Knowledge that Transforms

We give a full analytic characterization of a large class of sticky-price models where the firm’s price-setting behavior is described by a generalized hazard function. Such a function allows for a vast variety of empirical hazards to be fitted. This setup is microfounded by random adjustment costs, as in Caballero and Engel (1999), or by information frictions, as in Woodford (2009). We establish two main results. First, we show how to identify all the primitives of the model, including the distribution of the fundamental adjustment costs and the implied generalized hazard function, using the distribution of price changes. Second, we derive a sufficient statistic for the aggregate effect of a monetary shock: given an arbitrary generalized hazard function, the cumulative impulse response of output to a once-and-for-all monetary shock is proportional to the ratio of the kurtosis of the steady-state distribution of price changes over the frequency of price adjustment. We prove that Calvo’s model yields the upper bound and Golosov and Lucas’s model the lower bound on this measure in the class of random menu cost models.

There are two broad views as to why people stay poor. One emphasizes differences in fundamentals, such as ability, talent, or motivation. The poverty traps view emphasizes differences in opportunities that stem from access to wealth. To test these views, we exploit a large-scale, randomized asset transfer and an 11-year panel of 6,000 households who begin in extreme poverty. The setting is rural Bangladesh, and the assets are cows. The data support the poverty traps view—we identify a threshold level of initial assets above which households accumulate assets, take on better occupations (from casual labor in agriculture or domestic services to running small livestock businesses), and grow out of poverty. The reverse happens for those below the threshold. Structural estimation of an occupational choice model reveals that almost all beneficiaries are misallocated in the work they do at baseline and that the gains arising from eliminating misallocation would far exceed the program costs. Our findings imply that large transfers, which create better jobs for the poor, are an effective means of getting people out of poverty traps and reducing global poverty.

We link newly digitized personnel records of the U.S. government for 1907–1921 to census data to study the segregation of the civil service by race under President Woodrow Wilson. Using a difference-in-differences design around Wilson’s inauguration, we find that the introduction of employment segregation increased the black-white earnings gap by 3.4–6.9 percentage points. This increasing gap is driven by a reallocation of existing black civil servants to lower-paid positions, lowering their returns to education. Importantly, the negative effects extend beyond Wilson’s presidency. Using census data for 1900–1940, we show that segregation caused a relative decline in the home ownership rate of black civil servants. Moreover, by comparing children of black and white civil servants in adulthood, we provide suggestive evidence that descendants of black civil servants who were exposed to Wilson’s presidency exhibit lower levels of education, earnings, and social mobility. Our combined results thus document significant short- and long-run costs borne by minorities during a unique episode of state-sanctioned discrimination.

We study the results of a massive nationwide correspondence experiment sending more than 83,000 fictitious applications with randomized characteristics to geographically dispersed jobs posted by 108 of the largest U.S. employers. Distinctively Black names reduce the probability of employer contact by 2.1 percentage points relative to distinctively white names. The magnitude of this racial gap in contact rates differs substantially across firms, exhibiting a between-company standard deviation of 1.9 percentage points. Despite an insignificant average gap in contact rates between male and female applicants, we find a between-company standard deviation in gender contact gaps of 2.7 percentage points, revealing that some firms favor male applicants and others favor women. Company-specific racial contact gaps are temporally and spatially persistent, and negatively correlated with firm profitability, federal contractor status, and a measure of recruiting centralization. Discrimination exhibits little geographical dispersion, but two-digit industry explains roughly half of the cross-firm variation in both racial and gender contact gaps. Contact gaps are highly concentrated in particular companies, with firms in the top quintile of racial discrimination responsible for nearly half of lost contacts to Black applicants in the experiment. Controlling false discovery rates to the 5% level, 23 companies are found to discriminate against Black applicants. Our findings establish that discrimination against distinctively Black names is concentrated among a select set of large employers, many of which can be identified with high confidence using large-scale inference methods.

We use a field experiment to study price discrimination in a market with price posting and negotiation. Motivated by concerns that low-income consumers do poorly in markets with privately negotiated prices, we built a call center staffed with actors armed with bargaining scripts to reveal negotiated prices and their determinants. Our actors implement sequential bargaining games under incomplete information in the field. By experimentally manipulating how information is revealed, we generate sequences of price offers that allow us to identify price discrimination in negotiations based on retailer perceptions of consumers’ search and switching costs. We also document differences in price distributions between entrants and incumbents, reflecting differences in captivity of their respective consumer bases. Finally, we show that higher prices paid by lower-income subsidy recipients in our market is not due to discriminatory targeting; they can be explained by variation in consumer willingness and ability to search and bargain.

