Knowledge that Transforms

I. Introduction and summary, 376. — II. Fixed coefficients model: first analysis, 377.—III. Smooth substitution model: first analysis, 382.—IV. Fixed coefficients model: extended analysis, 385. — V. Smooth substitution I model: extended analysis, 394.—Appendix, 396.

I. Production, 617. — II. Money, 618. — III. Consumption and spending, 621. — IV. Pattern, 623. — V. Agriculture, 627. — VI. Conclusion, 631.

I. Introduction and summary of main conclusions, 684. — II. A model with three tradable goods usable in production or consumption, 588. — III. Intermediate products, production technology, and the gains from trade, 601. — IV. The structure of production in protected industries, 610.

The paper demonstrates the invalidity of Levhari’s attempts to show that it is impossible for a production system that has ceased to be profitable due to a change in the rate of profits, to become profitable again when the profit rate changes further in the same direction. We first point out where Levhari’s argument fails and then show, by means of a numerical example, that such a ‘return’, or ‘switch-back’, of a production system is possible under Levhari’s own assumptions. We will then comment on the origin and implications of the error that the ‘return’ of a system reveals in traditional theory.

I. Introduction, 526. — II. Alternative discrete capital models, 528. — III. Reswitching in two-good technologies, 531. — IV. Reswitching in a general capital model, 538. — V. Some additional implications for economic theory, 546.

Introduction, 314. — Definition of the precautionary demand for cash, 314. — The concepts, 315. — Optimal precautionary cash balances, 316. — Comparison with transactions demand for cash, 320. — Comparison with related studies, 320. — Appendix, 322.

David Levhari, Paul A. Samuelson; The Nonswitching Theorem is False, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 80, Issue 4, 1 November 1966, Pages 518–519

Introduction: the “Schumpeterian” hypothesis, 167. — I. Oxygen steelmaking: the history of its invention and innovation, 169. — II. Some cost and profit implications of innovative lethargy, 184. — III. Conclusion, 188.

I. Introduction, 400.—II. The initial situation, 401.—III. The entry of the government firm, 401. — IV. Price discrimination by the government firm, 407. — V. The government firm's size, 409. — VI. A numerical example, 410.— VII. Concluding remarks, 412.

I. A numerical example, 504. — II. Generalizations, 508. — III. A direct logical criticism, 510. — IV. Changes in the rate of profit and changes in the “quantity of capital, †512. — V. The trap of an old mode of thinking, 514.