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The Effects of the Recovery Act Upon Labor Organization

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1934 49(1), 52
The new features of general application introduced by the Act: prohibition of discrimination, 53; right to select a labor organization as the representative with whom employer must deal, 55; fixing of code terms without antecedent collective bargaining, 67; union representation on boards to settle labor disputes in the industry or on code authorities not general, 59. — Effects: strengthening of unions which had already established effective collective action over competitive areas, 62; obstacles to effective collective bargaining over competitive areas within the industry by separate organizations of the unskilled and semi-skilled, 66; importance of feasibility of fixing standard wage rates for better-paid workers over competitive areas, 69; craft vs. vertical unionism in mass-production industries, 71; competition of employee representation plans with outside organizations, 73; stimulus to political action, 77.

Professor Chamberlin's Theory of Limited Competition

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1934 48(2), 317
His review of Cournot and Edgeworth does not get down to bedrock, 318.— Difficulties in his treatment of foresight (1) under conditions of decreasing variable costs, 319; the argument expressed in terms of the symbols of Cournot, 323; (2) under unequal conditions of increasing cost, 325; diagrammatic presentation, 333; nine points of conflict with his conclusions, 335.

Prices Under Competition and Monopoly: Some Concrete Examples

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1934 48(2), 288
The essential conditions for competition, 288. — Lettuce in the Puget Sound district, 289. — The case of Washington potatoes, 291. — Washington apples, 293. — Staple non-perishables: dry beans, 295. — The Seattle Fur Exchange, 297. — Summary of these cases, 298. — Monopoly and competitive price contrasted: three cases, 300. — Types of discrimination, 302. — Reasons for discrimination, 303.

The Influence of Marginal Buyers on Monopolistic Competition

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1934 49(1), 121
Two extreme views of marginal buyers, 121.— Professor Hotelling's case, 122.— Professor Chamberlin fails to recognize their importance, 122.— Another view of the same situation, 123.— Effect on his conclusions, 126.— Another possibility under differentiation of product, 129.— A further stage: competitors still more numerous, 132.— Conclusions, 134.