This paper investigates the resource reallocation effected by content protection and content preference schemes under alternative assumptions regarding the definition of domestic content, the number of intermediate goods, and the market structure of the domestic intermediate good industry. Content protection is shown to be equivalent to a combination of more familiar commercial policies. However, the extent of application of these policies is determined endogenously by parameters of the production functions for intermediate and final goods. A number of anomalous and undesirable outcomes that may result from content protection and content preference are discussed.

The paper argues that appropriate domestic policies — more particularly, the real wage policy that is stressed here — can reduce the extent of foreign dependence of a country. It shows that foreign aid sufficient to achieve a given level of per capita domestic income is positively related to the real wages in an LDC with unemployment. The paper also links the level of real wages and the rate of technical change to the possibilities for self-sufficiency (from foreign aid) in the long run.

Journal Article Statistical cost Analysis Re-Revisited: Reply Get access James M. Griffin James M. Griffin University of Houston Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 96, Issue 1, February 1981, Pages 183–187, https://doi.org/10.2307/2936150 Published: 01 February 1981

It is argued that a full loss offset corporate tax with interest deductibility may reduce risk taking in that entrepreneurs might decrease the amount of investment made in risky projects with higher corporate tax rates. Unlike previous results in the literature, production functions with decreasing returns to scale and the possibility of equity financing of capital investment are allowed. A corporate tax that falls in part on the returns of equity owners or entrepreneurs can, under certain conditions, reduce risk taking. If the government taxes only risk, then a corporate tax with a full loss offset can encourage investment in risky projects.

Such issues as the freedom of speech or the right to vote are usually discussed as matters of principle or public policy, without concern for the preferences of the potential users of these rights. Yet it is interesting to see how strongly valued they are. This paper develops a method to derive the demand for legal and constitutional rights and rules, the values attached to them, and their sensitivity to income and education. The model is based on referendum data and on the interpretation of nonvoting behavior.

The effect of Social Security and private pensions on individual retirement decisions is modeled, relaxing in turn three commonly maintained assumptions—perfect capital markets, actuarial fairness, and certain lifetimes—which together imply that there is no effect. In each case, raising the contribution level can cause systematic changes (of either sign in general) in individual retirement decisions. For Social Security, the effects associated with forced saving and deviations from actuarial fairness probably tend to advance retirement. But those effects that arise solely from the insurance aspect of Social Security and private pensions are ambiguous in sign, owing to the presence of a substitution effect that tends to delay retirement because the insurance benefits can be fully realized only by working longer.

In a recent article A. Y. C. Koo [1973] sought to advance a “more general theory of land tenancy” and draw implications for land reform. While his contention that different models of share-tenancy (with conflicting efficiency properties) have different implications for land reform is correct, unfortunately, his mathematical analysis of oligopoly land market is both misleading and erroneous. It is misleading in the sense that it is not (as a close look at the model would verify) an oligopoly model of share-rental determination, which it purports to be. Thus, on this account, it is not really a critique of either Bardhan and Srinivasan [1971] or of Cheung [1974], which it claims to be.1 Rather it is an oligopoly model of determination of fixed-rental in the landlease market. If so, it loses much of its importance, at least empirically, since the fixed-rental system is of limited empirical significance. And the efficiency arguments for and against the share-rental lease, which he advances in the beginning, and also the land-reform question of reducing the share-rental become irrelevant for the analysis that follows. Second, even if we consider his mathematical argument on land renting on its own grounds, it is unfortunately marred by a mathematical flaw that prevails throughout his analysis and leads him to counterintuitive results. Section I gives a restatement of the Koo model and points to its errors and the resulting counterintuitive results. Section II reformulates the model in correct terms and shows how intuitively and empirically plausible results may be derived therefrom.