Two basic tenets of the Walrasian model, behavior based on self-interested exogenous preferences and complete and costless contracting have recently come under critical scrutiny. First, social norms and psychological dispositions extending beyond the selfish motives of Homo economicus may have an important bearing on outcomes, even in competitive markets. Second, market outcomes depend on strategic interactions in which power in the political sense is exercised. It follows that economics must become more behavioral and more institutional. We can return to these themes of the classical tradition, now equipped with the more powerful mathematical tools developed over the past century.

Work by Kaplan and Zingales provides both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that investment-cash �ow sensitivities are not good indicators of �nancing constraints. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen {this Journal} criticize those �ndings. In this note we explain how the Fazzari et al. criticisms are either very supportive of the claims in earlier work by Kaplan and Zingales or incorrect. We conclude with a discussion of unanswered questions. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen {1988} (hereinafter, FHP {1988}) introduce a methodology to identify the presence of �nancing constraints based on the differential sensitivity of corporate investment to cash �ow. Kaplan and Zingales {1997} (hereinafter, KZ) provide both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that this differential sensitivity is not a valid measure of �nancing constraints. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen {2000} (hereinafter, FHP {2000}) criticize those �ndings. In this note we explain that the main arguments in FHP {2000} are, in fact, quite supportive of KZ’s main conclusion, while the speci�c criticisms in FHP {2000} are unjusti�ed. I. POINTS OF AGREEMENT FHP {2000} admit that �nancially distressed �rms are likely to have lower investment-cash �ow sensitivities than less �nancially constrained �rms. This is exactly the point that the KZ model makes: investment-cash �ow sensitivities are not necessarily monotonic in the degree of �nancing constraints. The only disagreement FHP {2000} have with KZ is how pervasive the nonmonotonicity result is. But this is ultimately an empirical question. FHP {2000} also recognize that the literature on investmentcash �ow sensitivities has not been based on a solid theoretical foundation. As KZ point out, the practice of (1) splitting the sample according to a measure of �nancing constraints and then

A recent paper in this Journal by Kaplan and Zingales reexamines a subset of firms from work of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen and criticizes the usefulness of investment-cash flow sensitivities for detecting financing constraints. We show that the Kaplan and Zingales theoretical model fails to capture the approach employed in the literature and thus does not provide an effective critique. Moreover, we describe why their empirical classification system is flawed in identifYing both whether firms are constrained and the relative degree of constraints across firm groups. We conclude that their results do not support their conclusions about the usefulness of investment-cash flow sensitivities.