Journal Article A Note on the Transactions Demand for Cash Get access Russell D. Morris Russell D. Morris Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 85, Issue 3, August 1971, Pages 546–547, https://doi.org/10.2307/1885942 Published: 01 August 1971

The causes of differences in cost, as to ore, 262–264; fuel, 264–267; limestone, 267; labor cost for iron and steel, 267–270.—The accumulated profits of the Steel Corporation, 270–272.—The results of its business for 1906, 272–273.

Dwight M. Jaffee, Thomas Russell; Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing: A Reply*, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 99, Issue 4, 1

I. Introduction, 651.—II. The model of borrowing behavior, 652.—III. Lender and market behavior under competitive conditions, 658.—IV. Market solutions under monopoly, 663.—V. Conclusion, 664.—VI. Appendix, 665.

Journal Article Bertrand Russell on Socialism Get access G. A. Kleene G. A. Kleene Teinitt College, Hartford, Conn Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 34, Issue 4, August 1920, Pages 756–762, https://doi.org/10.2307/1885165 Published: 01 August 1920

C. Russell Hill, Frank P. Stafford; Intergenerational Wealth Transfers and the Educational Decisions of Male Youth: An Alternative Interpretation, The Quar

Journal Article An Econometric Model of the Medicare System: Comment Get access Louise B. Russell Louise B. Russell National Planning Association, Washington, D.C. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 87, Issue 3, August 1973, Pages 482–489, https://doi.org/10.2307/1882017 Published: 01 August 1973

This paper focuses on the importance of strategic complementarities in agents' payoff functions as a basis for macroeconomic coordination failures. Strategic complementarities arise when the optimal strategy of an agent depends positively upon the strategies of the other agents. We first analyze an abstract game and find that multiple equilibria and a multiplier process may arise when strategic complementarities are present. Often these equilibria can be Pareto ranked. We then place additional economic content on the analysis of this game by considering strategic complementarities arising from production functions, matching technologies, and commodity demand functions in a multisector, imperfectly competitive economy.

We propose a Walrasian explanation for the existence of fixed prices, i.e., of trades in which either the price or the quantity exchanged does not reflect all publicly available information. Such trades result in a rigid price system that facilitates the sharing of social risks; they may also cause allocative distortions that increase the equilibrium price of insurance above its actuarially fair level. We demonstrate that the market for noncontingent claims is active only when this insurance "gain" outweighs the "cost" of allocative distortions. Fixed price equilibria are constrained optima, i.e., they cannot be dominated by an appropriately constrained central planner.

Introduction, 426. — I. The structure of the dual economy, 427. — II. Labor force growth and biased technological progress: comparative statics, 432. — III. Labor force growth and biased technological progress: dynamics, 435. — IV. A numerical experiment, 436. — V. Conclusion, 443. —Appendix A, 445. — Appendix B, 447.