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Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(3), 871-915
We analyze the value placed by rational agents on self-confidence, and the strategies employed in its pursuit. Confidence in one's abilities generally enhances motivation, making it a valuable asset for individuals with imperfect willpower. This demand for self-serving beliefs (which can also arise from hedonic or signaling motives) must be weighed against the risks of overconfidence. On the supply side, we develop a model of self-deception through endogenous memory that reconciles the motivated and rational features of human cognition. The resulting intrapersonal game of strategic communication typically leads to multiple equilibria. While “positive thinking” can improve welfare, it can also be self-defeating (and nonetheless pursued).

The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(4), 1415-1451
The determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens is a key issue in political economy.Here we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems.Having a more informed an politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive.This suggests that there is a role both for democratic institutions and the mass media in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy.The ideas behind the model are tested on panel data from India.We show that public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure are greater, controlling for shocks, where governments face greater electoral accountability and where newspaper circulation is highest.

Junior Can't Borrow: A New Perspective on the Equity Premium Puzzle

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(1), 269-296
Ongoing questions on the historical mean and standard deviation of the return on equities and bonds and on the equilibrium demand for these securities are addressed in the context of a stationary, overlapping-generations economy in which consumers are subject to a borrowing constraint. The key feature captured by the OLG economy is that the bulk of the future income of the young consumers is derived from their wages forthcoming in their middle age, while the bulk of the future income of the middle-aged consumers is derived from their savings in equity and bonds. The young would like to borrow and invest in equity but the borrowing constraint prevents them from doing so. The middle-aged choose to hold a diversified portfolio that includes positive holdings of bonds and this explains the demand for bonds. Without the borrowing constraint, the young borrow and invest in equity, thereby decreasing the mean equity premium and increasing the rate of interest.

Why Have Women Become Left-Wing? The Political Gender Gap and the Decline in Marriage

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(3), 917-961
The last three decades have witnessed the rise of a pohtical gender gap in the United States wherein more women than men favor the Democratic party. We trace this development to the decline in marriage, which we posit has made men richer and women poorer. Data for the United States support this argument. First, there is a strong positive correlation between state divorce prevalence and the political gender gap—higher divorce prevalence reduces support for the Democrats among men but not women. Second, longitudinal data show that following marriage (divorce), women are less (more) likely to support the Democratic party.

Sticky Information versus Sticky Prices: A Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(4), 1295-1328 open access
This paper examines a model of dynamic price adjustment based on the assumption that information disseminates slowly throughout the population. Compared with the commonly used sticky-price model, this sticky-information model displays three related properties that are more consistent with accepted views about the effects of monetary policy. First, disinflations are always contractionary (although annoimced disinflations are less contractionary than surprise ones). Second, monetary policy shocks have their maximum impact on inflation with a substantial delay. Third, the change in inflation is positively correlated with the level of economic activity.

Currency Unions

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(2), 409-436 open access
Common currencies affect trading costs and, thereby, the amounts of trade, output, and consumption. From the perspective of monetary policy, the adoption of another country's currency trades off the benefits of commitment to price stability (if a committed anchor is selected) against the loss of an independent stabilization policy. We show that the type of country that has more to gain from giving up its own currency is a small open economy heavily trading with one particular large partner, with a history of high inflation and with a business cycle highly correlated with that of the potential “anchor.” We also characterize the features of the optimal number of currency unions.

An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic Effects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(4), 1329-1368
This paper characterizes the dynamic effects of shocks in government spending and taxes on U. S. activity in the postwar period. It does so by using a mixed structural VAR/event study approach. Identification is achieved by using institutional information about the tax and transfer systems to identify the automatic response of taxes and spending to activity, and, by implication, to infer fiscal shocks. The results consistently show positive government spending shocks as having a positive effect on output, and positive tax shocks as having a negative effect. One result has a distinctly nonstandard flavor: both increases in taxes and increases in government spending have a strong negative effect on investment spending.

Electoral Systems and Public Spending

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(2), 609-657
We study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public expenditure in OECD and Latin American countries. We emphasize the distinction between purchases of goods and services, which are easier to target geographically, and transfers, which are easier to target across social groups. We present a theoretical model in which voters anticipating government policymaking under different electoral systems have an incentive to elect representatives more prone to transfer (public good) spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems. The model also predicts higher total primary spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems when the share of transfer spending is high (low). After defining rigorous measures of proportionality to be used in the empirical investigation, we find considerable support for our predictions.

Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(1), 39-84
Relational contracts—informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships—are prevalent within and between firms. We develop repeated-game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms (vertical integration) differ from those between (nonintegration). We show that integration affects the parties' temptations to renege on a given relational contract, and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain. In this sense, the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties' relationship. Our approach also has implications for joint ventures, alliances, and networks, and for the role of management within and between firms.

The Regulation of Entry

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(1), 1-37 open access
Countries differ significantly in the way in which they regulate the entry of new businesses. To meet government requirements for starting to operate a business in Austria, an entrepreneur must complete 12 procedures taking at least 154 business days and pay US$11,612 in government fees. To do the same, an entrepreneur in Bolivia needs to follow 20 different procedures, pay US$2,696 in fees to the government and wait at least 82 business days to acquire the necessary permits. In contrast, an entrepreneur in Canada can finish the process in roughly 2 days by paying US$280 in government fees and completing only 2 procedures.