In the public sector, commodity bundling involves an agenda setter exercising control over a governmental unit's budgetary mix—the allocation of the unit's total budget to its various subactivities—in order to manipulate electoral outcomes on other fiscal variables such as the total budget. This paper develops an analytical model of a political market in which a multi-activity governmental unit practices commodity bundling in order to advance the interests of the setter. Two institutional structures are considered, each involving a different voting process or set of electoral constraints and, hence, a different form of commodity bundling. The paper explores the impact of this form of monopoly power on such policy outcomes as the governmental unit's total budget, its budgetary mix, and the distribution of net benefits from collective action.

Journal Article Estimating the Economic Model of Crime: Employment Versus Punishment Effects Get access Samuel L. Myers, Jr. Samuel L. Myers, Jr. Federal Trade Commission Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 98, Issue 1, February 1983, Pages 157–166, https://doi.org/10.2307/1885572 Published: 01 February 1983

This paper considers pricing and depletion of an exhaustible nonrenewable resource in an economy wherein domestic consumption is provided for by supplementing extraction from the economy's own resource stock with imports, the future supply of which is not assured. The socially optimal response to threat of trade disruption is a more conservationist depletion program for the domestic resource stock than would be called for, if import supplies were assured to persist. Competitive domestic firms adopt the socially optimal conservationist program. However, firms anticipating domestic market power after the disruption of import supplies are revealed to overextract the domestic resource stock.