Journal Article The Economics of the Iron and Steel Industry Get access M. M. Bober M. M. Bober Lawrence College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 52, Issue 1, November 1937, Pages 179–185, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884504 Published: 01 November 1937

Journal Article Recent Literature on the Origins of Modern Capitalism Get access M. M. Knight M. M. Knight Paris, France Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 41, Issue 3, May 1927, Pages 520–533, https://doi.org/10.2307/1883704 Published: 01 May 1927

Journal Article Academic Economics in Present Russia Gelesnoff, Grundzüge Get access M. M. Bober M. M. Bober Lawrence College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 43, Issue 2, February 1929, Pages 352–363, https://doi.org/10.2307/1882478 Published: 01 February 1929

In 2003 the federal-state Medicaid program provided prescription drug coverage to more than 50 million people. To determine the price that it will pay for each drug, Medicaid uses the average private sector price. When Medicaid is a large part of the demand for a drug, this creates an incentive for its maker to increase prices for other health care consumers. Using drug utilization and expenditure data for the top 200 drugs in 1997 and in 2002, we investigate the relationship between the Medicaid market share (MMS) and the average price of a prescription. Our estimates imply that a 10-percentage-point increase in the MMS is associated with a 7 to 10 percent increase in the average price of a prescription. In addition, the Medicaid rules increase a firm's incentive to introduce new versions of a drug in order to raise price. We find empirical evidence that firms producing newer drugs with larger sales to Medicaid are more likely to introduce new versions. Taken together, our findings suggest that government procurement rules can alter equilibrium price and product proliferation in the private sector.

This paper examines why Canadian poverty rates fell relative to U. S. poverty rates during the periods 1970–1979 and 1979–1986. During the 1970s the principal reason for declining Canadian poverty rates is higher economic growth. During the 1980s, however, differences in government transfer policy are the main cause of relative poverty change in the two countries. Virtually all of the 3.3 point fall in relative Canadian/U.S. poverty rates from 1979 to 1986 can be attributed to expansions in the Canadian transfer system and simultaneous contractions in U. S. transfers.

Introduction, 410. — Single-period versus multiperiod decision making, 411. — Simultaneous choice in a multiperiod process, 413. — Alternating choice in a multiperiod process, 416. — The method of backward induction, 417.— General quadratic profit functions, 420. — Reduced quadratic profit functions, 422. — Asymptotic results, 425. — The cost of competition and the benefits of trust, 427. — Conclusion, 428.

I. Introduction, 603. — II. Variations in factor inputs that are less than proportionate to changes in output, 604. — III. The influence of risk on the scale of operations, 607. — IV. More fundamental difficulties with constant factor proportions, 608. — V. The management factor and economies of scale, 611. — VI. Conclusion, 612.

Are there agglomeration economies in crime? The positive correlation between city size and crime rates is well-known. This paper establishes a positive relationship between youth cohort size and marijuana use rates. It further demonstrates a negative association between youth cohort size and marijuana prices, youth drug possession arrest rates, and both overall and youth sales arrest rates. Cohort size affects demand by lowering possession arrest probabilities, but this factor explains less than 10 percent of the relationship. The main effect shown here, accounting for at least a quarter of the relationship, is on the supply of marijuana. Larger youth cohorts yield thicker drug markets that, through lower sales arrest risk and informational economies, generate cost-savings in drug distribution.

I analyze a sequential bargaining model in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power (measured as the probability of making offers), but learn as they play the game. I show that there exists a uniquely predetermined settlement date, such that in equilibrium the players always reach an agreement at that date, but never reach one before it. Given any discount rate, if the learning is sufficiently slow, the players agree immediately. I show that, for any speed of learning, the agreement is delayed arbitrarily long, provided that the players are sufficiently patient. Therefore, although excessive optimism alone cannot cause delay, it can cause long delays if the players are expected to learn.

Many people believe in the "Law of Small Numbers," exaggerating the degree to which a small sample resembles the population from which it is drawn. To model this, I assume that a person exaggerates the likelihood that a short sequence of i.i.d. signals resembles the long-run rate at which those signals are generated. Such a person believes in the "gambler's fallacy", thinking early draws of one signal increase the odds of next drawing other signals. When uncertain about the rate, the person over-infers from short sequences of signals, and is prone to think the rate is more extreme than it is. When the person makes inferences about the frequency at which rates are generated by different sources --- such as the distribution of talent among financial analysts --- based on few observations from each source, he tends to exaggerate how much variance there is in the rates. Hence, the model predicts that people may pay for financial advice from "experts" whose expertise is entirely ...