We study the scope for international cooperation in macroprudential policies. Multinational banks contribute to and are affected by fire sales in countries they operate in. National governments setting quantity regulations noncooperatively fail to achieve the globally efficient outcome, underregulating domestic banks and overregulating foreign banks. Surprisingly, noncooperative national governments using revenue-generating Pigouvian taxation can achieve the global optimum. Intuitively, this occurs because governments internalize the business value of foreign banks through the tax revenue collected. Our theory provides a unified framework to think about international bank regulations and yields concrete insights with the potential to improve on the current policy stance.

Physicians, judges, teachers, and agents in many other settings differ systematically in the decisions they make when faced with similar cases. Standard approaches to interpreting and exploiting such differences assume they arise solely from variation in preferences. We develop an alternative framework that allows variation in preferences and diagnostic skill and show that both dimensions may be partially identified in standard settings under quasi-random assignment. We apply this framework to study pneumonia diagnoses by radiologists. Diagnosis rates vary widely among radiologists, and descriptive evidence suggests that a large component of this variation is due to differences in diagnostic skill. Our estimated model suggests that radiologists view failing to diagnose a patient with pneumonia as more costly than incorrectly diagnosing one without, and that this leads less skilled radiologists to optimally choose lower diagnostic thresholds. Variation in skill can explain 39% of the variation in diagnostic decisions, and policies that improve skill perform better than uniform decision guidelines. Failing to account for skill variation can lead to highly misleading results in research designs that use agent assignments as instruments.

Overdose deaths involving opioids have increased dramatically since the 1990s, leading to the worst drug overdose epidemic in U.S. history, but there is limited empirical evidence about the initial causes. In this article, we examine the role of the 1996 introduction and marketing of OxyContin as a potential leading cause of the opioid crisis. We leverage cross-state variation in exposure to OxyContin's introduction due to a state policy that substantially limited the drug's early entry and marketing in select states. Recently unsealed court documents involving Purdue Pharma show that state-based triplicate prescription programs posed a major obstacle to sales of OxyContin and suggest that less marketing was targeted to states with these programs. We find that OxyContin distribution was more than 50% lower in "triplicate states" in the years after the drug's launch. Although triplicate states had higher rates of overdose deaths prior to 1996, this relationship flipped shortly after the launch and triplicate states saw substantially slower growth in overdose deaths, continuing even 20 years after OxyContin's introduction. Our results show that the introduction and marketing of OxyContin explain a substantial share of overdose deaths over the past two decades.

We use three quasi-natural experiments in Mexico and one in Panama to estimate the effects of having the option to pay with cash on Uber rides. The ability to pay in cash affects the demand for rides, which is reflected in large changes in the total number of trips, fares, miles, and number of users after Uber introduced cash payments, particularly in lower-income city blocks. On the other hand, the effects on prices, estimated times of arrival, and competitor pricing are negligible, consistent with the supply of trips being very elastic. Although cash payments naturally increase the fraction of users that pay exclusively with cash, more than half of the users have access to both cards and cash, and alternate between payment methods. We find evidence consistent with cash and card payments being imperfectly substitutable at both the intensive and extensive margins, which magnifies the effect of policies that restrict the availability of payment methods.

We develop a novel bounded rationality model of imperfect reasoning as the interaction between automatic (System 1) and analytical (System 2) thinking. In doing so, we formalize the empirical consensus of cognitive psychology using a structural, constrained-optimal economic framework of mental information acquisition about the unknown optimal policy function. A key result is that agents reason less (more) when facing usual (unusual) states of the world, producing state- and history-dependent behavior. Our application is an otherwise standard incomplete-markets model with no a priori behavioral biases. The ergodic distribution of actions and beliefs is characterized by endogenous learning traps, where locally stable state dynamics generate familiar regions of the state space within which behavior appears to follow memory-based heuristics. This results in endogenous behavioral biases that have many empirically desirable properties: the marginal propensity to consume is high even for unconstrained agents, hand-to-mouth status is more frequent and persistent, and there is more wealth inequality than in the standard model.