Knowledge that Transforms

I. A sentence in King's working-journal, 483. — II. Some previous statements about King's law, 485. — III. Davenant's role, 488. — IV. Early variations of the demand schedule, 491. — V. Conclusion, 492.

I. Introduction, 88. — II. Mathematical-institutional economics and agrarian reform, 89. — II. A simple production function, 91. — IV. The feudal system, 93. — V. The capitalist and landless peasants, 94. — VI. A small landowner capitalist society, 97. — VII. The village commune, 100. — VIII. Corporate ownership, 102. — IX. Threats and point product, 104. — X. Summary, 104. — Appendix, 105.

Aggregation of preferences, 256. — The paradox of voting and its significance, 257. — Voting in a simple model, 258. — Some complications, 260. — Unimportance of the paradox, 263. — Voting in a more realistic model, 264. — Conclusion, 270.

I. Introduction, 1. — II. The model, 3. — III. Full optimization and complete specialization, 8. — IV. Full optimization and incomplete specialization, 10. — V. Optimal tax policy with free trade, 16. — VI. Optimal tariff policy with mobile capital, 23. — VII. Summary and conclusions, 31.

I. The conceptual framework, 396. — II. The model, 402. — III. Empirical application, 406. — IV. Some extensions of the analysis, 411. — V. Conclusion, 421.

I. Introduction and summary, 592.--II. The one-sector two-capital model, 593.--III. Dynamic analysis, 597.--IV. Market structure, 603.--V. Rationality and irrationality, 607.--VI. Concluding comments, 609.

Research and firm size within industries, 640. — Research elasticities and average firm size, 644. — Market structure and the level of research, 645. — The role of technical entry barriers, 652. — Conclusions, 656.

I. Returns and costs in the nonrivalrous case, 359. — II. The general rivalry problem, 363. — III. Specific duopoly models, 367. — IV. Solution concepts, 371. — V. Specific Cournot reaction patterns, 377. — VI. The N-firm problem, 389. — VII. Welfare implications, 392. — VIII. Conclusion, 394.

I. The isolation paradox and the assurance problem, 112. — II. Optimum savings, 116. — III. The rate of discount, 120. — IV. Rich they, poor us, 121. — V. Conclusions, 122.