model are tested on panel data from India.We show that public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure are greater, controlling for shocks, where governments face greater electoral accountability and where newspaper circulation is highest.

Ferreting out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(1), 121-148 open access
Owners of business groups are often accused of expropriating minority shareholders by tunneling resources from firms where they have low cash flow rights to firms where they have high cash flow rights. In this paper we propose a general methodology to measure the extent of tunneling activities. The methodology rests on isolating and then testing the distinctive implications of the tunneling hypothesis for the propagation of earnings shocks across firms within a group. When we apply our methodology to data on Indian business groups, we find a significant amount of tunneling, much of it occurring via nonoperating components of profit.

Dollarization, Bailouts, and the Stability of the Banking System

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(2), 467-502 open access
Central bank policy suffers from time inconsistency when facing a banking crisis: a bailout is optimal ex post, but ex ante it should be limited to control moral hazard. Dollarization provides a credible commitment not to help at the cost of not helping even when it would be ex ante optimal to do so. Dollarization is good when the costs of establishing a reputation for the central bank are high, monitoring effort by the banker is important in improving returns, and when the cost of liquidating projects is moderate. However, a very severe moral hazard problem could make dollarization undesirable. The results obtained are applied to assess the desirability of dollarization in a range of countries and the potential role of the IMF as International LOLR. We would never put ourselves in a position where we envisioned actions that we would take would be of assistance to the rest of the world but to the detriment of the United States. Alan Greenspan to a congressional panel in 1999 [IHT, January 19, 2000].

Sticky Information versus Sticky Prices: A Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(4), 1295-1328 open access
This paper examines a model of dynamic price adjustment based on the assumption that information disseminates slowly throughout the population. Compared with the commonly used sticky-price model, this sticky-information model displays three related properties that are more consistent with accepted views about the effects of monetary policy. First, disinflations are always contractionary (although annoimced disinflations are less contractionary than surprise ones). Second, monetary policy shocks have their maximum impact on inflation with a substantial delay. Third, the change in inflation is positively correlated with the level of economic activity.

Fiscal Policy with Noncontingent Debt and the Optimal Maturity Structure

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(3), 1105-1131
How should the tax rate and the level of public debt adjust to an adverse fiscal shock? What is the optimal maturity structure of public debt? If the maturity structure is carefully chosen, the ex post variation in the market value of public debt can cover the government against the need to raise taxes or debt if fiscal conditions should turn bad. In general, almost every Arrow-Debreu allocation can be implemented with noncontingent debt of different maturities. In a stylized example, the optimal policy is implemented by selling a perpetuity and investing in a short-term asset.