We study a general equilibrium efficiency wage model characterized by fully optimizing agents, flexible prices, and imperfect information. The model has a unique competitive equilibrium with underemployment in a sector (called manufacturing) with efficiency wages, relative to a self-employment sector. Since prices are flexible, the multiplier of manufacturing output with respect to autonomous demand changes may or may not exceed unity: demand changes lead to price effects as well as income effects that work opposite each other. Nevertheless, there always exist government policies that achieve Pareto improvements by switching demand toward the manufacturing sector. Optimal demand-switching policies are explicitly characterized.

This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms.The firms' .superiorinformation about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance.Under plausible assumptions, such aj^reements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk.ll is shown that, if leisure is a normal good and firms are risk-neutral, employment is always ahoue the efficient level.Such a one-period implicit contracting model cannot, therefore, be used to "explain" unemployment as a rational byproduct of risk sharing between workers and a risk-neutral firm under conditions of asymmetric information.