This paper establishes the existence of an equilibrium wage distribution for a labor market in which job seekers search sequentially. The search model shows why some workers will drop out of the market. Previous analysis of policies designed to reduce the number of dropouts was partial because wage distributions were exogenously given. Through the use of the equilibrium wage distribution implied by each policy, the analysis here shows that subsidizing search or imposing a minimum wage will reduce the number of dropouts, while a job training program or a reduction in unemployment compensation may either increase or decrease the number of dropouts. I In his article, "Economics of Information and Job Search " [1970], John McCall proposed a sequential search process that job seekers could use to screen the market for information. McCall's model pro-vided an intuitive explanation of why some workers decide to drop out of the labor market and several policies designed to reverse the dropout decision. However, the policy implications of the model have